altercation developed into large-scale clashes between Arabs and Jews. These riots seem to be the turning point for the mufti. The controversy involved the question of sovereignty over the Al-Aqsa Mosque and the Dome on the Rock, both built over the Jewish Temple a millennium earlier and under the administration of Muslims. Arabs feared a Jewish takeover of the site they consider the third-holiest shrine in Islam.
While the British worked on yet another White Paper, the mufti turned the issue into an international Islamic campaign, asking Muslims worldwide to help him save the Dome from the hands of the Jews. If he had any illusions that the British would honour their private promises to him, an exchange in London in May 1930 revealed the true attitude of Britain towards Palestine. The mufti and a number of Palestinian “notables” met with Labour prime minister Ramsay MacDonald and his socialist secretary of state for Dominion affairs, Lord Passfield (formerly Sidney Webb, the well-known Fabian and author), to review the ramifications of the bloody clashes between Jews and Arabs that had occurred in 1928–29, and look at the options available to resolve the Palestine Question.
The mufti and his team argued their case on the basis of Article 4 of the League of Nations Covenant, under which the British were awarded the mandate in Palestine. Article 4 recognized the mandated territories as “independent states,” yet the British wouldn’t budge on the question of creating a Jewish national home in Palestine. In fact, MacDonald brushed aside the Arab argument as “irrelevant.” Lord Passfield rubbed salt into the wound by lecturing his Palestinian guests: “Your position is inferior to that of a colony and it is our duty under the Mandate to endeavour that you should rise to the point of a Colony.” Shocked, the mufti asked, “Do you mean we are below the Negroes of Africa?” Passfield reassured him that they were not, but that they were “less than” some other colonies. Raghib al-Nashashibi lamented, “We had a government of our own in which we participated. We had Parliaments” (referring to the Ottoman Parliament before the British occupation). Sitting next to him was Hajj al-Husayni, the very man who had contributed to the defeat of the Parliament the two Palestinians were now moaning about. The arguments of the Palestinians fell on deaf ears. They were admonished by the British prime minister to “get back into the Iron Cage.” 10
However, when Lord Passfield came out with his White Paper, the Arabs were overjoyed. To the outrage of the Zionists in the cabinet and among the Jewish population, he recommended that all Jewish immigration to Palestine be suspended. Prime Minister MacDonald was forced to distance himself from the paper in a “letter of clarification” to Chaim Weizmann, president of the World Zionist Organisation. Among Arabs the letter became known as the “Black Letter” that killed the White Paper. Seeing a dead end, the mufti turned to the Muslim world and organised an International Islamic Conference to drum up support for his cause.
In December 1931 the General Islamic Congress met in Jerusalem. Prominent among the delegates were Rashid Rida, the EgyptianSalafist; Muhammad Iqbal, the Indian philosopher-poet; and Shawkat Ali, the head of India’s Khilafat Movement that had rallied in defence of the Ottoman caliphate, the very institution the mufti had helped defeat. Turkey and Saudi Arabia stayed away. But even after days of deliberation, the only thing that emerged beyond rhetoric was the decision to establish an Islamic university in Jerusalem, as if Al-Azhar and the countless other madrassahs were not enough. While the frustrations of the Palestinian people grew, the conference of world Muslims offered them mere platitudes and prayers. The delegates had obviously forgotten that a large number of Palestinians were Christians.
By the time the Palestinian uprising began in 1936,
While the British worked on yet another White Paper, the mufti turned the issue into an international Islamic campaign, asking Muslims worldwide to help him save the Dome from the hands of the Jews. If he had any illusions that the British would honour their private promises to him, an exchange in London in May 1930 revealed the true attitude of Britain towards Palestine. The mufti and a number of Palestinian “notables” met with Labour prime minister Ramsay MacDonald and his socialist secretary of state for Dominion affairs, Lord Passfield (formerly Sidney Webb, the well-known Fabian and author), to review the ramifications of the bloody clashes between Jews and Arabs that had occurred in 1928–29, and look at the options available to resolve the Palestine Question.
The mufti and his team argued their case on the basis of Article 4 of the League of Nations Covenant, under which the British were awarded the mandate in Palestine. Article 4 recognized the mandated territories as “independent states,” yet the British wouldn’t budge on the question of creating a Jewish national home in Palestine. In fact, MacDonald brushed aside the Arab argument as “irrelevant.” Lord Passfield rubbed salt into the wound by lecturing his Palestinian guests: “Your position is inferior to that of a colony and it is our duty under the Mandate to endeavour that you should rise to the point of a Colony.” Shocked, the mufti asked, “Do you mean we are below the Negroes of Africa?” Passfield reassured him that they were not, but that they were “less than” some other colonies. Raghib al-Nashashibi lamented, “We had a government of our own in which we participated. We had Parliaments” (referring to the Ottoman Parliament before the British occupation). Sitting next to him was Hajj al-Husayni, the very man who had contributed to the defeat of the Parliament the two Palestinians were now moaning about. The arguments of the Palestinians fell on deaf ears. They were admonished by the British prime minister to “get back into the Iron Cage.” 10
However, when Lord Passfield came out with his White Paper, the Arabs were overjoyed. To the outrage of the Zionists in the cabinet and among the Jewish population, he recommended that all Jewish immigration to Palestine be suspended. Prime Minister MacDonald was forced to distance himself from the paper in a “letter of clarification” to Chaim Weizmann, president of the World Zionist Organisation. Among Arabs the letter became known as the “Black Letter” that killed the White Paper. Seeing a dead end, the mufti turned to the Muslim world and organised an International Islamic Conference to drum up support for his cause.
In December 1931 the General Islamic Congress met in Jerusalem. Prominent among the delegates were Rashid Rida, the EgyptianSalafist; Muhammad Iqbal, the Indian philosopher-poet; and Shawkat Ali, the head of India’s Khilafat Movement that had rallied in defence of the Ottoman caliphate, the very institution the mufti had helped defeat. Turkey and Saudi Arabia stayed away. But even after days of deliberation, the only thing that emerged beyond rhetoric was the decision to establish an Islamic university in Jerusalem, as if Al-Azhar and the countless other madrassahs were not enough. While the frustrations of the Palestinian people grew, the conference of world Muslims offered them mere platitudes and prayers. The delegates had obviously forgotten that a large number of Palestinians were Christians.
By the time the Palestinian uprising began in 1936,
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