Beyond Peace by Richard Nixon Page B

acceptable instrument in Russian foreign policy, and the “divide and rule” technique is frequently relied upon by the Kremlin in such places as Georgia and Azerbaijan.
    That Russian policy has become more assertive, even heavy-handed, is not in dispute. Yeltsin and his pro-Western Foreign Minister, Andrei Kozyrev, talk proudly about the newly muscular defense of Russian interests in the “near abroad”—the Russians’ term for the other former Soviet republics. Ukrainian President Kravchuk and former Latvian President Anatoly Gorbunous, now Speaker of the Parliament, are ex-communists and not anti-Russian firebrands. But they personally expressed concern to me last year about the Russian tendency to push their countries around.
    Still, I do not think a new imperialism looms. I have spoken with many Russian politicians of different persuasions, including President Yeltsin, who were nostalgic for at least some aspects of the former Soviet empire. But with the exception of the supernationalistic fringe, all the Russians with whom I have spoken seem to understand that the past can no longer be recreated. Russia’s Defense Minister, General Pavel Grachev, has told me that he was adamantly opposed to any Russian military intervention in former Soviet republics. Others confirmed that the understaffed and poorly supplied Russian armed forces were not enthusiastic about a greater role outside their country’s borders.
    Similarly, both Yegor Gaidar, then the Russian First Deputy Prime Minister, and Oleg Lobov, Secretary of the Russian Federation Security Council, made a strong case to me thatRussia does not want to accept economic responsibility for other newly independent states. Russian monetary and economic policies during the past year have actually been pushing other former Soviet republics out of the ruble zone—hardly a policy one would undertake if planning to re-create the Soviet Union.
    All this does not mean that the United States should not be concerned about heavy-handed Russian actions in the “near abroad.” We should be realistic about our limited leverage in Russia’s backyard and should avoid creating the impression that the United States wants to proceed with a new encirclement of Russia. It would be contrary to our interests to give Moscow the impression that we are prepared to help only as long as Russia remains on its knees. Russia is a great country that deserves to be treated with appropriate respect. U.S. leverage depends upon the perception in Moscow that America is a friendly nation that wishes it well and takes it seriously as a major power. At the same time, Moscow has to be told unequivocally that there is a line beyond which unscrupulous conduct in the “near abroad” will be incompatible with good relations with the United States. In this context, it should be explained in particular that Ukraine and the Baltic States occupy a special place in the American heart and—because of their location in the center of Europe—U.S. strategic thinking. The Russian government is entitled to be made aware that encroachments in that region would seriously damage U.S.-Russian relations.
    It is not premature to indicate to Russia’s leaders at the highest level, quietly, but with complete clarity, that Russia’s conduct is coming dangerously close to the point at which no American administration would be able to ignore it. While appreciating Yeltsin’s need not to surrender the patriotic high ground to reactionaries, we cannot allow his need to outmaneuver political opponents to become a permanent excuse for an aggressive foreign policy.
    It is likely that Russia’s leaders, even those who advocate a more nationalist policy, will be practical about the consequencesof any steps that could be construed in the West as aggression against their neighbors. They will bear in mind the fragility of the political coalitions supporting aid to Russia