doled out; during one operation, 3/3 aided over five hundred villagers in a remote part of AO Trinity with everything from simple bandages to inoculations, to casting broken limbs, to enabling locals to better care for themselves by stocking basic medicinal aids and information on how to use those aids. The Marines would then continue to maintain security in a region and undertake various humanitarian assistance missions, typically handing out school and other supplies. 3/3’s operations typically spanned a week or more in duration, with the “kinetic” portion lasting just the first few hours.
Myriad noncombat-oriented agencies formed integral components in 3/3’s greater COIN efforts in Afghanistan. Chief among these were the PRTs, or Provincial Reconstruction Teams. Tasked with digging clean wells, building roads, schools, and mosques, and helping to maintain other vital infrastructure in the tiny villages throughout AO Trinity, 3/3 employed the PRTs as one of their most effective and long-term COIN “weapons.” During an operation, Marines would list the needs of a village, pass that information to one of the PRTs, and within weeks, the lives of the villagers would improve. 3/3’s leadership would also meet regularly with other agencies, both of the Afghan and U.S. governments, and nongovernmental organizations like the Red Cross and others associated with United Nations relief workers and U.S. AID.
The Cooling-Priddy operational model reached its zenith of success in early February of 2005 with Operation Spurs . Named in honor of the San Antonio Spurs basketball team (3/3 used sports-team names—primarily Texas basketball teams—for their major operations during their deployment), Spurs had Marines of India and Lima companies driving into the heart of the vicious Korangal Valley. Inserting by day via U.S. Army CH-47s, the grunts cordoned off target zones while U.S. Navy SEALs captured a number of known and suspected Islamic fundamentalist combatants. The operation culminated in a number of meetings with village elders (called shura meetings), and then a MEDCAP. 3/3 Marines maintained a presence in the Korangal for weeks after Spurs, continuing to pressure one particular individual who had proved to be cunningly elusive both to 3/3 and to the SOF teams who were there before 3/3’s arrival in Afghanistan. This individual was a man named Najmudeen.
A known militant who based his efforts out of the Korangal Valley, Najmudeen held the distinction of having his name on a list of the most wanted Islamic extremist fighters not just in AO Trinity, or in RC-East, but in all of Afghanistan. SOF had been trying for over eighteen months to catch him through a number of failed direct-action operations. Cooling and Priddy soon reasoned that the best way to take him was not through quick hard-hit raids, but through a consistent campaign of pressure, forcing him over time to come forward. SOF commanders scoffed at this plan; they believed that Najmudeen could only be killed or captured, and that the militant would never surrender or pledge allegiance to the new government of Afghanistan. But in early April, CJSOTF-A Command jaws hit the floor when they learned the news that near the town of Nangalam, deep in the Pech River Valley, Najmudeen met Captain Jim Sweeney, India Company commander, halfway across a bridge, stating to Jim, “Welcome, my friend.” The battalion’s continuous platoon-level presence in the Korangal Valley over the course of three harsh winter months—an uncomfortably austere, drawn-out, and downright unglamorous mission (particularly when compared to SOF direct-action raids)—had forced Najmudeen to live in a series of small caves, where he fell gravely ill and lost all options but surrender. Weeks of subsequent debriefing yielded reams of actionable intelligence from the former militant, intel vital for future operations—including those ⅔ would undertake within a matter of weeks.
In late March,
Myriad noncombat-oriented agencies formed integral components in 3/3’s greater COIN efforts in Afghanistan. Chief among these were the PRTs, or Provincial Reconstruction Teams. Tasked with digging clean wells, building roads, schools, and mosques, and helping to maintain other vital infrastructure in the tiny villages throughout AO Trinity, 3/3 employed the PRTs as one of their most effective and long-term COIN “weapons.” During an operation, Marines would list the needs of a village, pass that information to one of the PRTs, and within weeks, the lives of the villagers would improve. 3/3’s leadership would also meet regularly with other agencies, both of the Afghan and U.S. governments, and nongovernmental organizations like the Red Cross and others associated with United Nations relief workers and U.S. AID.
The Cooling-Priddy operational model reached its zenith of success in early February of 2005 with Operation Spurs . Named in honor of the San Antonio Spurs basketball team (3/3 used sports-team names—primarily Texas basketball teams—for their major operations during their deployment), Spurs had Marines of India and Lima companies driving into the heart of the vicious Korangal Valley. Inserting by day via U.S. Army CH-47s, the grunts cordoned off target zones while U.S. Navy SEALs captured a number of known and suspected Islamic fundamentalist combatants. The operation culminated in a number of meetings with village elders (called shura meetings), and then a MEDCAP. 3/3 Marines maintained a presence in the Korangal for weeks after Spurs, continuing to pressure one particular individual who had proved to be cunningly elusive both to 3/3 and to the SOF teams who were there before 3/3’s arrival in Afghanistan. This individual was a man named Najmudeen.
A known militant who based his efforts out of the Korangal Valley, Najmudeen held the distinction of having his name on a list of the most wanted Islamic extremist fighters not just in AO Trinity, or in RC-East, but in all of Afghanistan. SOF had been trying for over eighteen months to catch him through a number of failed direct-action operations. Cooling and Priddy soon reasoned that the best way to take him was not through quick hard-hit raids, but through a consistent campaign of pressure, forcing him over time to come forward. SOF commanders scoffed at this plan; they believed that Najmudeen could only be killed or captured, and that the militant would never surrender or pledge allegiance to the new government of Afghanistan. But in early April, CJSOTF-A Command jaws hit the floor when they learned the news that near the town of Nangalam, deep in the Pech River Valley, Najmudeen met Captain Jim Sweeney, India Company commander, halfway across a bridge, stating to Jim, “Welcome, my friend.” The battalion’s continuous platoon-level presence in the Korangal Valley over the course of three harsh winter months—an uncomfortably austere, drawn-out, and downright unglamorous mission (particularly when compared to SOF direct-action raids)—had forced Najmudeen to live in a series of small caves, where he fell gravely ill and lost all options but surrender. Weeks of subsequent debriefing yielded reams of actionable intelligence from the former militant, intel vital for future operations—including those ⅔ would undertake within a matter of weeks.
In late March,
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