implications of the Soviet Army’s relentless advance; and he was preoccupied by daily dealings with Polish matters. In the first half of 1944, detailed attention was paid to the political, territorial, and military issues.
On the political front, Churchill was anxious that some sort of deal be fixed up with Moscow before Stalin made his own unilateral arrangements. On 16 February 1944, he called in Premier Mick and warned him that if Stalin’s wishes were not met a proSoviet puppet Government would be set up by the Red Army and confirmed by rigged elections. He was angered by the exiled Government’s reluctance to comply. Yet he also knew that Stalin’s demands were provocative, and that some form of compromise might yet be reached. The First Ally was not in the same straits as Yugoslavia. There was no Tito in the Underground; there was little popular sympathy at home for Soviet-style politics; and the First Ally’s armed forces were everywhere fighting loyally for the Allied cause. What is more, there were signs that Stalin was playing a double game. Whilst demanding, outrageously, that the exiled Government purge itsallegedly ‘anti-Soviet’ members, starting with the President of the Republic, he was also keeping unofficial feelers open though the Soviet Embassy in London. So all was not yet lost. The optimists had reason to believe that with active Western involvement they might yet be able to forge a settlement before the crunch came.
For this reason, a compromise deal on the territorial issue seemed the best way forward. Here, the counsels of the Foreign Office were divided. One view, to which Eden had initially been inclined, held that Stalin’s demands would have to be met simply to keep him happy. This was the line which Eden had taken over the Baltic states in 1942 and which Churchill had favoured since Teheran, with the proviso that the First Ally must be generously compensated with land taken from Germany. But no final decision was judged to have been taken, and the Teheran discussions were kept strictly secret. The alternative view, which was not without support in London, held that the First Ally should not give way without securing some modest concessions. After all, she was being pressed to abandon the equivalent of Britain losing Scotland.
To this end, the Foreign Office put its best brains to work on the ethnic, historical, and political complexities of the First Ally’s eastern borders. Between November 1943 and July 1944, four detailed memoranda were produced. Two, dated 19 and 22 November 1943, preceded the Teheran Conference. The third, dated 12 February 1944, was prepared by the world-famous historian, Director of the Royal Institute of International Affairs and Head of the FO’s Research Department, Professor Arnold Toynbee. The fourth, dated 25 July 1944, was drawn up by one of Toynbee’s assistants, Francis Bourdillon. The details of these memoranda will delight anyone who is fascinated by the delineation of the Suvalki Region, the location of the Borislav–Drohobich Basin, the distinction between the A and B variants of the ‘Curzon Line’, and the many spellings of Lwów, Lvov, L’viv, Leopolis, Lemberg, and ‘City of Lions’ (pronounced ‘Lvoof’ and here rendered as Lvuv). They are wonderful fodder for cartographic masochists. But the important fact is that all four memoranda agreed on one point – that the First Ally should at the very least retain control of Lvuv. 49
In the minds of the British experts, these memoranda appear to have been based on the assumption of a two-stage solution: namely, that once the exiled Government had agreed to accept the Curzon Line in principle, Moscow could then be pressed to accept some relatively minor adjustments. 50 In the eyes of the exiled Government, however, the memoranda encouraged intransigence. They gave the clear impression that the gamewas not yet up, and that, given Western help, Lvuv represented the irreducible minimum of
On the political front, Churchill was anxious that some sort of deal be fixed up with Moscow before Stalin made his own unilateral arrangements. On 16 February 1944, he called in Premier Mick and warned him that if Stalin’s wishes were not met a proSoviet puppet Government would be set up by the Red Army and confirmed by rigged elections. He was angered by the exiled Government’s reluctance to comply. Yet he also knew that Stalin’s demands were provocative, and that some form of compromise might yet be reached. The First Ally was not in the same straits as Yugoslavia. There was no Tito in the Underground; there was little popular sympathy at home for Soviet-style politics; and the First Ally’s armed forces were everywhere fighting loyally for the Allied cause. What is more, there were signs that Stalin was playing a double game. Whilst demanding, outrageously, that the exiled Government purge itsallegedly ‘anti-Soviet’ members, starting with the President of the Republic, he was also keeping unofficial feelers open though the Soviet Embassy in London. So all was not yet lost. The optimists had reason to believe that with active Western involvement they might yet be able to forge a settlement before the crunch came.
For this reason, a compromise deal on the territorial issue seemed the best way forward. Here, the counsels of the Foreign Office were divided. One view, to which Eden had initially been inclined, held that Stalin’s demands would have to be met simply to keep him happy. This was the line which Eden had taken over the Baltic states in 1942 and which Churchill had favoured since Teheran, with the proviso that the First Ally must be generously compensated with land taken from Germany. But no final decision was judged to have been taken, and the Teheran discussions were kept strictly secret. The alternative view, which was not without support in London, held that the First Ally should not give way without securing some modest concessions. After all, she was being pressed to abandon the equivalent of Britain losing Scotland.
To this end, the Foreign Office put its best brains to work on the ethnic, historical, and political complexities of the First Ally’s eastern borders. Between November 1943 and July 1944, four detailed memoranda were produced. Two, dated 19 and 22 November 1943, preceded the Teheran Conference. The third, dated 12 February 1944, was prepared by the world-famous historian, Director of the Royal Institute of International Affairs and Head of the FO’s Research Department, Professor Arnold Toynbee. The fourth, dated 25 July 1944, was drawn up by one of Toynbee’s assistants, Francis Bourdillon. The details of these memoranda will delight anyone who is fascinated by the delineation of the Suvalki Region, the location of the Borislav–Drohobich Basin, the distinction between the A and B variants of the ‘Curzon Line’, and the many spellings of Lwów, Lvov, L’viv, Leopolis, Lemberg, and ‘City of Lions’ (pronounced ‘Lvoof’ and here rendered as Lvuv). They are wonderful fodder for cartographic masochists. But the important fact is that all four memoranda agreed on one point – that the First Ally should at the very least retain control of Lvuv. 49
In the minds of the British experts, these memoranda appear to have been based on the assumption of a two-stage solution: namely, that once the exiled Government had agreed to accept the Curzon Line in principle, Moscow could then be pressed to accept some relatively minor adjustments. 50 In the eyes of the exiled Government, however, the memoranda encouraged intransigence. They gave the clear impression that the gamewas not yet up, and that, given Western help, Lvuv represented the irreducible minimum of
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