interrelation of tactics and ammunition when it succinctly stated in its memo that ammo consumption must be related to enemy actions. No conservation plan is sound unless correlated with combat activities, and, conversely, there can be no understanding of ammunition expenditures without concomitant knowledge of the tactical situation.
Considering the tactical situations as they related to artillery ammo, I arrived at a formula that primarily provided a measure for the level of combat intensity.
It must be pointed out in the strongest terms that no formula will provide an exact measurement. A major advantage for calculating periodic combat intensity factors (CIFs) was that they provided meaningful measurements of combat intensities over time. It was obvious from the streams of combat data that the North Vietnamese were increasing their combat levels. They conducted many more attacks by fire, and at the time the scope of their ground attacks was escalating from regimental to divisional units. Therefore, we believed that measuring and reporting on the intensities of combat would allow the parties in Washington to judge whether or not additional funding was required to enable the South Vietnamese to combat the increasingly blatant communist aggression. The CIF was developed as a macroscopic measurement of the combat level and was considered an average over many units within a military region. We emphasized that the recommended rates were gross estimates only and should be used as such.
This measurement of the combat intensity level related artillery responses to combat activities. It provided limited artillery allocations for counterbattery, close ground support, and 15 percent for interdictions. It was event oriented in that it considered the number of attacks by fire and ground contacts, and intensity oriented in that it provided additional artillery for major contacts depending upon casualty rates. Battle casualties are the most realistic measures of combat intensity, and 25 percent of all RVNAF losses were from ABFs ( table 16 ). When the ABFportion of the CIF was computed for four six-month periods it varied from 22 to 25 percent, closely correlated to actual battle casualties.
To provide the ARVN with a conservation plan aimed at determining a reasonable level of artillery capabilities, it was necessary to relate expenditures to the level of combat, choose a baseline for computation purposes, take measurements weekly for each MR and the country as a whole, and take measurements that provided absolute as well as relative criteria. The chief of the joint general staff had issued his ammo conservation memorandum to the corps commanders on 24 January 1974. Consequently, the baseline was taken from 29 June 1973 to 24 January 1974, a period without any conservation. Five weeks were allowed for the units to adjust to the new conservation program, and the conservation period was then measured from 1 March 1974 through the final data input on 27 March 1975. We computed the levels of combat, and thus the artillery allowances, every week for each military region and the country as a whole. This enabled absolute as well as relative comparisons to be made. In that way, the JGS could compare conservation results among the military regions. 52
The army made great progress conserving ammunition in the first twenty-four weeks of the conservation period, 1 March 1974 to 15 August 1974. It reduced artillery expenditures by 40 percent, although troops were still firing in excess of the computed allowances. Regardless of their progress in conservation, however, by August 1974 ground ammunition was a very pressing problem. The ARVNâs FY 75 ammo budget was only $262 million; in July expenditures amounted to $28 million and in August $50 million, an annual rate of expenditures of about $470 million. Thus, in two months it had spent 30 percent of its budget, creating a potentially serious drawdown of stocks. But the level of combat had
Considering the tactical situations as they related to artillery ammo, I arrived at a formula that primarily provided a measure for the level of combat intensity.
It must be pointed out in the strongest terms that no formula will provide an exact measurement. A major advantage for calculating periodic combat intensity factors (CIFs) was that they provided meaningful measurements of combat intensities over time. It was obvious from the streams of combat data that the North Vietnamese were increasing their combat levels. They conducted many more attacks by fire, and at the time the scope of their ground attacks was escalating from regimental to divisional units. Therefore, we believed that measuring and reporting on the intensities of combat would allow the parties in Washington to judge whether or not additional funding was required to enable the South Vietnamese to combat the increasingly blatant communist aggression. The CIF was developed as a macroscopic measurement of the combat level and was considered an average over many units within a military region. We emphasized that the recommended rates were gross estimates only and should be used as such.
This measurement of the combat intensity level related artillery responses to combat activities. It provided limited artillery allocations for counterbattery, close ground support, and 15 percent for interdictions. It was event oriented in that it considered the number of attacks by fire and ground contacts, and intensity oriented in that it provided additional artillery for major contacts depending upon casualty rates. Battle casualties are the most realistic measures of combat intensity, and 25 percent of all RVNAF losses were from ABFs ( table 16 ). When the ABFportion of the CIF was computed for four six-month periods it varied from 22 to 25 percent, closely correlated to actual battle casualties.
To provide the ARVN with a conservation plan aimed at determining a reasonable level of artillery capabilities, it was necessary to relate expenditures to the level of combat, choose a baseline for computation purposes, take measurements weekly for each MR and the country as a whole, and take measurements that provided absolute as well as relative criteria. The chief of the joint general staff had issued his ammo conservation memorandum to the corps commanders on 24 January 1974. Consequently, the baseline was taken from 29 June 1973 to 24 January 1974, a period without any conservation. Five weeks were allowed for the units to adjust to the new conservation program, and the conservation period was then measured from 1 March 1974 through the final data input on 27 March 1975. We computed the levels of combat, and thus the artillery allowances, every week for each military region and the country as a whole. This enabled absolute as well as relative comparisons to be made. In that way, the JGS could compare conservation results among the military regions. 52
The army made great progress conserving ammunition in the first twenty-four weeks of the conservation period, 1 March 1974 to 15 August 1974. It reduced artillery expenditures by 40 percent, although troops were still firing in excess of the computed allowances. Regardless of their progress in conservation, however, by August 1974 ground ammunition was a very pressing problem. The ARVNâs FY 75 ammo budget was only $262 million; in July expenditures amounted to $28 million and in August $50 million, an annual rate of expenditures of about $470 million. Thus, in two months it had spent 30 percent of its budget, creating a potentially serious drawdown of stocks. But the level of combat had
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