Chechnya, mostly denying that violence was taking place despite the overwhelming reports of war crimes.
It’s a remarkable feeling to read those news conference transcripts today. A Russian president, pressed to answer tough questions from the Russian press! You could be forgiven for forgetting that such a moment had ever existed in Russian history. At their conference in Moscow on May 10, 1995, one reporter got straight to the point after hearing Yeltsin’s usual dismissive remarks.
reporter : “President Clinton, you’ve just heard President Yeltsin describe the situation in Chechnya in a way that may be at odds with news dispatches coming from the part of the country describing a massacre. And I wondered if—what your reaction is to his description, whether you accept it, if not why not, and what impact these reports of terrible things there may be having on the countries eager to join NATO, and what you would have to say to him about that?”
Clinton’s response referred to how the civilian casualties and the prolonged fighting in Chechnya had “troubled the rest of the world greatly and have had an impact in Europe on the attitudes of many countries about what is going on here and about future relationships.” He said he had urged Yeltsin to make a cease-fire and “bring this to a speedy resolution,” concluding that “it’s been a difficult thing for them [Russia] as well.”
So then, what could the American president or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) do about a bloody civil war in Russia where tens of thousands of civilians were being displaced, tortured, and murdered? One clue comes from earlier in the same press conference, when President Clinton was asked what he would do about Russia’s continued support for Iran’s nuclear program.
reporter : “Will you resist Republican threats to cut off foreign aid to Russia?”
What!? Yes, this was the situation in 1995! Today, exactly twenty years later, the Iranian nuclear program Russia built is back on the front pages for mostly the same reason: fear over Iran making a nuclear bomb. It all started while American aid was helping keep Russia afloat (and helping Yeltsin get reelected in 1996). Surely making such aid conditional on dropping support for the Iranian nuclear program or on ending the massacre in Chechnya should have been discussed. In fact, such conditionality was discussed quite a bit in the US Congress, in both houses, in 1995 and 1996.
The Russian nuclear agency, MinAtom (succeeded by RosAtom in 2007), brought in desperately needed hard currency and was run with an alarming degree of autonomy. Its chief, Viktor Mikhaylov, had made a secret deal with Iran to deliver a gas centrifuge that would enable them to produce weapons-grade uranium, and he had done so without even telling Yeltsin. The rogue agency also had the support of Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov, who promoted close political and economic ties with Iran.
Clinton recounts in his book that when he first met Yeltsin in the Kremlin on that trip, they “shook hands” on Yeltsin publicly announcing Russia wouldn’t give any nuclear technology to Iran that could be used for military purposes. He duly did so at the press conference, but Yeltsin wouldn’t officially prohibit such weapons-related transfers until August 1996, over a year later.
Many members of Congress were outraged and added conditions to restrict aid to Russia if it continued to support Iran’s nuclear program and to wage war on civilians. But the Clinton administration managed to include a provision in the Russian aid bill to “allow the President to waive this restriction if he deemed it in the interest of US national security. The Administration argued that it was inappropriate to condition aid to Russia on a particular desired behavior in either Iran or Chechnya inasmuch as the aid program was intended to benefit reformist elements in Russia and ultimately facilitate a
It’s a remarkable feeling to read those news conference transcripts today. A Russian president, pressed to answer tough questions from the Russian press! You could be forgiven for forgetting that such a moment had ever existed in Russian history. At their conference in Moscow on May 10, 1995, one reporter got straight to the point after hearing Yeltsin’s usual dismissive remarks.
reporter : “President Clinton, you’ve just heard President Yeltsin describe the situation in Chechnya in a way that may be at odds with news dispatches coming from the part of the country describing a massacre. And I wondered if—what your reaction is to his description, whether you accept it, if not why not, and what impact these reports of terrible things there may be having on the countries eager to join NATO, and what you would have to say to him about that?”
Clinton’s response referred to how the civilian casualties and the prolonged fighting in Chechnya had “troubled the rest of the world greatly and have had an impact in Europe on the attitudes of many countries about what is going on here and about future relationships.” He said he had urged Yeltsin to make a cease-fire and “bring this to a speedy resolution,” concluding that “it’s been a difficult thing for them [Russia] as well.”
So then, what could the American president or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) do about a bloody civil war in Russia where tens of thousands of civilians were being displaced, tortured, and murdered? One clue comes from earlier in the same press conference, when President Clinton was asked what he would do about Russia’s continued support for Iran’s nuclear program.
reporter : “Will you resist Republican threats to cut off foreign aid to Russia?”
What!? Yes, this was the situation in 1995! Today, exactly twenty years later, the Iranian nuclear program Russia built is back on the front pages for mostly the same reason: fear over Iran making a nuclear bomb. It all started while American aid was helping keep Russia afloat (and helping Yeltsin get reelected in 1996). Surely making such aid conditional on dropping support for the Iranian nuclear program or on ending the massacre in Chechnya should have been discussed. In fact, such conditionality was discussed quite a bit in the US Congress, in both houses, in 1995 and 1996.
The Russian nuclear agency, MinAtom (succeeded by RosAtom in 2007), brought in desperately needed hard currency and was run with an alarming degree of autonomy. Its chief, Viktor Mikhaylov, had made a secret deal with Iran to deliver a gas centrifuge that would enable them to produce weapons-grade uranium, and he had done so without even telling Yeltsin. The rogue agency also had the support of Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov, who promoted close political and economic ties with Iran.
Clinton recounts in his book that when he first met Yeltsin in the Kremlin on that trip, they “shook hands” on Yeltsin publicly announcing Russia wouldn’t give any nuclear technology to Iran that could be used for military purposes. He duly did so at the press conference, but Yeltsin wouldn’t officially prohibit such weapons-related transfers until August 1996, over a year later.
Many members of Congress were outraged and added conditions to restrict aid to Russia if it continued to support Iran’s nuclear program and to wage war on civilians. But the Clinton administration managed to include a provision in the Russian aid bill to “allow the President to waive this restriction if he deemed it in the interest of US national security. The Administration argued that it was inappropriate to condition aid to Russia on a particular desired behavior in either Iran or Chechnya inasmuch as the aid program was intended to benefit reformist elements in Russia and ultimately facilitate a
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