against the giant nuclear-backed war machine of Vladimir Putin and the United States tells Ukraine sorry, but it should have read the fine print in Budapest?
To answer my own question, it tells the world that American security promises are worthless (and British ones, for good measure). The only point of Budapest was to demonstrate to any potential aggressor—all eyes on the Russian bear next door, obviously—that the United States was putting Ukraine under its nuclear wing. If such displays are meaningless, and having one’s own nuclear weapon is the only way to be safe from aggression, it will not take long for other countries to move full speed toward acquiring them. Japan and Taiwan count on America to deter China. South Korea counts on America to deter North Korea. And whether they admit to it or not, half of the nations in the
Middle East have rejected a push for nuclear weapons to match Israel’s because of America’s long shadow. It is difficult to see that restraint lasting very long if President Obama continues to meet Russian military aggression with weak sanctions, worthless negotiations, and expressions of deep concern.
Since he is still very much a public figure, Bill Clinton himself should be asked what he thinks of Obama’s indifferent attitude about the document Clinton signed in Budapest. Especially since they are of the same party and Hillary Clinton served in Obama’s cabinet as secretary of state. It probably never occurred to any of the reporters in Budapest to ask Clinton what his administration would do if Russia rolled tanks into Ukraine as they have now done, but I would very much like to hear his answer today.
There is an irresistible tendency to look only for big moments in history. While such moments do exist, long-term trends and patterns usually matter more than any one decision or event. When we talk about the collapse of Russia’s democracy and the Western appeasement that facilitated its collapse, it is important to look at how each moment fit into an overall pattern.
Bush 41 supported Mikhail Gorbachev to a fault and to the bitter end. Bill Clinton’s administration was similarly enamored of Boris Yeltsin and supported him at the expense of a coherent and consistent policy of pressuring for economic reform and democracy in Russia. As I’ll discuss in the next chapter, Bush 43 made the same mistake with Putin by putting his trust in an individual instead of the democratic institutions, policies, and principles Russia so badly needed. The West would find someone they liked, or felt they could work with, and jump in with both feet. When the results inevitably failed to live up to the unrealistic hopes, it was awkward or impossible to back away.
At the same time, American authority and credibility on the global stage was being whittled away throughout the 1990s. The
United States looked all powerful at the end of the Cold War, like the Wizard of Oz before the curtain was pulled back. By 1999, when Clinton finally got it right in Kosovo, the curtain had been pulled back, torn down, and burned in effigy. The “Blackhawk Down” catastrophe in Somalia, the genocides in Yugoslavia and Rwanda, conceding to Russia on Chechnya and limiting NATO expansion: each was a blow to global stability and its supposed guarantors in the United States and the European Union.
Far from the imperial overreach and hegemonic tendencies that Russia and China kept warning about, the United States retreated instead. By 1998, Clinton’s personal credibility was also diminishing rapidly. The Monica Lewinsky scandal exploded in the headlines in January. The media circus, trial, and impeachment became a huge distraction for the government and the American people. Later in the year, Clinton had his wag-the-dog moment when he ordered a cruise missile strike on what turned out to be a benign pharmaceutical factory in Sudan.
As convenient as it would be to put all the blame for the collapse of Russian
To answer my own question, it tells the world that American security promises are worthless (and British ones, for good measure). The only point of Budapest was to demonstrate to any potential aggressor—all eyes on the Russian bear next door, obviously—that the United States was putting Ukraine under its nuclear wing. If such displays are meaningless, and having one’s own nuclear weapon is the only way to be safe from aggression, it will not take long for other countries to move full speed toward acquiring them. Japan and Taiwan count on America to deter China. South Korea counts on America to deter North Korea. And whether they admit to it or not, half of the nations in the
Middle East have rejected a push for nuclear weapons to match Israel’s because of America’s long shadow. It is difficult to see that restraint lasting very long if President Obama continues to meet Russian military aggression with weak sanctions, worthless negotiations, and expressions of deep concern.
Since he is still very much a public figure, Bill Clinton himself should be asked what he thinks of Obama’s indifferent attitude about the document Clinton signed in Budapest. Especially since they are of the same party and Hillary Clinton served in Obama’s cabinet as secretary of state. It probably never occurred to any of the reporters in Budapest to ask Clinton what his administration would do if Russia rolled tanks into Ukraine as they have now done, but I would very much like to hear his answer today.
There is an irresistible tendency to look only for big moments in history. While such moments do exist, long-term trends and patterns usually matter more than any one decision or event. When we talk about the collapse of Russia’s democracy and the Western appeasement that facilitated its collapse, it is important to look at how each moment fit into an overall pattern.
Bush 41 supported Mikhail Gorbachev to a fault and to the bitter end. Bill Clinton’s administration was similarly enamored of Boris Yeltsin and supported him at the expense of a coherent and consistent policy of pressuring for economic reform and democracy in Russia. As I’ll discuss in the next chapter, Bush 43 made the same mistake with Putin by putting his trust in an individual instead of the democratic institutions, policies, and principles Russia so badly needed. The West would find someone they liked, or felt they could work with, and jump in with both feet. When the results inevitably failed to live up to the unrealistic hopes, it was awkward or impossible to back away.
At the same time, American authority and credibility on the global stage was being whittled away throughout the 1990s. The
United States looked all powerful at the end of the Cold War, like the Wizard of Oz before the curtain was pulled back. By 1999, when Clinton finally got it right in Kosovo, the curtain had been pulled back, torn down, and burned in effigy. The “Blackhawk Down” catastrophe in Somalia, the genocides in Yugoslavia and Rwanda, conceding to Russia on Chechnya and limiting NATO expansion: each was a blow to global stability and its supposed guarantors in the United States and the European Union.
Far from the imperial overreach and hegemonic tendencies that Russia and China kept warning about, the United States retreated instead. By 1998, Clinton’s personal credibility was also diminishing rapidly. The Monica Lewinsky scandal exploded in the headlines in January. The media circus, trial, and impeachment became a huge distraction for the government and the American people. Later in the year, Clinton had his wag-the-dog moment when he ordered a cruise missile strike on what turned out to be a benign pharmaceutical factory in Sudan.
As convenient as it would be to put all the blame for the collapse of Russian
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