hard-charging Texan, who’d graduated near the top of his class at the U.S. Naval Academy, worked with his staff to create his own way to utilize special operations forces—for the benefit not of just his battalion or those SOF teams with which 3/3 would work, but for the entire war effort in AO Trinity.
Cooling, however, didn’t want to control the SOF units; he just wanted to ensure that his battalion’s COIN efforts wouldn’t be undermined. So he and his operations officer, Major Drew Priddy (also a Naval Academy graduate), developed their own operational model, not one where missions would be planned to “employ” SOF under 3/3’s command, or for special operations teams to take the lead over the battalion’s Marines, but one where SOF and 3/3 would work as equal players for the benefit of the overall operation—each, in essence, would work for the operation. The two most salient issues Cooling and Priddy faced in developing operations of this novel style were command and control, and intel—called C2I. The two officers wanted to be able to craft missions that adhered fully with the concept of unity of effort, and as much as possible with unity of command, and also to share intelligence with SOF teams in order to determine which targets had the highest probability of being actual “bad guys” and which ones might have been incorrectly identified. But while the concept seemed to them to be an effective work-around to the situation in AO Trinity, they’d have to get “buy-in” from the teams themselves as well as the nod from Major General Olson. So Cooling went to Colonel Cheek and then to CJTF-76 headquarters at Bagram Airfield, and Priddy arranged face-to-face meetings with members of the ODAs and ODBs, Navy SEALs, and a group of Army Rangers—Task Force Red—at 3/3’s headquarters at Jalalabad Airfield.
Priddy received warm responses from Special Forces and the Navy SEALs, who fell under the command of CJSOTF-A. Task Force Red also found the new operational model agreeable, but the Rangers worked directly for SOCOM and had no official area of operation—they went anywhere SOCOM directed them, so working with them on such missions would prove more difficult. Cooling had success as well—with Cheek, a vociferous advocate for Cooling and Priddy’s plan, and with Major General Olson, who immediately embraced the model. The ops began . . . sharp, well-vetted intel rolled in, 3/3 and SOF units weeded out bad guys, and the Marines’ COIN campaign flourished. The battalion primarily worked with Special Forces and Navy SEALs, who found the model to work as a powerful “force multiplier,” enabling them to achieve far more than they could have achieved if working alone. Cooling and Priddy had effectively adapted the essence of a MAGTF and applied it to build a conventional-forces-SOF team. During the planning stages of each operation, SOF and 3/3 would pore over each other’s intel, develop a general “scheme of maneuver,” and then execute. Because they’d incorporated SOF into their operations, Cooling and Priddy elevated the saliency of their missions, grabbing the attention of Olson, which paid the dividend of gaining 3/3 access to scarce aviation assets, essentially placing the A back into the “MAGTF” the Marines emulated in-country. So in addition to balancing SOF intel with theirs to ensure that the direct-action raids were limited, contained, and mitigated collateral damage, the battalion gained additional resources to which they would not otherwise have had access, helping them to operate more or less as a MAGTF.
Typically, SOF would undertake the first phases of an operation as 3/3 supported them by cordoning off a village while a direct-action team took down a target. Once SOF’s part of the mission was complete, they’d “exfil” (typically by helicopter), and 3/3’s Marines would conduct a Medical Capabilities mission (a MEDCAP), where medical supplies and health care would be
Cooling, however, didn’t want to control the SOF units; he just wanted to ensure that his battalion’s COIN efforts wouldn’t be undermined. So he and his operations officer, Major Drew Priddy (also a Naval Academy graduate), developed their own operational model, not one where missions would be planned to “employ” SOF under 3/3’s command, or for special operations teams to take the lead over the battalion’s Marines, but one where SOF and 3/3 would work as equal players for the benefit of the overall operation—each, in essence, would work for the operation. The two most salient issues Cooling and Priddy faced in developing operations of this novel style were command and control, and intel—called C2I. The two officers wanted to be able to craft missions that adhered fully with the concept of unity of effort, and as much as possible with unity of command, and also to share intelligence with SOF teams in order to determine which targets had the highest probability of being actual “bad guys” and which ones might have been incorrectly identified. But while the concept seemed to them to be an effective work-around to the situation in AO Trinity, they’d have to get “buy-in” from the teams themselves as well as the nod from Major General Olson. So Cooling went to Colonel Cheek and then to CJTF-76 headquarters at Bagram Airfield, and Priddy arranged face-to-face meetings with members of the ODAs and ODBs, Navy SEALs, and a group of Army Rangers—Task Force Red—at 3/3’s headquarters at Jalalabad Airfield.
Priddy received warm responses from Special Forces and the Navy SEALs, who fell under the command of CJSOTF-A. Task Force Red also found the new operational model agreeable, but the Rangers worked directly for SOCOM and had no official area of operation—they went anywhere SOCOM directed them, so working with them on such missions would prove more difficult. Cooling had success as well—with Cheek, a vociferous advocate for Cooling and Priddy’s plan, and with Major General Olson, who immediately embraced the model. The ops began . . . sharp, well-vetted intel rolled in, 3/3 and SOF units weeded out bad guys, and the Marines’ COIN campaign flourished. The battalion primarily worked with Special Forces and Navy SEALs, who found the model to work as a powerful “force multiplier,” enabling them to achieve far more than they could have achieved if working alone. Cooling and Priddy had effectively adapted the essence of a MAGTF and applied it to build a conventional-forces-SOF team. During the planning stages of each operation, SOF and 3/3 would pore over each other’s intel, develop a general “scheme of maneuver,” and then execute. Because they’d incorporated SOF into their operations, Cooling and Priddy elevated the saliency of their missions, grabbing the attention of Olson, which paid the dividend of gaining 3/3 access to scarce aviation assets, essentially placing the A back into the “MAGTF” the Marines emulated in-country. So in addition to balancing SOF intel with theirs to ensure that the direct-action raids were limited, contained, and mitigated collateral damage, the battalion gained additional resources to which they would not otherwise have had access, helping them to operate more or less as a MAGTF.
Typically, SOF would undertake the first phases of an operation as 3/3 supported them by cordoning off a village while a direct-action team took down a target. Once SOF’s part of the mission was complete, they’d “exfil” (typically by helicopter), and 3/3’s Marines would conduct a Medical Capabilities mission (a MEDCAP), where medical supplies and health care would be
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