service was very thinly established in Russia. It knew nothing of the vital military secrets of the Soviets, whereas they knew everything about Germany. They knew all about German weapons, about German garrisons, they knew where the German training areas were situated, and where the armament factories were. They knew the exact figures for German tank production. They had a clear picture about the number of German divisions. The German Command, by way of contrast, at the beginning of the war estimated the Red Army at 200 divisions. Within six weeks of the start of operations it discovered that there were at least 360. The German Command had no idea that the Russians had super-heavy KV tanks, or the T- 34, or those terrifying multiple mortars, soon to be nicknamed "Stalin's organ-pipes."
Naturally, the German military secret sendee had tried, especially after 1933, to look behind the Soviet scenes. But the Soviets' mistrust of Hitler's Third Reich had been greater still than their suspicion of the Weimar Republic, and consequently the prospects of establishing secret agents within the Soviet Union were not promising. Besides, German
intelligence was not overzealous in this direction and was unwilling to take risks. After all, no one in the German High Command envisaged a war between Germany and Russia.
Later, when Hitler demanded intensified intelligence work in Russia, it was found that this could not be organized at such short notice. The strict controls on the frontiers of the Communist empire, the close surveillance of every traveller, and indeed every stranger, made it virtually impossible to build up a network of agents. If, now and again, a spy was insinuated nevertheless from Finland, Turkey, or Iraq he would encounter almost insuperable difficulties in transmitting his information. A courier service was out of the question since no Soviet citizen was allowed to travel abroad. What few tourists there were were under strict supervision. That left only carrier pigeons from the frontier regions, and the radio. Both methods were enormously dangerous, and very few people were prepared to take the risk.
Nevertheless, in conjunction with the work of the German Military Attachés, some useful information was obtained in this way. Thus Guderian published a book entitled Achtung — Panzer! in which, on the grounds of reliable information, he put the number of Soviet tanks at 10,000. But in the German High Command the general was ridiculed. The then Chief of Army General Staff, Colonel-General Beck, accused Guderian of exaggerating, and even of creating alarm and despondency. Yet Guderian had deliberately erred on the cautious side and deducted a few thousand from the number reported to him. Quite unnecessarily, as it turned out, since the Russians at the outbreak of war possessed over 17,000 tanks.
In 1941 nobody would have thought that possible. The Finnish-Soviet winter war of 1939—40 had had a disastrous effect on the assessment of Soviet strength. The fact that little Finland offered such prolonged resistance to the Soviets was taken as evidence of Soviet weakness. To this day there are quite a few serious observers who maintain that Stalin deliberately conducted the Finnish war with outmoded weapons and inferior forces as a gigantic bluff, in order to deceive the world. Certainly the Soviet High Command did not employ the T-34 or the super-heavy KV tanks—even though these were manufactured right on Finland's doorstep, at Kolpino—nor yet the multiple mortars.
Finland's Marshal Mannerheim reports in his memoirs that Hitler told him in 1942 that the Russian armaments came as a colossal surprise to him. "If anyone had told me before the beginning of the war that the Russians could mobilize 35,000 fighting vehicles I would have had him declared insane. But up to date they have in fact thrown 35,000 of them into battle."
In order to get a peep behind Russia's walls after all, in spite of the well-nigh insuperable Soviet
Naturally, the German military secret sendee had tried, especially after 1933, to look behind the Soviet scenes. But the Soviets' mistrust of Hitler's Third Reich had been greater still than their suspicion of the Weimar Republic, and consequently the prospects of establishing secret agents within the Soviet Union were not promising. Besides, German
intelligence was not overzealous in this direction and was unwilling to take risks. After all, no one in the German High Command envisaged a war between Germany and Russia.
Later, when Hitler demanded intensified intelligence work in Russia, it was found that this could not be organized at such short notice. The strict controls on the frontiers of the Communist empire, the close surveillance of every traveller, and indeed every stranger, made it virtually impossible to build up a network of agents. If, now and again, a spy was insinuated nevertheless from Finland, Turkey, or Iraq he would encounter almost insuperable difficulties in transmitting his information. A courier service was out of the question since no Soviet citizen was allowed to travel abroad. What few tourists there were were under strict supervision. That left only carrier pigeons from the frontier regions, and the radio. Both methods were enormously dangerous, and very few people were prepared to take the risk.
Nevertheless, in conjunction with the work of the German Military Attachés, some useful information was obtained in this way. Thus Guderian published a book entitled Achtung — Panzer! in which, on the grounds of reliable information, he put the number of Soviet tanks at 10,000. But in the German High Command the general was ridiculed. The then Chief of Army General Staff, Colonel-General Beck, accused Guderian of exaggerating, and even of creating alarm and despondency. Yet Guderian had deliberately erred on the cautious side and deducted a few thousand from the number reported to him. Quite unnecessarily, as it turned out, since the Russians at the outbreak of war possessed over 17,000 tanks.
In 1941 nobody would have thought that possible. The Finnish-Soviet winter war of 1939—40 had had a disastrous effect on the assessment of Soviet strength. The fact that little Finland offered such prolonged resistance to the Soviets was taken as evidence of Soviet weakness. To this day there are quite a few serious observers who maintain that Stalin deliberately conducted the Finnish war with outmoded weapons and inferior forces as a gigantic bluff, in order to deceive the world. Certainly the Soviet High Command did not employ the T-34 or the super-heavy KV tanks—even though these were manufactured right on Finland's doorstep, at Kolpino—nor yet the multiple mortars.
Finland's Marshal Mannerheim reports in his memoirs that Hitler told him in 1942 that the Russian armaments came as a colossal surprise to him. "If anyone had told me before the beginning of the war that the Russians could mobilize 35,000 fighting vehicles I would have had him declared insane. But up to date they have in fact thrown 35,000 of them into battle."
In order to get a peep behind Russia's walls after all, in spite of the well-nigh insuperable Soviet
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