Beyond Peace by Richard Nixon

and influence, the United States should be candid when our views do not coincide. But the inevitable clashes in our views must be seen as differences between friends and not between potential enemies.
    The most dangerous mistake we could make would be to ignore our differences or attempt to drown them in champagne and vodka toasts at feel-good summit meetings. Rather than papering over differences with diplomatic gobbledygook, we must find ways to disagree without damaging one of the world’s most important strategic relationships.
    The second most dangerous mistake would be to neglect our responsibility for assisting Russia in its transition to freedom, or arrogantly to scold or punish it for every foreign or domestic policy transgression, as though it were an international problem child. I saw Helmut Kohl in Bonn after visiting Moscow in early 1994, and he had an apt summation of the importance of treating Russia as a great power. “My mother was a wise, simple, pious woman,” he said. “She told us several adages that apply to politics as well as to private life. One was that you always meet everyone twice in your lifetime. The first time, always have in mind the impression you will make the secondtime. We are going to meet these Russians again in a few years, I’m convinced of that.”
    The recent flap over the indictment of a highly placed Russian mole in the CIA was a glaring example of how unprepared many Americans are to think of Russia as a great power with its own interests and prerogatives. Many observers were quick to condemn Yeltsin, even though the mole was first recruited under Gorbachev. But the demands that we should not send aid to a country that spies on us were disingenuous at best. How many of these same critics called for a cutoff of our massive aid to Israel in the wake of the Pollard spy case, where Israeli intelligence was spying on the United States? As that incident and others show, most nations reserve the right to gather intelligence about both friends and foes. Although the Cold War had been over for more than three years, the CIA budget in 1993 was an estimated $30 billion. What did we spend it on—finding out whether they were growing coffee instead of cocoa in Ghana?
    Twenty-seven years ago, two years before I took office as President, Charles de Gaulle told me that the United States should reestablish relations with China before its power impelled us to do so. A generation later, China’s explosive growth and burgeoning economic, diplomatic, and military power represent a total vindication of de Gaulle’s assessment. A similar sense of anticipation must govern our relations with Russia. Its seemingly overwhelming problems will not last forever. Its human and natural resources, and thus its capacity to recover and ultimately to excel, are virtually unlimited. The United States and the West should develop a collaborative, businesslike relationship with Russia today so that when we meet these Russians again, we will do so as friends, if not necessarily as partners, rather than as potential adversaries.
    What the United States wants most from Russia is a nonaggressive foreign policy. While being sensitive to Russia’s legitimate interests, the administration, in discussions with the Yeltsin government, should not hesitate to raise questions aboutaspects of Russia’s international conduct that affect our interests. Our support for Russia’s reformers does not justify failing to present security concerns to Moscow forthrightly and early on, while there is still a possibility of having an impact without causing a conflict.
    Any attempt to reestablish the Russian empire by force, coercion, or destabilization of its neighbors would be contrary to U.S. interests. To avoid any possible misunderstanding, the American government should make this clear to the Russian leadership at the outset. In addition, the other newly independent states need to be reassured