Beyond Peace by Richard Nixon Page A

that America’s desire for partnership with Russia does not imply neglect of their security interests.
    While the collapse of the Soviet empire may be seen as a historically progressive development, the disintegration of the Russian Federation would be a different matter. It is hard to imagine an amicable divorce between the central government in Moscow and the Russian republics and regions. Twice before in Russian history—in the seventeenth century during the so-called Time of Troubles, and at the beginning of the twentieth century during the rule of the Provisional Government of 1917—separatist trends split Russia apart. The separation triggered bloody civil wars and the emergence of governments in Moscow that came to power through the barrel of the gun, reunited Russia with an iron fist, and soon became a menace to Russia’s neighbors.
    It is impossible to overstate the dangers of a civil war in a nation with thousands of nuclear weapons, dozens of nuclear power stations, and numerous depots with chemical and perhaps biological weapons. The consequences of such a conflict would inevitably extend far beyond Russia’s own borders.
    Stability does not mean the re-creation of a unitary state. Russia is too big, too complex, too diverse a country to be run from the Kremlin in an efficient yet democratic way. The most stable arrangement for Russia is a genuine federation as set forthin the new Russian constitution, under which the republics and regions have considerable control over their own affairs and a meaningful voice in the central government.
    The Russian armed forces do not now represent a serious threat to the United States. Russia lacks any serious nonnuclear force projection capability. Its conventional forces are grossly understaffed and underpaid. Military manpower has fallen below the 1.5 million authorized by the former Supreme Soviet and continues to shrink. Draft dodging is a chronic problem: In the spring of 1993, 60 percent of all eligible males avoided the draft. The military does not have the necessary funds for even minimally adequate training, and its logistical base is deteriorating rapidly. Major offensive operations outside the former Soviet region are completely beyond the capability of the Russian military for the foreseeable future. The strategic nuclear forces, in the absence of any serious conflict, are not a significant threat to the United States. Today, with Russia’s GNP roughly a third of the former Soviet Union’s, it will be difficult to rebuild the military machine from scratch.
    At the same time, the West must take note of warning signs on the horizon. Russian military thinking is becoming more nationalistic and more assertive in defense of Russia’s interests in the other former Soviet states bordering on Russia, and more supportive of the use of military force as an instrument of foreign policy.
    Russian policy toward other post-Soviet nations represents the greatest dilemma for the United States. A new attempt by Moscow to rebuild its empire would be a tragedy for Russia and its neighbors alike. In view of the Russian-Soviet historical legacy, it is understandable that Russia’s neighbors are sensitive to any signs of new assertiveness on Moscow’s part. It took Germany and Japan several decades to rehabilitate themselves after World War II, and even today some European and Asian nations are nervous about Berlin’s and Tokyo’s more assertive conduct.
    Perceptions and fears of aggression have real consequencesin that they affect international security. The United States cannot be indifferent to the fears of Russia’s neighbors, particularly because in many instances those fears are based on new, disturbing elements in Russia’s own behavior. There is considerable evidence that Russian security thinking during the two years since the collapse of the Soviet Union has moved in a more aggressive direction. Force has become a more