Makers of Ancient Strategy: From the Persian Wars to the Fall of Rome by Victor Davis Hanson Page A
Authors: Victor Davis Hanson
Ads: Link
needed to expand without limit or that the
democratic constitution and the empire together had shaped an Athe-
nian citizen who could never be quiet and satisfied. This is not to say that
he was blind to the dangers of excessive ambition. He knew there were
Athenians who wanted to conquer new lands, especially in the west-
ern Mediterranean, Sicily, Italy, and even Carthage. But he was firmly
against further expansion, as his future actions would clearly demon-
strate. During the great Peloponnesian War, he repeatedly warned the
Athenians against trying to increase the size of the empire. It is also
revealing that he never spoke of the tremendous potential power of
the naval empire until the year before his death, when the Athenians
were despondent and needed extraordinary encouragement. He held
back from this not merely, as he said, to avoid boastfulness, but chiefly
to avoid fanning the flames of excessive ambition.
54 Kagan
If Pericles ever had planned to expand the empire, the disastrous
result of the Egyptian campaign in the 450s seems to have convinced
him otherwise. Its failure shook the foundations of the empire and
threatened the safety of Athens itself. From that time forward, Pericles
worked consistently to resist the desires of ambitious expansionists and
avoid undue risks. He plainly believed that intel igence and reason could
restrain unruly passions, maintain the empire at its current size, and use
its revenues for a different, safer, but possibly even greater glory than the
Greeks had yet known. Pericles considered the Athenian Empire large
enough and its expansion both unnecessary and dangerous. The war
against Persia was over; now the success of Pericles’ plans and policies
depended on his ability to make and sustain peace with the Spartans.
Thus, Pericles’ defense of the Athenian Empire required a complex
strategy. The Athenians needed to deter rebellions by the great power
of their fleet and the readiness to crush uprisings when they occurred,
as Pericles did against Euboea in 446–445 and Samos in 440, and other
places at other times. At the same time, the policy of controlling the
empire was firm but not brutal, as it became after the death of Peri-
cles in 429. His successors killed all the men and sold the women and
children into slavery at Scione and Melos. Neither Cimon nor Pericles
ever permitted such atrocities. At the same time as he counseled keep-
ing the allies under firm control, he also resisted the pressure toward
further expansion, fearing that it would endanger the empire Athens
already had. Finally, he continued to make the effort to persuade Athe-
nian critics and the other Greeks that the Athenian Empire was neces-
sary, justified and no menace to other states. Although Thucydides was
doubtful that a democracy could restrain its ambition and conduct an
empire with moderation for long, he believed that it could so under an
extraordinary leader like Pericles.
Further Reading
The nature and elements of the Athenian Empire are best outlined in the classic survey
of Russel Meiggs, The Athenian Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972), updated
by Malcom McGregor, The Athenians and Their Empire (Vancouver: University of Brit-
ish Columbia Press, 1987), and P. J. Rhodes and the Classical Association, The Athenian
Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985). Controversy arises over whether the
Pericles and the Defense of Empire 55
Athenians were exploitive imperialists or enlightened democrats who protected the
poor abroad through their advocacy of popular government. The arguments for both
views are set out well in Loren J. Samons II, The Empire of the Owl: Athenian Impe-
rial Finance (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000), and Donald W. Bradeen,
“The Popularity of the Athenian Empire,” Historia 9 (1960): 257–69. G.E.M. de Ste.
Croix most forcefully advanced the argument of Athens as a well-meaning protector
of
democratic constitution and the empire together had shaped an Athe-
nian citizen who could never be quiet and satisfied. This is not to say that
he was blind to the dangers of excessive ambition. He knew there were
Athenians who wanted to conquer new lands, especially in the west-
ern Mediterranean, Sicily, Italy, and even Carthage. But he was firmly
against further expansion, as his future actions would clearly demon-
strate. During the great Peloponnesian War, he repeatedly warned the
Athenians against trying to increase the size of the empire. It is also
revealing that he never spoke of the tremendous potential power of
the naval empire until the year before his death, when the Athenians
were despondent and needed extraordinary encouragement. He held
back from this not merely, as he said, to avoid boastfulness, but chiefly
to avoid fanning the flames of excessive ambition.
54 Kagan
If Pericles ever had planned to expand the empire, the disastrous
result of the Egyptian campaign in the 450s seems to have convinced
him otherwise. Its failure shook the foundations of the empire and
threatened the safety of Athens itself. From that time forward, Pericles
worked consistently to resist the desires of ambitious expansionists and
avoid undue risks. He plainly believed that intel igence and reason could
restrain unruly passions, maintain the empire at its current size, and use
its revenues for a different, safer, but possibly even greater glory than the
Greeks had yet known. Pericles considered the Athenian Empire large
enough and its expansion both unnecessary and dangerous. The war
against Persia was over; now the success of Pericles’ plans and policies
depended on his ability to make and sustain peace with the Spartans.
Thus, Pericles’ defense of the Athenian Empire required a complex
strategy. The Athenians needed to deter rebellions by the great power
of their fleet and the readiness to crush uprisings when they occurred,
as Pericles did against Euboea in 446–445 and Samos in 440, and other
places at other times. At the same time, the policy of controlling the
empire was firm but not brutal, as it became after the death of Peri-
cles in 429. His successors killed all the men and sold the women and
children into slavery at Scione and Melos. Neither Cimon nor Pericles
ever permitted such atrocities. At the same time as he counseled keep-
ing the allies under firm control, he also resisted the pressure toward
further expansion, fearing that it would endanger the empire Athens
already had. Finally, he continued to make the effort to persuade Athe-
nian critics and the other Greeks that the Athenian Empire was neces-
sary, justified and no menace to other states. Although Thucydides was
doubtful that a democracy could restrain its ambition and conduct an
empire with moderation for long, he believed that it could so under an
extraordinary leader like Pericles.
Further Reading
The nature and elements of the Athenian Empire are best outlined in the classic survey
of Russel Meiggs, The Athenian Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972), updated
by Malcom McGregor, The Athenians and Their Empire (Vancouver: University of Brit-
ish Columbia Press, 1987), and P. J. Rhodes and the Classical Association, The Athenian
Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985). Controversy arises over whether the
Pericles and the Defense of Empire 55
Athenians were exploitive imperialists or enlightened democrats who protected the
poor abroad through their advocacy of popular government. The arguments for both
views are set out well in Loren J. Samons II, The Empire of the Owl: Athenian Impe-
rial Finance (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000), and Donald W. Bradeen,
“The Popularity of the Athenian Empire,” Historia 9 (1960): 257–69. G.E.M. de Ste.
Croix most forcefully advanced the argument of Athens as a well-meaning protector
of
Similar Books
