Hitler and the Forgotten Nazis by Bruce F. Pauley

(truce) was concluded just in time for the elections. When resumed several months later the negotiations failed, apparently because the Austrians still insisted on retaining their own organization and policies so far as purely Austrian affairs were concerned. Local HB leaders also feared losing their positions after a merger. As usual, Hitler^ own conditions were simple: “either subordination or a fight in which the stronger would decide. He hoped to be the stronger.” 58
    Although 1928 witnessed some actual violence between the Nazi followers of Schulz and those of Hitler, 59 reunification efforts resumed in 1929. On 5 October 1929 the Deutsche Arbeiter-Presse suddenly announced that the two Nazi factions had been reunited on 30 September. As their common platform they demanded an Austro-German Anschluss, a fight against the Jewish domination of the country’s economy, culture, and public life, a fundamental constitutional reform changing voting rights, and an important role for nationalist trade unions. 60 Significantly, nothing was said about party structure or the future status of the South Tyrol.
    The DAP ’s rejoicing was premature. The Gauleiter of the Hitler Bewegung vehemently denounced the merger in a meeting held in Vienna on 5 January 1930. In letters to Gregor Strasser at the Munich Reichsleitung and to the new Landesleitung in Linz, they objected to the selection of Leo Haubenberger, a railway official and Schulz’s deputy, as the Landesleiter of the united party. The letter writers claimed that the Schulz group was now insignificant and would soon die out. 61 What really upset the Gau leaders, of course, was the horrifying prospect of losing their jobs to Schulz men.
    Like Georg von Schonerer, the Hitler Nazis regarded conflicts as irreconcilable and negotiations as little better than surrender. Thus Alfred Proksch later indignantly denied the accusation made by one of his party enemies, that he had led the negotiations for reunification. It was a matter of pride that he was influential in persuading Hitler to end the talks. 62
    Hitler played a surprisingly minor role in these negotiations. When Hans Krebs, the HB Landesleiter, and Alfred Proksch spoke with the Fiihrer in Munich, Hitler merely stated that he did not believe in the possibility of a reunification. Without firm leadership on the side of the Hitler Bewegung, however, a reconciliation between the two Austrian factions proved impos-
    !    sible. Negotiations broke down on 2 March 1930, with each side blaming the
    other for the failure. It is impossible to say for certain which side was more responsible for the fiasco; but the attempts of Hans Krebs, to organize an opposition to Schulz within Schulz’s own membership, did not go unnoticed and did little to improve mutual trust and good will. 63 The unification efforts I    were not a total failure, however, as    Walter Riehl and his tiny Deutschsozialer
    1    Verein (which he founded in 1924    after resigning from the party) rejoined
    the Hitler movement in September 1930. 84
    Last Years of the “Schulz Party”
    The “Schulz party,” as it was contemptuously called by its Hitlerian opponents, lingered on for more than five years after the failure of the last reunification efforts in 1930. Although they did not then have the facts to prove it, the Gauleiter 's prophecy that the Schulz faction would die a natural death was basically correct. Karl Schulz simply did not have the ability to build a mass party. But more importantly, Adolf Hitler’s local electoral victories in Germany in 1929 and his much more impressive national victory in September 1930, when the Reich Nazis won over 6.4 million votes and became the Reichstag’s second largest party, gave the Austrian NSDAP (HB) a badly needed boost. Although still hampered by the popularity of other right-wing groups, the Hitler Nazis nevertheless gained 111,000 votes in the November 1930 parliamentary elections, thus