Congress, in 1939, .Stalin had again broached the subject, in the following significant words: "Our Army and intelligence service have their sharp eyes no longer on the enemy within our country, but on the enemy abroad." In view of these remarks, is it credible that in 1941 Stalin would have taken no notice of the information
supplied to him by his secret service about the German preparations for an attack? He must have been informed. After all, he had first-rate informants. From Berlin to Tokyo, from Paris to Geneva, his informants—many of them highly respected men beyond the breath of suspicion—sat in high positions and supplied valuable information.
The thoroughness of their work was revealed during the very first few weeks of the war. When the 221st Defence Division in Lomza cracked the safe left behind by the C-in-C of the First Cossack Army, they found in it maps for the whole of Germany, with the location of German Armies, Army Groups, and divisions accurately entered. The information was complete—nothing was lacking.
But this, by comparison, was peanuts. Some much more exciting discoveries were made.
The German radio monitoring service in the East Prussian seaside resort of Cranz had been intercepting the coded messages of countless unknown agents' transmitters since the beginning of the war. Attempts to crack the ingenious figure codes had been in vain. At last, in November 1942, German intelligence received the key. The Soviet chief agent Viktor Sokolov, alias Kent, had been captured in Marseilles. In order to save his mistress, Margarete Barcza, he offered to work for the Germans and betrayed the code.
What Admiral Canaris was shown after the decoding of the messages was far worse than the greatest pessimists had feared. There was a message of 2nd July 1941, for instance. Ten days after the outbreak of war Alexander Rado reported from Geneva to Moscow: "Rdo. To Director. KNR 34. Valid German plan of operations is Plan 1 with objective Moscow. Operations on wings merely diversions. Main thrust on Central Front. Rado."
About three weeks later, on 27th July, Rado amplified his message in reply to an inquiry from Moscow: "Rdo. To Director. KNR 92. Re RSK 1211. In case Plan 1 meets with difficulties Plan 2 will be used with main thrust on wings. Change of plan will be known to me within two days. Plan 3 with objective Caucasus not envisaged before November. Rado."
Needless to say, Berlin was flabbergasted to find a Soviet agent in Switzerland so accurately informed, and every effort was made to discover his source—a source which could discover a "change of plan" in the German High Command "within two days." But this source was never discovered. It has not been discovered to this day. Right through the war Alexander Rado continued to send his information to Moscow by radio. One thing is certain, however: Rado's main contact was Rudolf Rössler, alias Lucy, a Communist émigré from Bavaria who worked in Switzerland. In The Soviet Army, edited by the British military historian Liddell Hart, Dr Raymond L. Garthoff, who made a thorough study of the evidence, states that an anonymous source on the German General Staff informed this net of the German plans for the invasion of the USSR, and even provided the date of the invasion.
What more could Stalin or the Soviet General Staff want? Hitler's secrets were openly revealed to the Kremlin. Moscow, therefore, could have turned Operation Barbarossa, based as it was on surprise, into a crushing defeat for Hitler within the first twenty-four hours. Provided, of course, Stalin drew the correct military conclusions from his information. Why did he not do it?
To decide this key question of the German-Soviet war we have to turn our attention to a different one first. What was the state of German espionage against Russia? What did the German Command know about the military secrets of the Soviet Union? The question can be answered in two words— very little. The German secret
supplied to him by his secret service about the German preparations for an attack? He must have been informed. After all, he had first-rate informants. From Berlin to Tokyo, from Paris to Geneva, his informants—many of them highly respected men beyond the breath of suspicion—sat in high positions and supplied valuable information.
The thoroughness of their work was revealed during the very first few weeks of the war. When the 221st Defence Division in Lomza cracked the safe left behind by the C-in-C of the First Cossack Army, they found in it maps for the whole of Germany, with the location of German Armies, Army Groups, and divisions accurately entered. The information was complete—nothing was lacking.
But this, by comparison, was peanuts. Some much more exciting discoveries were made.
The German radio monitoring service in the East Prussian seaside resort of Cranz had been intercepting the coded messages of countless unknown agents' transmitters since the beginning of the war. Attempts to crack the ingenious figure codes had been in vain. At last, in November 1942, German intelligence received the key. The Soviet chief agent Viktor Sokolov, alias Kent, had been captured in Marseilles. In order to save his mistress, Margarete Barcza, he offered to work for the Germans and betrayed the code.
What Admiral Canaris was shown after the decoding of the messages was far worse than the greatest pessimists had feared. There was a message of 2nd July 1941, for instance. Ten days after the outbreak of war Alexander Rado reported from Geneva to Moscow: "Rdo. To Director. KNR 34. Valid German plan of operations is Plan 1 with objective Moscow. Operations on wings merely diversions. Main thrust on Central Front. Rado."
About three weeks later, on 27th July, Rado amplified his message in reply to an inquiry from Moscow: "Rdo. To Director. KNR 92. Re RSK 1211. In case Plan 1 meets with difficulties Plan 2 will be used with main thrust on wings. Change of plan will be known to me within two days. Plan 3 with objective Caucasus not envisaged before November. Rado."
Needless to say, Berlin was flabbergasted to find a Soviet agent in Switzerland so accurately informed, and every effort was made to discover his source—a source which could discover a "change of plan" in the German High Command "within two days." But this source was never discovered. It has not been discovered to this day. Right through the war Alexander Rado continued to send his information to Moscow by radio. One thing is certain, however: Rado's main contact was Rudolf Rössler, alias Lucy, a Communist émigré from Bavaria who worked in Switzerland. In The Soviet Army, edited by the British military historian Liddell Hart, Dr Raymond L. Garthoff, who made a thorough study of the evidence, states that an anonymous source on the German General Staff informed this net of the German plans for the invasion of the USSR, and even provided the date of the invasion.
What more could Stalin or the Soviet General Staff want? Hitler's secrets were openly revealed to the Kremlin. Moscow, therefore, could have turned Operation Barbarossa, based as it was on surprise, into a crushing defeat for Hitler within the first twenty-four hours. Provided, of course, Stalin drew the correct military conclusions from his information. Why did he not do it?
To decide this key question of the German-Soviet war we have to turn our attention to a different one first. What was the state of German espionage against Russia? What did the German Command know about the military secrets of the Soviet Union? The question can be answered in two words— very little. The German secret
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