confidence and courage of those running the company who were not scared of making light of a very sensitive subject.
The growth continued throughout the war and by 1917 was causing such overcrowding on the tube system that it engendered widespread criticism in the press and even Parliament. The limitations of the technology as originally designed were beginning to be felt. The attendant-operated lifts were slow and there was a shortage of rolling stock, exacerbated by the difficulty of getting spares during the war, which meant many trains were shorter than normal. Although some improvements were being made, such as controlling the lifts from landings (which was faster as well as saving labour), and replacing hydraulic operation with electric lifts or escalators, these were long-term investment programmes which would take decades to complete and had little short-term impact. The overcrowding problem was exacerbated when in May 1918 the government, through the Board of Trade (whose president was now none other than Sir Albert Stanley) 6 , ordered a cutback in services because of concern over coal shortages, and several stations had to be closed early or on Sundays. Despite all the problems, overall use of the Underground increased by two thirds during the course of the war, and by the end of the conflict half of all passenger journeys in the capital were on the Underground system.
In terms of the numbers of trains, the busiest section was the Metropolitan’s City widened lines, the link built fifty years previously to allow trains to go from Farringdon across the river and into the overground rail network. This was still one of only three rail connections through London, and the most direct. Therefore it had carried an extraordinary number of troop and other special military trains, a total of 26,000 during the war, an average of sixteen trains per day. At peak periods, in a build-up to an offensive, the traffic was much greater than that, reaching, for example, 210 trains daily for the first fortnight of 1915.
To cope with the crowds on the tube lines, various short-term measures were introduced, including barriers at platforms which slid open once the alighting passengers had left and queuing systems at the busier stations, but in reality little could be done to improve the situation except to increase the overall capacity. It is no exaggeration to suggest that the war made both government and the population realize the extent to which the Underground system was a vital part of the infrastructure of the capital – and even of the nation. The increased usage was so great that, together with a rise in fares of one third, it enabled modest dividends to be paid to all the various shareholders of the companies making up the Combine – with the exception of the District which was still unable to provide its owners with any return whatsoever. The Underground system came of age in the Great War, and now, with Stanley back at the helm after his stint in government, the stage was set for expanding and consolidating the network.
ELEVEN
REACHING OUT
While the short-term effect of the war had been to halt progress on a number of planned developments on the Underground system, the increase in passengers strengthened the case for these extensions to be built. Stanley understood that it would always be difficult to justify these new sections stretching far out into the suburbs and countryside in purely economic terms. Of course, they would generate additional traffic, but that would not be enough to compensate shareholders adequately for their investment and risk. The war therefore marked the end of the pretence that the Underground could be a solely private enterprise; all future work would have a public component in its funding.
Stanley had returned to the Underground after resigning as President of the Board of Trade in 1919 and became Lord Ashfield of Southwell in the 1920 New Year’s Honours list. The two years at
The growth continued throughout the war and by 1917 was causing such overcrowding on the tube system that it engendered widespread criticism in the press and even Parliament. The limitations of the technology as originally designed were beginning to be felt. The attendant-operated lifts were slow and there was a shortage of rolling stock, exacerbated by the difficulty of getting spares during the war, which meant many trains were shorter than normal. Although some improvements were being made, such as controlling the lifts from landings (which was faster as well as saving labour), and replacing hydraulic operation with electric lifts or escalators, these were long-term investment programmes which would take decades to complete and had little short-term impact. The overcrowding problem was exacerbated when in May 1918 the government, through the Board of Trade (whose president was now none other than Sir Albert Stanley) 6 , ordered a cutback in services because of concern over coal shortages, and several stations had to be closed early or on Sundays. Despite all the problems, overall use of the Underground increased by two thirds during the course of the war, and by the end of the conflict half of all passenger journeys in the capital were on the Underground system.
In terms of the numbers of trains, the busiest section was the Metropolitan’s City widened lines, the link built fifty years previously to allow trains to go from Farringdon across the river and into the overground rail network. This was still one of only three rail connections through London, and the most direct. Therefore it had carried an extraordinary number of troop and other special military trains, a total of 26,000 during the war, an average of sixteen trains per day. At peak periods, in a build-up to an offensive, the traffic was much greater than that, reaching, for example, 210 trains daily for the first fortnight of 1915.
To cope with the crowds on the tube lines, various short-term measures were introduced, including barriers at platforms which slid open once the alighting passengers had left and queuing systems at the busier stations, but in reality little could be done to improve the situation except to increase the overall capacity. It is no exaggeration to suggest that the war made both government and the population realize the extent to which the Underground system was a vital part of the infrastructure of the capital – and even of the nation. The increased usage was so great that, together with a rise in fares of one third, it enabled modest dividends to be paid to all the various shareholders of the companies making up the Combine – with the exception of the District which was still unable to provide its owners with any return whatsoever. The Underground system came of age in the Great War, and now, with Stanley back at the helm after his stint in government, the stage was set for expanding and consolidating the network.
ELEVEN
REACHING OUT
While the short-term effect of the war had been to halt progress on a number of planned developments on the Underground system, the increase in passengers strengthened the case for these extensions to be built. Stanley understood that it would always be difficult to justify these new sections stretching far out into the suburbs and countryside in purely economic terms. Of course, they would generate additional traffic, but that would not be enough to compensate shareholders adequately for their investment and risk. The war therefore marked the end of the pretence that the Underground could be a solely private enterprise; all future work would have a public component in its funding.
Stanley had returned to the Underground after resigning as President of the Board of Trade in 1919 and became Lord Ashfield of Southwell in the 1920 New Year’s Honours list. The two years at
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