Hitler and the Forgotten Nazis by Bruce F. Pauley Page B

the decade. The split in 1925-26 proved to be permanent and had a debilitating effect on the party’s success for the next five years. After the resignation of Walter Riehl in 1923, the party never again found an entirely satisfactory leader. Karl Schulz was acceptable to the older and more conservative members, but not to the young radicals, who turned to Adolf Hitler. But Hitler, even though providing his followers with ideological guidance, was prohibited from entering Austrian territory and in any case was too preoccupied with German affairs to provide the Austrian Nazis with practical day-to-day leadership. Therefore, the late twenties proved to be a time of frustration and stagnation for both wings of the Austrian Nazi party.

CHAPTER IV FASCISTS WITHOUT A FUHRER
    The German-speaking people have an old proverb, Man braucht Feinde (one needs enemies). The Nazis of both Germany and Austria were fervent believers and practitioners of this philosophy. Even before the rivalry between the Schulz and Hitlerian Nazis ended for all practical purposes in 1929-30, new foes appeared on the horizon. One of these was the paramilitary Austrian Heimwehr; the other, amazingly enough, consisted of the party’s 1 own leaders.
    v ; i;
     
    Fascists without a Fiihrer • 53
     
    Germany and the Leadership Principle
    It was one of the major ironies of the Hitlerian Nazis (and also of the fascists in the Heimwehr movement) that however much they prattled about the glories of the Fiihrerprinzip, when it came to following a leader unconditionally, they often acted more like anarchists than disciplined followers of the German Messiah.
    Of course, Hitler remained the supreme leader, a remote “umpire” who was able to prevent the outbreak of the kinds of ideological disputes that plagued the Heimwehr. But the Fiihrer’s strategy was to concentrate on gaining power in Germany first, before shifting his money and attention to the struggle in Austria. 2 Being forbidden by the Austrian government from entering the country no doubt made it difficult for Hitler to intervene in day-to-day party quarrels there. 3 But a more fundamental problem was Hitler’s unwillingness to bother with the mundane aspects of running a party (or, later on, a government). Hitler’s only real interests were art and war. Thus he contented himself with laying down only a few broad outlines of policies for the party and seldom even issued written orders. His underlings were left to carry out his programs as best they could interpret them, with whatever means they chose. Hitler intervened in everyday party affairs in both Austria and Germany only if they seriously threatened to disrupt the party or to interfere with his overall international objectives. Gregor Strasser, as head of the party directorship (Reichsleitung) in Munich between 1928 and 1930, also made administrative decisions concerning Austria, but was often too busy to handle
    the incessant feuds. 4
    Most historians have firmly believed that after 1926 the Austrian Nazi party was “a mere appendage of Hitler’s movement [which] must be ruled out as representative of Austrian fascism.” 5 Although the Austrian Landesleiter were appointed (if at all) in Munich, local Nazi functionaries felt little control from Germany. For the Austrian Nazis, the problem was a lack of Reich German interference rather than too much, especially between 1926 and 1931 . (In later years, however, they frequently made the opposite complaint.) So jealous were the Austrian Gauleiter of each other that they never could agree to give unconditional allegiance to one of their colleagues as Landesleiter of the whole Austrian party. 6 Their mistrust and envy were to remain chronic problems for the party, not only in the late twenties, but also even up to the Anschluss in 1938.
    Munich’s laissez faire policy was more than simply the product of Hitler’s natural inclinations toward laziness and indecisiveness. If the Austrian party were