powers to mediate in Polish–Soviet affairs was fast decreasing. Stalin’s break with the First Ally would not have been so serious if other negative factors had not come into play. For one thing, American diplomacy under the guidance of Roosevelt’s chief adviser, Harry Hopkins, moved steadily towards the conciliation of Moscow’s ambitions, and showed ever less patience for what it regarded as peripheral causes of friction. For another, Churchill was losing something of the stature which he had initially enjoyed. Stalin could not fail to notice the inexorable rise of American influence. Churchill’s discomfiture was further worsened by the departure of the former Soviet Ambassador, Maisky, with whom he had conducted frequent and friendly business for two years. His contacts with Maisky’s replacement were sparse and stiff. In sum, the Americans deferred Polish matters to the British, and the British tended to evade them by telling the Poles to talk directly to Moscow, even though Stalin had cut off the normal channels for talking. The climate of embarrassment that grew in proportion to the Western powers’ failure to open a second front did not provide the basis for effective problem-solving.
In the same phase of the war, the Western powers were faced with the tricky problem of Yugoslavia; and their decisions regarding the Yugoslavs reflected on their approach to Eastern Europe as a whole. From 1941 onwards, the West had supported the royal Yugoslav Government and its Serb-based Underground movement, the Chetniks. King Peter and his ministers were resident in London. But their grip on developments declined when rival elements in occupied Yugoslavia indulged in a multilateral and murderous civil war. The Chetniks appeared to be most concerned with fighting the Croat Fascists, the Ustasha, and, to assist their fight, to be willing to deal with the Italian occupiers. They were also challenged by a revolutionary partisan movement led by the Moscow-trained Josip ‘Broz’ Tito, who was thought to be determined both to fight the Germans and to keep Yugoslavia united. In consequence, the West switched clients. The Chetniks were abandoned. The partisans were lavishly supplied from Allied bases in Italy; and the King was pressured to reach an agreement with Tito. In February 1944, despite the protests of his ministers, the King made common cause with Tito’s Anti-Fascist Councilof National Liberation. It was a stop-gap measure which briefly helped the prosecution of the war, but which in due course led to the complete elimination of the King and his erstwhile adherents. It did nothing to enhance the West’s reputation for political probity; and it gave the concept of ‘compromise’ in Eastern Europe a distinctly opportunist colouring.
Greece, in contrast, was the one East European country where Churchill was adamantly opposed to any form of compromise. In April 1939, the British Government had issued a guarantee of Greece, similar to that of the First Ally, but had not proceeded to a formal alliance. In the spring of 1944, the exiled royal Government of Greece was lodged in Cairo. The Resistance movement, which was dominated by the Communist movement, was preparing to come down from the mountains and to take over Athens as soon as the Germans withdrew. Indeed it had created a Political Committee of National Liberation that clearly harboured intentions of becoming a provisional Government. Churchill would have none of it. When mutiny threatened among Greek soldiers in Cairo, he ordered it to be snuffed out, by force if necessary. And he would not countenance a division of power. Needless to say, he could afford to take this high-handed line towards the only East European country to which the Royal Navy and British troops enjoyed direct access.
Nonetheless, it would be wrong to assume that the Western powers were totally negligent of or indifferent to their First Ally. Churchill, in particular, was acutely aware of the
In the same phase of the war, the Western powers were faced with the tricky problem of Yugoslavia; and their decisions regarding the Yugoslavs reflected on their approach to Eastern Europe as a whole. From 1941 onwards, the West had supported the royal Yugoslav Government and its Serb-based Underground movement, the Chetniks. King Peter and his ministers were resident in London. But their grip on developments declined when rival elements in occupied Yugoslavia indulged in a multilateral and murderous civil war. The Chetniks appeared to be most concerned with fighting the Croat Fascists, the Ustasha, and, to assist their fight, to be willing to deal with the Italian occupiers. They were also challenged by a revolutionary partisan movement led by the Moscow-trained Josip ‘Broz’ Tito, who was thought to be determined both to fight the Germans and to keep Yugoslavia united. In consequence, the West switched clients. The Chetniks were abandoned. The partisans were lavishly supplied from Allied bases in Italy; and the King was pressured to reach an agreement with Tito. In February 1944, despite the protests of his ministers, the King made common cause with Tito’s Anti-Fascist Councilof National Liberation. It was a stop-gap measure which briefly helped the prosecution of the war, but which in due course led to the complete elimination of the King and his erstwhile adherents. It did nothing to enhance the West’s reputation for political probity; and it gave the concept of ‘compromise’ in Eastern Europe a distinctly opportunist colouring.
Greece, in contrast, was the one East European country where Churchill was adamantly opposed to any form of compromise. In April 1939, the British Government had issued a guarantee of Greece, similar to that of the First Ally, but had not proceeded to a formal alliance. In the spring of 1944, the exiled royal Government of Greece was lodged in Cairo. The Resistance movement, which was dominated by the Communist movement, was preparing to come down from the mountains and to take over Athens as soon as the Germans withdrew. Indeed it had created a Political Committee of National Liberation that clearly harboured intentions of becoming a provisional Government. Churchill would have none of it. When mutiny threatened among Greek soldiers in Cairo, he ordered it to be snuffed out, by force if necessary. And he would not countenance a division of power. Needless to say, he could afford to take this high-handed line towards the only East European country to which the Royal Navy and British troops enjoyed direct access.
Nonetheless, it would be wrong to assume that the Western powers were totally negligent of or indifferent to their First Ally. Churchill, in particular, was acutely aware of the
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