This was war by budget! That in itself is not bad, if the budget fits the combat situation. In FY 74, the budget was tight but workable. We had to ensure that our allies maximized their combat power within the budget restrictions. Currently, the rates of ammunition expenditures in both South Vietnam ($544 million) and Cambodia ($301 million) were far greater than the approved congressional funding would support, thereby necessitating the undesirable drawdown of ammunition stocks as well as precluding the requisitioning of other necessary items. The major expenditures creating across-the-board funding shortfalls were in ammunition, so this was where we concentrated.
The estimated quantity of conventional ammunition required per day to sustain operations in an active theater is called a day of supply (DOS). A DOS is calculated by multiplying the weapons density by the supply rate. The force structure that determines the weapons density and the rate of supply are the key factors. Some ammunition definitions are in order. First, required supply rate (RSR) is the amount of ammunition expressed in rounds per weapon per day for ammunition to support tactical operations. Authorized supply rate (ASR), now called the controlled supply rate, is the amount of ammunition estimated to be available to sustain operations of a designated force for a specified time if expenditures are controlled at that rate. Daily expenditure rate is the average rate of expenditures per day, over a givenperiod of time. And, finally, intensive combat rate is the amount of ammunition expressed in rounds per weapon per day required to sustain heavy-intensity combat.
All of the supply rates in Southeast Asia varied with combat intensity, which could be seasonal and/or dependent upon friendly and enemy actions. The DOS varied with the weapons densities. The optimum situation was to have sufficient ammo so that the controlled supply rate (ASR) equaled the tactical commanderâs requirements (RSR) and to have daily expenditure rates equal to or below the ASR. However, in Southeast Asia the unavailability of funding, transportation, or stockage levels required the authorized supply rate to be below tactical requirements (RSR), and, generally, the daily expenditure rate was in excess of the authorized supply rate.
Comparative RSRs
Our first step was to compare the RSRs of the ARVN and the Cambodian armed forces (FANK) to those of the United States. Table 8 compares the Cambodian and South Vietnamese rates at the time with those of the United States under inactive combat. Both Southeast Asia RSRs were significantly below the lowest level of American RSRs. Measured against U.S. standards, ammo expenditures in South Vietnam and Cambodia were low. However, measured against the restrictive congressional funding levels, they were excessive.
Table 8. Comparative Required Supply Rates, Rounds per Weapon per Day, October 1973
Source
: Authorized country RSRs as of October 1973.
Ammunition Conservation
In mid-December 1973, General Vien, the RVNAF chief of staff, asked Major General Murray if the DAO could make an analysis of army artillery expenditures. Murray passed this request to USSAG, knowing that we were already attempting to get a handle on the Cambodian ammunition situation. It was obvious to all concerned that with the reduced FY 74 funding levels some solution concerning ammunition expenditures had to be found. Since artillery ammo made up 75 percent of ARVN ammo tonnage and more than 50 percent of the costs, artillery was the critical line item in South Vietnam.
In South Vietnam, shortly after the cease-fire and before the full departure of American forces, the JGS arrived at the understanding that there had to be a cutback in ammunition expenditures. On 12 March 1973 a JGS memorandum from General Vien with the subject of âRestricted Employment of Artillery and Tactical Airâ was distributed to all corps, divisions, and major units as well as the
The estimated quantity of conventional ammunition required per day to sustain operations in an active theater is called a day of supply (DOS). A DOS is calculated by multiplying the weapons density by the supply rate. The force structure that determines the weapons density and the rate of supply are the key factors. Some ammunition definitions are in order. First, required supply rate (RSR) is the amount of ammunition expressed in rounds per weapon per day for ammunition to support tactical operations. Authorized supply rate (ASR), now called the controlled supply rate, is the amount of ammunition estimated to be available to sustain operations of a designated force for a specified time if expenditures are controlled at that rate. Daily expenditure rate is the average rate of expenditures per day, over a givenperiod of time. And, finally, intensive combat rate is the amount of ammunition expressed in rounds per weapon per day required to sustain heavy-intensity combat.
All of the supply rates in Southeast Asia varied with combat intensity, which could be seasonal and/or dependent upon friendly and enemy actions. The DOS varied with the weapons densities. The optimum situation was to have sufficient ammo so that the controlled supply rate (ASR) equaled the tactical commanderâs requirements (RSR) and to have daily expenditure rates equal to or below the ASR. However, in Southeast Asia the unavailability of funding, transportation, or stockage levels required the authorized supply rate to be below tactical requirements (RSR), and, generally, the daily expenditure rate was in excess of the authorized supply rate.
Comparative RSRs
Our first step was to compare the RSRs of the ARVN and the Cambodian armed forces (FANK) to those of the United States. Table 8 compares the Cambodian and South Vietnamese rates at the time with those of the United States under inactive combat. Both Southeast Asia RSRs were significantly below the lowest level of American RSRs. Measured against U.S. standards, ammo expenditures in South Vietnam and Cambodia were low. However, measured against the restrictive congressional funding levels, they were excessive.
Table 8. Comparative Required Supply Rates, Rounds per Weapon per Day, October 1973
Source
: Authorized country RSRs as of October 1973.
Ammunition Conservation
In mid-December 1973, General Vien, the RVNAF chief of staff, asked Major General Murray if the DAO could make an analysis of army artillery expenditures. Murray passed this request to USSAG, knowing that we were already attempting to get a handle on the Cambodian ammunition situation. It was obvious to all concerned that with the reduced FY 74 funding levels some solution concerning ammunition expenditures had to be found. Since artillery ammo made up 75 percent of ARVN ammo tonnage and more than 50 percent of the costs, artillery was the critical line item in South Vietnam.
In South Vietnam, shortly after the cease-fire and before the full departure of American forces, the JGS arrived at the understanding that there had to be a cutback in ammunition expenditures. On 12 March 1973 a JGS memorandum from General Vien with the subject of âRestricted Employment of Artillery and Tactical Airâ was distributed to all corps, divisions, and major units as well as the
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