of the most hated words and which had endured as a rigid class taboo—‘officer’, ofitser —closed the circle completely. Side by side with the privileges, however, went the penalties; during the autumn of 1942 penal-battalions, the strafbats (with special officer penal-battalions) were introduced into the Red Army.Discipline was screwed tighter and tighter; the commissars were militarized; the less the obligation to ‘socialism’, the greater the duty to sheer professionalism and strict military orthodoxy. At the same time, the party organs within the armed forces were restructured to compensate for the loss of direct influence: the battalion party organization became the fundamental unit of party activity (previously it had been at regimental level), with the object of bringing the widest range of ‘officers, sergeants and men’ into the circle of party influence. The Central Committee pronouncement of 24 May assigned to the battalion party organization the position of ‘primary party organization’. There was also a defensive as well as a compensating aspect to this reorganization, for the officers were now inclined to press their military advantages to the full and already by February 1943 some of the previous army–party tension had begun to reassert itself. One of the chief targets of discontent within the military was the ‘military soviet’ system (with its separate representation for the political apparatus), which senior officers sought to displace.
Far-reaching though this face-lift was, the crucial change had come with the stabilization of the very highest level of the Soviet command, within the compass of Supreme Commander–Deputy Supreme Commander–Stavka . In August 1942 Zhukov had taken over as Stalin’s ‘deputy’, a post formalized as Deputy to the Supreme Commander, and Vasilevskii had only just taken over the General Staff. Almost at once, Vasilevskii spent a great deal of time away from Moscow, involved as he was with the planning of the Stalingrad operations. This, in turn, threw an immense strain on the General Staff, in particular upon the head of the Operations Section, where there was a rapid turnover in officers. A.I. Bodin held this post in June–July 1942 (he was later killed on the Trans-Caucasus Front), then came A.N. Bogolyubov, V.D. Ivanov (who in January 1943 was severely wounded on the Voronezh Front), as well as P.G. Tikhomirov, P.P. Vechnyi, and Sh.N. Geniatulin. At one point even the commissar attached to the General Staff, Maj.-Gen. F.E. Bokov, took over the duties of chief, a post far beyond his capabilities for all his amiableness and his career as a party official. While at the front, Vasilevskii kept in contact with Front commanders through the General Staff signals units that followed him on his travels. At noon he reported to Stalin on developments which had taken place during the previous night, and at 21–2200 hours he reported on the day’s events. Urgent matters were signalled at once. Vasilevskii’s report was based on information received from Operations Section, where each officer responsible for a ‘sector’ or ‘axis’—the napravlentsy —compiled the data. While out of Moscow, Vasilevskii confined his basic report to the operations he was presently ‘co-ordinating’, though he found it ‘a rare day’ when Stalin had no question about the other fronts or raised no query about the movement of reserves. The Stavka was a personal staff which served Stalin as Supreme Commander, and the General Staff in turn served the Stavka as an operational planning group. For this reason, the head of the Operations Section, as well as the other administrations of the General Staff (transport, signals,intelligence) and the Defence Commissariat, had a key role. The Chief of Operations and the heads of administrations kept their nachalniki napravlenii , specialists for given theatres and fronts, always on call; these officers assembled in what they called
Far-reaching though this face-lift was, the crucial change had come with the stabilization of the very highest level of the Soviet command, within the compass of Supreme Commander–Deputy Supreme Commander–Stavka . In August 1942 Zhukov had taken over as Stalin’s ‘deputy’, a post formalized as Deputy to the Supreme Commander, and Vasilevskii had only just taken over the General Staff. Almost at once, Vasilevskii spent a great deal of time away from Moscow, involved as he was with the planning of the Stalingrad operations. This, in turn, threw an immense strain on the General Staff, in particular upon the head of the Operations Section, where there was a rapid turnover in officers. A.I. Bodin held this post in June–July 1942 (he was later killed on the Trans-Caucasus Front), then came A.N. Bogolyubov, V.D. Ivanov (who in January 1943 was severely wounded on the Voronezh Front), as well as P.G. Tikhomirov, P.P. Vechnyi, and Sh.N. Geniatulin. At one point even the commissar attached to the General Staff, Maj.-Gen. F.E. Bokov, took over the duties of chief, a post far beyond his capabilities for all his amiableness and his career as a party official. While at the front, Vasilevskii kept in contact with Front commanders through the General Staff signals units that followed him on his travels. At noon he reported to Stalin on developments which had taken place during the previous night, and at 21–2200 hours he reported on the day’s events. Urgent matters were signalled at once. Vasilevskii’s report was based on information received from Operations Section, where each officer responsible for a ‘sector’ or ‘axis’—the napravlentsy —compiled the data. While out of Moscow, Vasilevskii confined his basic report to the operations he was presently ‘co-ordinating’, though he found it ‘a rare day’ when Stalin had no question about the other fronts or raised no query about the movement of reserves. The Stavka was a personal staff which served Stalin as Supreme Commander, and the General Staff in turn served the Stavka as an operational planning group. For this reason, the head of the Operations Section, as well as the other administrations of the General Staff (transport, signals,intelligence) and the Defence Commissariat, had a key role. The Chief of Operations and the heads of administrations kept their nachalniki napravlenii , specialists for given theatres and fronts, always on call; these officers assembled in what they called
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