would be maintaining an ever-productive relationship with locals in areas where SOF conducted direct-action raids. The Marines of 3/3 worked day and night to establish and strengthen ties with the Afghan people as soon as they hit the ground in AO Trinity, developing strong bonds over weeks and months that led to multisource human intelligence. This “HUMINT” led to scores of weapons-cache discoveries and the identification of enemy hideouts. Just as important— more important in the minds of many—3/3’s COIN campaign fostered bonds of trust and friendship between the Marines and the locals, helping to legitimize the national government in the minds of Afghans living in some of the farthest recesses of the Hindu Kush.
But a one-hour direct-action raid by a SOF team that captured or killed the wrong—i.e. innocent —target and left piles of smoldering collateral damage in the form of dead livestock and destroyed homes would undermine—even destroy—the benefits of months of 3/3’s work with locals. Cooling noted during his research that some of the SOF hits relied on what he and his staff considered to be questionable intel gleaned not from numerous counterbalanced and cross-referenced sources (as Cooling mandated before his Marines conducted any kinetic operation), but from single individuals, whom some SOF teams “ran” through monetary payouts and used repeatedly without cross-checking their statements. Furthermore, these units weren’t required to share intel with either Cooling or Cheek preoperation, often assuming the posture that their missions were of such a degree of importance and specialty that disclosing their information with a conventional unit might compromise them—as they felt that conventional forces couldn’t maintain operational security to a high enough degree to be entrusted with such intel. And by USSOCOM doctrine, these teams didn’t have to share intel anyway—even if a compelling reason surfaced, such as the need to compare their information with that of the Marines for accuracy to ensure that an intended target really was who they thought he was, and not an innocent noncombatant—allowing the individual who should have been the target to slip into the night as he heard the raid going down a few houses down from his location. Cooling knew that relying on single-element or even a small number of HUMINT sources risks a unit being led astray by the personal grudges a source may harbor against another villager, or just plain financial greed.
While the vast majority of the SOF units operating in RC-East worked with exceptional professionalism, Cooling knew that at any moment—and without notice—a misdirected hard-hit raid might go down and ruin weeks or even months of COIN work of untold value. But he also knew of the doctrinal brick wall he and his staff faced: SOCOM could have units undertake missions whenever they wanted, wherever they wanted, and however they wanted, with or without informing 3/3 or Task Force Thunder; and in theory, even without informing CFC-A Command, which ran the entire Afghan Theater. Frustrated by the nonintegration of SOF with conventional forces, and by the extreme difficulty—sometimes impossibility due to unannounced operations—of simply deconflicting a conventional unit’s plans with those of SOF units, Cooling and his staff brainstormed avenues to partially integrate and to fully deconflict operations so that both his battalion and any SOF team undertaking simultaneous missions in a given area not only wouldn’t interdict each other, but would actually aid each other, fostering a synergy of mutual effort. Cooling viewed SOF teams as uniquely capable and ultraspecialized but absolutely vital entities in the larger war-fighting machine—much like an AH-1W Super Cobra, an artillery battery, or a Marine scout/sniper team, any of which he could directly control as part of a MAGTF. But by doctrine he couldn’t control a SOF team—directly. So the
But a one-hour direct-action raid by a SOF team that captured or killed the wrong—i.e. innocent —target and left piles of smoldering collateral damage in the form of dead livestock and destroyed homes would undermine—even destroy—the benefits of months of 3/3’s work with locals. Cooling noted during his research that some of the SOF hits relied on what he and his staff considered to be questionable intel gleaned not from numerous counterbalanced and cross-referenced sources (as Cooling mandated before his Marines conducted any kinetic operation), but from single individuals, whom some SOF teams “ran” through monetary payouts and used repeatedly without cross-checking their statements. Furthermore, these units weren’t required to share intel with either Cooling or Cheek preoperation, often assuming the posture that their missions were of such a degree of importance and specialty that disclosing their information with a conventional unit might compromise them—as they felt that conventional forces couldn’t maintain operational security to a high enough degree to be entrusted with such intel. And by USSOCOM doctrine, these teams didn’t have to share intel anyway—even if a compelling reason surfaced, such as the need to compare their information with that of the Marines for accuracy to ensure that an intended target really was who they thought he was, and not an innocent noncombatant—allowing the individual who should have been the target to slip into the night as he heard the raid going down a few houses down from his location. Cooling knew that relying on single-element or even a small number of HUMINT sources risks a unit being led astray by the personal grudges a source may harbor against another villager, or just plain financial greed.
While the vast majority of the SOF units operating in RC-East worked with exceptional professionalism, Cooling knew that at any moment—and without notice—a misdirected hard-hit raid might go down and ruin weeks or even months of COIN work of untold value. But he also knew of the doctrinal brick wall he and his staff faced: SOCOM could have units undertake missions whenever they wanted, wherever they wanted, and however they wanted, with or without informing 3/3 or Task Force Thunder; and in theory, even without informing CFC-A Command, which ran the entire Afghan Theater. Frustrated by the nonintegration of SOF with conventional forces, and by the extreme difficulty—sometimes impossibility due to unannounced operations—of simply deconflicting a conventional unit’s plans with those of SOF units, Cooling and his staff brainstormed avenues to partially integrate and to fully deconflict operations so that both his battalion and any SOF team undertaking simultaneous missions in a given area not only wouldn’t interdict each other, but would actually aid each other, fostering a synergy of mutual effort. Cooling viewed SOF teams as uniquely capable and ultraspecialized but absolutely vital entities in the larger war-fighting machine—much like an AH-1W Super Cobra, an artillery battery, or a Marine scout/sniper team, any of which he could directly control as part of a MAGTF. But by doctrine he couldn’t control a SOF team—directly. So the
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