mufti chose to come to the table to highlight the plight of the most vulnerable among the Palestinians. The economic interests of Arab orchard farmers played a role as well. The Spanish Civil War was at its peak, causing citrus prices to soar in Europe. If the strike by Palestinian farmers continued, they would not benefit at all from the shortages created by the war in Spain.
As soon as the hostilities ceased, the British acted. Within a month, a royal commission was set up to examine the underlying causes of the disturbances in Palestine. William Robert Wellesley, Earl Peel, who had been Britain’s secretary of state for India in 1922, headed the commission. The earl arrived in Jerusalem in November 1936, got down to work immediately, and stayed in Palestine less than three months. For most of his stay, the Arabs boycotted the commission, feeling it had come with a preconceived notion about the conflict. However, the 400-page Peel Commission report contained a surprising admission. It stated in unequivocal terms that the British Mandate could no longer be maintained and needed to be replaced by new treaty arrangementsbetween the parties. For the first time, the notion of a single state based on the Balfour Declaration was abandoned. The report described the dilemma faced by the British in unflattering terms.
“An irrepressible conflict has arisen between two national communities within the narrow bounds of one small country. There is no common ground between them. Their national aspirations are incompatible. The Arabs desire to revive the traditions of the Arab golden age. The Jews desire to show what they can achieve when restored to the land in which the Jewish nation was born. Neither of the two national ideals permits of combination in the service of a single State.”
Instead, the Peel Commission proposed a “partition” of Mandate Palestine into an Arab state and a Jewish state. In hindsight, this was a bonanza for the Arabs. Most of Mandate Palestine (70 per cent) was to remain in the Arab state, including all of the Negev to Nablus in the north and Gaza in the west. The Jewish homeland (20 per cent) was restricted to the northwest and included the Galilee, Tel Aviv, and Haifa, while a corridor from Jaffa to Jerusalem would remain under a fresh British mandate. There was one catch: the Arab area was to be merged with Transjordan, which was originally part of the Palestine Mandate and had been carved out as a separate kingdom in 1922.
Surprisingly, the Zionists gave the proposal a qualified approval, but true to tradition, the Arab leadership rejected the plan. Hajj al-Husayni, who presided over the Arab Higher Committee, called for a wholesale rejection of the plan and the creation of an Arab state in all of Palestine. (Hamas still clings to this hope.) With war clouds gathering in Europe, terror was introduced for the first time as a weapon in the conflict. On September 26, 1937, a senior British civil servant, Lewis Andrews, was assassinated in Nazareth. Although the Arab Higher Committee condemned the killing, the British administration outlawed the group and all the strike committees across Palestine. Leading politicians were arrested and some were deported to distant Seychelles in the Indian Ocean.
The mufti went into hiding in the Al-Aqsa Mosque compound while the British proscribed the Supreme Muslim Council, dismissed him from his positions, and impounded all the endowments that al-Husayni represented. The mufti’s remarkable double role as a spokesman for the Arab cause and a salaried official of the British Crown had come to an end.
Within weeks, Hajj al-Husayni scurried off to Lebanon – disguised as a woman – escaping the British dragnet in much the same way as, decades later, Mullah Omar and Osama bin Laden wore burqas and gave the slip to the Americans. From Lebanon, where he was briefly arrested by the French, al-Husayni tried to control the uprising in Palestine, but the movement had
As soon as the hostilities ceased, the British acted. Within a month, a royal commission was set up to examine the underlying causes of the disturbances in Palestine. William Robert Wellesley, Earl Peel, who had been Britain’s secretary of state for India in 1922, headed the commission. The earl arrived in Jerusalem in November 1936, got down to work immediately, and stayed in Palestine less than three months. For most of his stay, the Arabs boycotted the commission, feeling it had come with a preconceived notion about the conflict. However, the 400-page Peel Commission report contained a surprising admission. It stated in unequivocal terms that the British Mandate could no longer be maintained and needed to be replaced by new treaty arrangementsbetween the parties. For the first time, the notion of a single state based on the Balfour Declaration was abandoned. The report described the dilemma faced by the British in unflattering terms.
“An irrepressible conflict has arisen between two national communities within the narrow bounds of one small country. There is no common ground between them. Their national aspirations are incompatible. The Arabs desire to revive the traditions of the Arab golden age. The Jews desire to show what they can achieve when restored to the land in which the Jewish nation was born. Neither of the two national ideals permits of combination in the service of a single State.”
Instead, the Peel Commission proposed a “partition” of Mandate Palestine into an Arab state and a Jewish state. In hindsight, this was a bonanza for the Arabs. Most of Mandate Palestine (70 per cent) was to remain in the Arab state, including all of the Negev to Nablus in the north and Gaza in the west. The Jewish homeland (20 per cent) was restricted to the northwest and included the Galilee, Tel Aviv, and Haifa, while a corridor from Jaffa to Jerusalem would remain under a fresh British mandate. There was one catch: the Arab area was to be merged with Transjordan, which was originally part of the Palestine Mandate and had been carved out as a separate kingdom in 1922.
Surprisingly, the Zionists gave the proposal a qualified approval, but true to tradition, the Arab leadership rejected the plan. Hajj al-Husayni, who presided over the Arab Higher Committee, called for a wholesale rejection of the plan and the creation of an Arab state in all of Palestine. (Hamas still clings to this hope.) With war clouds gathering in Europe, terror was introduced for the first time as a weapon in the conflict. On September 26, 1937, a senior British civil servant, Lewis Andrews, was assassinated in Nazareth. Although the Arab Higher Committee condemned the killing, the British administration outlawed the group and all the strike committees across Palestine. Leading politicians were arrested and some were deported to distant Seychelles in the Indian Ocean.
The mufti went into hiding in the Al-Aqsa Mosque compound while the British proscribed the Supreme Muslim Council, dismissed him from his positions, and impounded all the endowments that al-Husayni represented. The mufti’s remarkable double role as a spokesman for the Arab cause and a salaried official of the British Crown had come to an end.
Within weeks, Hajj al-Husayni scurried off to Lebanon – disguised as a woman – escaping the British dragnet in much the same way as, decades later, Mullah Omar and Osama bin Laden wore burqas and gave the slip to the Americans. From Lebanon, where he was briefly arrested by the French, al-Husayni tried to control the uprising in Palestine, but the movement had
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