Makers of Ancient Strategy: From the Persian Wars to the Fall of Rome by Victor Davis Hanson
Authors: Victor Davis Hanson
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lives,
for they do not make men, but men make them. And if I thought I
could persuade you I would ask you to go out and lay waste to them
52 Kagan
yourselves and show the Peloponnesians that you will not yield to
them because of such things.”30
But not even Pericles could persuade the Athenians to do that in
mid-century. The employment of such a strategy based on cold in-
telligence and reason, flying in the face of tradition and the normal
passions of human beings, would require the kind of extraordinary
leadership that only he could hope to exercise, and even in the face of
a Spartan invasion in 465–446, Pericles was not able to persuade the
Athenians to abandon their farms. In 431 he imposed his strategy, and
held to it only with great difficulty. But by then he had become strong
enough to make it the strategy of Athens.
The second major weakness was less tangible but no less serious,
arising from the very dynamism that had brought the naval empire
into being. Shrewd observers, both Athenians and foreigners, recog-
nized this characteristic of imperial exuberance and the opportunities
and dangers it presented. Many years after Pericles’ death, his ward,
Alcibiades, arguing for an imperial adventure against Sicily, painted the
picture of an empire whose natural dynamism could only be tamed
at the cost of its own destruction. Athens should respond to all op-
portunities for expanding its influence, he said, “for that is the way we
obtained our empire, . . . eagerly coming to the aid of those who call
on us, whether barbarians or Greeks; if, on the other hand, we keep
our peace and draw fine distinctions as to whom we should help, we
would add little to what we already have and run the risk of losing the
empire itself.”31 Like Pericles, he warned that it was too late for Athens
to change its policies; having launched upon the course of empire,
the city could not safely give it up: it must rule or be ruled. But Alcibi-
ades went further, asserting that the Athenian Empire had acquired a
character that did not permit it to stop expanding—an inner, dynamic
force that did not allow for limits or stability: “A State that is naturally
active will quickly be destroyed by changing to inactivity, and people
live most safely when they accept the character and institutions they
already have, even if they are not perfect, and try to differ from them
as little as possible.”32
In 432, when they tried to persuade the Spartans to declare war on
Athens, the Corinthians made a similar point from a hostile perspective,
Pericles and the Defense of Empire 53
connecting the dynamic nature of the empire with the similar nature
of the Athenians themselves. They drew a sharp contrast between the
placid, immobile, defensive character of the Spartans and the danger-
ous and aggressive character of the Athenians:
When they have thought of a plan and failed to carry it through
to full success, they think they have been deprived of their own
property; when they have acquired what they aimed at, they
think it only a small thing compared with what they will acquire
in the future. If it happens that an attempt fails, they form a new
hope to compensate for the loss. For with them alone it is the
same thing to hope and to have, when once they have invented a
scheme, because of the swiftness with which they carry out what
they have planned. And in this way they wear out their entire
lives with labor and dangers, and they enjoy what they have least
of all men—because they are always engaged in acquisition and
because they think their only holiday is to do what is their duty
and also because they consider tranquil peace a greater disaster
than painful activity. As a result, one would be correct in saying
that it is their nature neither to enjoy peace themselves nor allow
it to other men.33
Pericles emphatically disputed such analyses. He did not believe that
the Athenian naval empire
for they do not make men, but men make them. And if I thought I
could persuade you I would ask you to go out and lay waste to them
52 Kagan
yourselves and show the Peloponnesians that you will not yield to
them because of such things.”30
But not even Pericles could persuade the Athenians to do that in
mid-century. The employment of such a strategy based on cold in-
telligence and reason, flying in the face of tradition and the normal
passions of human beings, would require the kind of extraordinary
leadership that only he could hope to exercise, and even in the face of
a Spartan invasion in 465–446, Pericles was not able to persuade the
Athenians to abandon their farms. In 431 he imposed his strategy, and
held to it only with great difficulty. But by then he had become strong
enough to make it the strategy of Athens.
The second major weakness was less tangible but no less serious,
arising from the very dynamism that had brought the naval empire
into being. Shrewd observers, both Athenians and foreigners, recog-
nized this characteristic of imperial exuberance and the opportunities
and dangers it presented. Many years after Pericles’ death, his ward,
Alcibiades, arguing for an imperial adventure against Sicily, painted the
picture of an empire whose natural dynamism could only be tamed
at the cost of its own destruction. Athens should respond to all op-
portunities for expanding its influence, he said, “for that is the way we
obtained our empire, . . . eagerly coming to the aid of those who call
on us, whether barbarians or Greeks; if, on the other hand, we keep
our peace and draw fine distinctions as to whom we should help, we
would add little to what we already have and run the risk of losing the
empire itself.”31 Like Pericles, he warned that it was too late for Athens
to change its policies; having launched upon the course of empire,
the city could not safely give it up: it must rule or be ruled. But Alcibi-
ades went further, asserting that the Athenian Empire had acquired a
character that did not permit it to stop expanding—an inner, dynamic
force that did not allow for limits or stability: “A State that is naturally
active will quickly be destroyed by changing to inactivity, and people
live most safely when they accept the character and institutions they
already have, even if they are not perfect, and try to differ from them
as little as possible.”32
In 432, when they tried to persuade the Spartans to declare war on
Athens, the Corinthians made a similar point from a hostile perspective,
Pericles and the Defense of Empire 53
connecting the dynamic nature of the empire with the similar nature
of the Athenians themselves. They drew a sharp contrast between the
placid, immobile, defensive character of the Spartans and the danger-
ous and aggressive character of the Athenians:
When they have thought of a plan and failed to carry it through
to full success, they think they have been deprived of their own
property; when they have acquired what they aimed at, they
think it only a small thing compared with what they will acquire
in the future. If it happens that an attempt fails, they form a new
hope to compensate for the loss. For with them alone it is the
same thing to hope and to have, when once they have invented a
scheme, because of the swiftness with which they carry out what
they have planned. And in this way they wear out their entire
lives with labor and dangers, and they enjoy what they have least
of all men—because they are always engaged in acquisition and
because they think their only holiday is to do what is their duty
and also because they consider tranquil peace a greater disaster
than painful activity. As a result, one would be correct in saying
that it is their nature neither to enjoy peace themselves nor allow
it to other men.33
Pericles emphatically disputed such analyses. He did not believe that
the Athenian naval empire
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