known in war broke the centre of the French line of armies, and in forty-eight hours threatened to cut all the northern armies alike from their southern communications and from the sea. By the 14th at the latest the French High Command should have given imperative orders to these armies to make a general retreat at full speed, accepting not only risks but heavy losses of material. This issue was not faced in its brutal realism by General Gamelin. The French commander of the northern group, Billotte, was incapable of taking the necessary decisions himself. Confusion reigned throughout the armies of the threatened left wing.
As the superior power of the enemy was felt, they fell back. As the turning movement swung round their right, they formed a defensive flank. If they had started back on the 14th, they could have been on their old line by the 17th and would have had a good chance of fighting their way out. At least three mortal days were lost. From the 17th onwards the British War Cabinet saw clearly that an immediate fighting march southward would alone save the British Army. They were resolved to press their view upon the French Government and General Gamelin, but their own commander, Lord Gort, was doubtful whether it was possible to disengage the fighting fronts, and still more to break through at the same time. On the 19th, General Gamelin was dismissed, and Weygand reigned in his stead. Gamelin’s “Instruction No. 12,” his last order, though five days late, was sound in principle, and also in conformity with the main conclusions of the British War Cabinet and Chiefs of Staff. The change in the supreme command, or want of command, led to another three days’ delay. The spirited plan which General Weygand proposed after visiting the northern armies was never more than a paper scheme. In the main it was the Gamelin plan, rendered still more hopeless by further delay.
In the hideous dilemma which now presented itself, we accepted the Weygand plan and made loyal and persistent, though now ineffectual, efforts to carry it out until the 25th, when, all the communications being cut, our weak counter-attack being repulsed with the loss of Arras, the Belgian front being broken and King Leopold about to capitulate, all hope of escape to the southward vanished. There remained only the sea. Could we reach it, or must we be surrounded and broken up in the open field? In any case the whole artillery and equipment of our army, irreplaceable for many months, must be lost. But what was that compared with saving the army, the nucleus and structure upon which alone Britain could build her armies of the future? Lord Gort, who had from the 25th onwards felt that evacuation by sea was our only chance, now proceeded to form a bridgehead around Dunkirk and to fight his way into it with what strength remained. All the discipline of the British, and the qualities of their commanders, who included Brooke, Alexander, and Montgomery, were to be needed. Much more was to be needed. All that man could do was done. Would it be enough?
* * * * *
A much-disputed episode must now be examined: General Halder, Chief of the German General Staff, has declared that at this moment Hitler made his only effective direct personal intervention in the battle. He became, according to this authority, “alarmed about the armoured formations because they were in considerable danger in a difficult country, honeycombed with canals, without being able to attain any vital results.” He felt he could not sacrifice armoured formations uselessly, as they were essential to the second stage of the campaign. He believed, no doubt, that his air superiority would be sufficient to prevent a large-scale evacuation by sea. He therefore, according to Halder, sent a message to him through Brauchitsch, ordering “the armoured formations to be stopped, the points even taken back.” Thus, says Halder, the way to Dunkirk was cleared for the British Army. At any rate we
As the superior power of the enemy was felt, they fell back. As the turning movement swung round their right, they formed a defensive flank. If they had started back on the 14th, they could have been on their old line by the 17th and would have had a good chance of fighting their way out. At least three mortal days were lost. From the 17th onwards the British War Cabinet saw clearly that an immediate fighting march southward would alone save the British Army. They were resolved to press their view upon the French Government and General Gamelin, but their own commander, Lord Gort, was doubtful whether it was possible to disengage the fighting fronts, and still more to break through at the same time. On the 19th, General Gamelin was dismissed, and Weygand reigned in his stead. Gamelin’s “Instruction No. 12,” his last order, though five days late, was sound in principle, and also in conformity with the main conclusions of the British War Cabinet and Chiefs of Staff. The change in the supreme command, or want of command, led to another three days’ delay. The spirited plan which General Weygand proposed after visiting the northern armies was never more than a paper scheme. In the main it was the Gamelin plan, rendered still more hopeless by further delay.
In the hideous dilemma which now presented itself, we accepted the Weygand plan and made loyal and persistent, though now ineffectual, efforts to carry it out until the 25th, when, all the communications being cut, our weak counter-attack being repulsed with the loss of Arras, the Belgian front being broken and King Leopold about to capitulate, all hope of escape to the southward vanished. There remained only the sea. Could we reach it, or must we be surrounded and broken up in the open field? In any case the whole artillery and equipment of our army, irreplaceable for many months, must be lost. But what was that compared with saving the army, the nucleus and structure upon which alone Britain could build her armies of the future? Lord Gort, who had from the 25th onwards felt that evacuation by sea was our only chance, now proceeded to form a bridgehead around Dunkirk and to fight his way into it with what strength remained. All the discipline of the British, and the qualities of their commanders, who included Brooke, Alexander, and Montgomery, were to be needed. Much more was to be needed. All that man could do was done. Would it be enough?
* * * * *
A much-disputed episode must now be examined: General Halder, Chief of the German General Staff, has declared that at this moment Hitler made his only effective direct personal intervention in the battle. He became, according to this authority, “alarmed about the armoured formations because they were in considerable danger in a difficult country, honeycombed with canals, without being able to attain any vital results.” He felt he could not sacrifice armoured formations uselessly, as they were essential to the second stage of the campaign. He believed, no doubt, that his air superiority would be sufficient to prevent a large-scale evacuation by sea. He therefore, according to Halder, sent a message to him through Brauchitsch, ordering “the armoured formations to be stopped, the points even taken back.” Thus, says Halder, the way to Dunkirk was cleared for the British Army. At any rate we
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