By now House undoubtedly knew that this acceptance had been mere lip service to pry the guns out of the Germans’ hands. Clinging to it only underscored his growing anxiety. 27
VII
On Armistice Day, Wilson had gone before Congress to announce the good news of the war’s cessation and the approach of a peace of “disinterested justice.” He pointed to the way the victorious governments were displaying their “humane temper” by a unanimous resolution in the Supreme War Council to supply the people of Germany and Austria-Hungary with food and fuel to relieve “the distressing want that is in so many places threatening their very lives.” 28
In the preliminary talks about the Fourteen Points, House had already pushed the importance of feeding a starved German population. But hehad been unable to alter the British determination to maintain the blockade. House’s solution was an urgent cable to Woodrow Wilson, asking him to send Herbert Hoover, the savior of starving Belgium, to Paris as soon as possible to take charge of the problem.
Few people knew that Hoover had spent as much time arguing with the British as with the Germans about getting food to the Belgians. The “poor little Belgium” of British propaganda meant little to the British admirals and bureaucrats who were sure the Germans would make off with the victuals. First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill, who favored letting the Belgians starve and blaming the Germans, called Hoover “a son of a bitch.” Hoover responded by calling the admiralty “the sanctuary of British militarists.” 29
Hoover was proud of his achievement in Belgium and instantly accepted the challenge of feeding the defeated enemy—and the rest of Europe, which was almost as hungry. Before he departed, he arranged for the shipment of 250,000 tons of foodstuffs to various European harbors. On the day he sailed, Hoover issued a statement from shipboard, calling for a relaxation of the “watertight blockade.” He warned that otherwise, anarchy would reign and there would be no government to make peace with and no one to pay for the damage done to Belgium and France. 30
The exhortation and Hoover’s unilateral shipment of food had zero impact. When Hoover got to London, one of the top people in the British Food Ministry told him to stop making public statements about the blockade. The British government was opposed to lifting it “until the Germans learn a few things.” Not quite able to believe what he had heard, Hoover watched numbly as Lloyd George waged his “make the Hun pay” election campaign. In London’s newspapers, stories about German hunger were headed “Feeding the Beast” and “Germany Whines—Limits of Endurance Reached.” worsening matters was a British decision to forbid the German Baltic fishing fleet to catch so much as a herring, depriving the enemy of a source of food they had depended on throughout the war. This extension of the blockade began the day the armistice was signed. Heretofore, the British navy had had no access to the Baltic Sea. 31
From London, Hoover sent an assistant into Germany to obtain a thorough report of the country’s situation. He brought back a study by the German National Health Office, describing a nation on the brink of mass starvation. To verify this portrait, Hoover sent a three-man team of American experts, who brought back even more dolorous facts. Most Germans were suffering from chronic malnutrition. The grain harvest, normally 30 million tons, had fallen to 16 million because of bad weather and lack of hands to harvest it. In north Germany, eight hundred adults were dying of starvation every day. 32
Hoover reported the situation to Wilson, still in Washington, and the president ordered House to present a plan to the Allied governments, making Hoover director general of relief with the authority to lift the blockade and get food into Germany without delay. The Allies’ reaction was coldly negative. With
VII
On Armistice Day, Wilson had gone before Congress to announce the good news of the war’s cessation and the approach of a peace of “disinterested justice.” He pointed to the way the victorious governments were displaying their “humane temper” by a unanimous resolution in the Supreme War Council to supply the people of Germany and Austria-Hungary with food and fuel to relieve “the distressing want that is in so many places threatening their very lives.” 28
In the preliminary talks about the Fourteen Points, House had already pushed the importance of feeding a starved German population. But hehad been unable to alter the British determination to maintain the blockade. House’s solution was an urgent cable to Woodrow Wilson, asking him to send Herbert Hoover, the savior of starving Belgium, to Paris as soon as possible to take charge of the problem.
Few people knew that Hoover had spent as much time arguing with the British as with the Germans about getting food to the Belgians. The “poor little Belgium” of British propaganda meant little to the British admirals and bureaucrats who were sure the Germans would make off with the victuals. First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill, who favored letting the Belgians starve and blaming the Germans, called Hoover “a son of a bitch.” Hoover responded by calling the admiralty “the sanctuary of British militarists.” 29
Hoover was proud of his achievement in Belgium and instantly accepted the challenge of feeding the defeated enemy—and the rest of Europe, which was almost as hungry. Before he departed, he arranged for the shipment of 250,000 tons of foodstuffs to various European harbors. On the day he sailed, Hoover issued a statement from shipboard, calling for a relaxation of the “watertight blockade.” He warned that otherwise, anarchy would reign and there would be no government to make peace with and no one to pay for the damage done to Belgium and France. 30
The exhortation and Hoover’s unilateral shipment of food had zero impact. When Hoover got to London, one of the top people in the British Food Ministry told him to stop making public statements about the blockade. The British government was opposed to lifting it “until the Germans learn a few things.” Not quite able to believe what he had heard, Hoover watched numbly as Lloyd George waged his “make the Hun pay” election campaign. In London’s newspapers, stories about German hunger were headed “Feeding the Beast” and “Germany Whines—Limits of Endurance Reached.” worsening matters was a British decision to forbid the German Baltic fishing fleet to catch so much as a herring, depriving the enemy of a source of food they had depended on throughout the war. This extension of the blockade began the day the armistice was signed. Heretofore, the British navy had had no access to the Baltic Sea. 31
From London, Hoover sent an assistant into Germany to obtain a thorough report of the country’s situation. He brought back a study by the German National Health Office, describing a nation on the brink of mass starvation. To verify this portrait, Hoover sent a three-man team of American experts, who brought back even more dolorous facts. Most Germans were suffering from chronic malnutrition. The grain harvest, normally 30 million tons, had fallen to 16 million because of bad weather and lack of hands to harvest it. In north Germany, eight hundred adults were dying of starvation every day. 32
Hoover reported the situation to Wilson, still in Washington, and the president ordered House to present a plan to the Allied governments, making Hoover director general of relief with the authority to lift the blockade and get food into Germany without delay. The Allies’ reaction was coldly negative. With
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