air force. It stated that if responsible officials did not restrict the usage of ammunition, a shortage would certainly come and that artillery and air should be employed only when the unitâs organic crew-served weapons (machine guns, mortars, and recoilless rifles) had been fully employed. It also restricted the use of harassment and interdiction fires. Units were authorized to fire only within their prescribed ammo loads. The memorandum concluded: âThe abundant and nearly unlimited artillery and air support in the recent past does not exist at present, so it is necessary to get the troops morally prepared to accept it and to get familiarized with our restricted means in this phase of self-sufficiency and self-development.â 295
Relating Ammunition Usage to Combat Levels
The RVNAF was indeed predisposed to the conservation of ammunitionâthey just required assistance in getting a handle on the problem. The question, then, was whether current artillery expenditures were reasonable and whether steps could be taken to ensure adequate firepower at reduced rates. There are many factors in the ammunition equation: rates of supply, density of weapons, organization of forces, types of ammunition, cost of line items, conservation measures, and levels of combat. Of these, only the level of combat was in part dictated by the enemyâallother factors were under friendly control. Therefore, it was important to relate artillery responses to known combat activities. The ARVN had kept excellent data on enemy attacks by fire and ground contacts. USSAG then considered four types of activities that resulted in artillery expenditures: counterbattery in response to enemy attacks by fire, artillery support of minor contacts, artillery support of major contacts, and harassment and interdiction fires. Close air and artillery support of troops in contact is a function of the intensity of conflict and is less for minor contacts and more for prolonged intensive fighting. In late 1973, this was still a war of attrition; 50 percent of all ground contacts reported resulted in one or fewer casualtiesâthat is, friendly killed or wounded or enemy killed. Not much artillery should be employed in support of minor contacts. However, in major contacts, where fierce fighting often occurred over prolonged periods, a large amount of artillery support was absolutely essential to meaningful fire and maneuver tactics. There was obviously a requirement for counterbattery fires in response to enemy attacks by fire and also a requirement for limited interdictive fires.
USSAG responded quickly to the DAO and JGS request for an analysis of artillery expenditures. We initially calculated artillery allocations for 29 June through 6 December 1973. We took the number of tubes in each military region into consideration and computed the total rounds per tube fired. The results were eye-opening; some military regions, particularly MR-2, used far more artillery ammo than others, even considering the level of combat. As a result of this initial analysis, the joint staff set about drafting an ammunition conservation memorandum, issued to corps commanders on 24 January 1974. The staff also asked USSAG to develop an ammunition conservation program. It required a formula for what could be considered a reasonable response to enemy activities, using as its base the four aforementioned types of combat. It was important to keep in mind the interrelationship of ammunition and tactics. The Army Field Manual 101-10-1 states: âAmmunition directly influences tactical operations. Therefore, tactical commanders must plan their operations and commit their forces with full awareness of the support capabilities of the ammunition service support structure ⦠an imbalance of either tactics or ammunition service may decisively influence operationsâ¦. Ammunition demands vary in direct ratio to the intensity of combat.â 296 The jointstaff recognized the
Relating Ammunition Usage to Combat Levels
The RVNAF was indeed predisposed to the conservation of ammunitionâthey just required assistance in getting a handle on the problem. The question, then, was whether current artillery expenditures were reasonable and whether steps could be taken to ensure adequate firepower at reduced rates. There are many factors in the ammunition equation: rates of supply, density of weapons, organization of forces, types of ammunition, cost of line items, conservation measures, and levels of combat. Of these, only the level of combat was in part dictated by the enemyâallother factors were under friendly control. Therefore, it was important to relate artillery responses to known combat activities. The ARVN had kept excellent data on enemy attacks by fire and ground contacts. USSAG then considered four types of activities that resulted in artillery expenditures: counterbattery in response to enemy attacks by fire, artillery support of minor contacts, artillery support of major contacts, and harassment and interdiction fires. Close air and artillery support of troops in contact is a function of the intensity of conflict and is less for minor contacts and more for prolonged intensive fighting. In late 1973, this was still a war of attrition; 50 percent of all ground contacts reported resulted in one or fewer casualtiesâthat is, friendly killed or wounded or enemy killed. Not much artillery should be employed in support of minor contacts. However, in major contacts, where fierce fighting often occurred over prolonged periods, a large amount of artillery support was absolutely essential to meaningful fire and maneuver tactics. There was obviously a requirement for counterbattery fires in response to enemy attacks by fire and also a requirement for limited interdictive fires.
USSAG responded quickly to the DAO and JGS request for an analysis of artillery expenditures. We initially calculated artillery allocations for 29 June through 6 December 1973. We took the number of tubes in each military region into consideration and computed the total rounds per tube fired. The results were eye-opening; some military regions, particularly MR-2, used far more artillery ammo than others, even considering the level of combat. As a result of this initial analysis, the joint staff set about drafting an ammunition conservation memorandum, issued to corps commanders on 24 January 1974. The staff also asked USSAG to develop an ammunition conservation program. It required a formula for what could be considered a reasonable response to enemy activities, using as its base the four aforementioned types of combat. It was important to keep in mind the interrelationship of ammunition and tactics. The Army Field Manual 101-10-1 states: âAmmunition directly influences tactical operations. Therefore, tactical commanders must plan their operations and commit their forces with full awareness of the support capabilities of the ammunition service support structure ⦠an imbalance of either tactics or ammunition service may decisively influence operationsâ¦. Ammunition demands vary in direct ratio to the intensity of combat.â 296 The jointstaff recognized the
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