‘the dressing room’, working or resting, ready to answer a summons from Stalin at a Stavka session in the Kremlin war-room. Either they supplied the requisite information to their chiefs or else they attended the Stavka session in person to present detailed situation reports.
The news in December 1942 that Lt.-Gen. A.I. Antonov, chief of staff to the Trans-Caucasus Front, was to become Chief of Operations raised a few sceptical eyebrows and prompted remarks that he would probably last as long as the others—after two or three ‘journeys’ to the Stavka , they were marched out for good on Stalin’s orders, hence the rapid turnover in personnel. Forty-six years of age, Antonov had emerged from the pre-war staff courses generally recognized as a very talented staff officer. In June 1941 he was chief of staff in the Kiev military district, served as chief of staff to the Southern Front (August 1941) and then in the Caucasus. His reputation with Stalin and the senior officer ‘permanent members’ of the Stavka was already high when in December 1942 Vasilevskii recommended him as Chief of Operations with the General Staff. Unlike his predecessors, Antonov did not rush to put in an appearance at a Stavka session; he worked for a full week, familiarizing himself with the overall situation before presenting himself to a summons. The critics and sceptics, sure that it would be a case as before of ‘a few visits and then—out’, were confounded. The first encounters with the Stavka passed off very smoothly and Antonov quickly put an end to the vigils in the ‘dressing room’ where so many officers had previously kicked their heels.
So well did Antonov acquit himself that within a month Stalin despatched him as Stavka representative to the Voronezh Front, where he arrived on 10 January, first to assist Vasilevskii and second to prepare recommendations for the Stavka on future operations. None of this impinged in the slightest on Stalin’s methods of command control, which demanded absolute obedience and ruthless punishment if caught in any infringement of ‘the rules’. During the liquidation of the Stalingrad pocket, Voronov was not allowed to begin the second stage of his operations since Karpovka had to be taken first; in fact, Voronov had launched the second phase but Stalin demanded that Voronov report ‘specially’ on the capture of Karpovka. Earlier, during the critical Kotelnikovo fighting, Stalin had refused to accept Vasilevskii’s recommendations about switching 2nd Guards Army from the inner encirclement. If Stalin was not better informed, he was at least now better advised; under Antonov’s new regime he usually asked for ‘the General Staff evaluation’ while weighing the reports of the Front commanders. Antonov presented his materials for Stalin in three sets of files, red for urgent matters (draft directives and orders), blue for matters of lower priority, and finally the green (which needed careful choice about the moment to present them), covering promotions and appointments.
On the fronts, Stalin had two sets of representatives, those from the Stavka and his civilian supervisors who joined military soviets as the political member (in addition to the commander and the chief of staff). For critically important operations, the top officers were on hand as Stavka representatives, either to supervise preparation or ‘co-ordinate’ execution (or both). Marshal Zhukov had supervised the preparations for the Voronezh Front attack on the middle Don, after which he moved to the north-west even though Marshal Voroshilov had been sent to the Leningrad area by Stalin as Stavka representative. Marshal Timoshenko had also taken over the North-Western Front but this did not preclude the ‘co-ordination’ of Marshals Zhukov and Voronov. Vasilevskii, joined by Antonov, remained with the Voronezh and Bryansk Fronts as the focus of attention shifted from the south itself into the northern Ukraine. From the
The news in December 1942 that Lt.-Gen. A.I. Antonov, chief of staff to the Trans-Caucasus Front, was to become Chief of Operations raised a few sceptical eyebrows and prompted remarks that he would probably last as long as the others—after two or three ‘journeys’ to the Stavka , they were marched out for good on Stalin’s orders, hence the rapid turnover in personnel. Forty-six years of age, Antonov had emerged from the pre-war staff courses generally recognized as a very talented staff officer. In June 1941 he was chief of staff in the Kiev military district, served as chief of staff to the Southern Front (August 1941) and then in the Caucasus. His reputation with Stalin and the senior officer ‘permanent members’ of the Stavka was already high when in December 1942 Vasilevskii recommended him as Chief of Operations with the General Staff. Unlike his predecessors, Antonov did not rush to put in an appearance at a Stavka session; he worked for a full week, familiarizing himself with the overall situation before presenting himself to a summons. The critics and sceptics, sure that it would be a case as before of ‘a few visits and then—out’, were confounded. The first encounters with the Stavka passed off very smoothly and Antonov quickly put an end to the vigils in the ‘dressing room’ where so many officers had previously kicked their heels.
So well did Antonov acquit himself that within a month Stalin despatched him as Stavka representative to the Voronezh Front, where he arrived on 10 January, first to assist Vasilevskii and second to prepare recommendations for the Stavka on future operations. None of this impinged in the slightest on Stalin’s methods of command control, which demanded absolute obedience and ruthless punishment if caught in any infringement of ‘the rules’. During the liquidation of the Stalingrad pocket, Voronov was not allowed to begin the second stage of his operations since Karpovka had to be taken first; in fact, Voronov had launched the second phase but Stalin demanded that Voronov report ‘specially’ on the capture of Karpovka. Earlier, during the critical Kotelnikovo fighting, Stalin had refused to accept Vasilevskii’s recommendations about switching 2nd Guards Army from the inner encirclement. If Stalin was not better informed, he was at least now better advised; under Antonov’s new regime he usually asked for ‘the General Staff evaluation’ while weighing the reports of the Front commanders. Antonov presented his materials for Stalin in three sets of files, red for urgent matters (draft directives and orders), blue for matters of lower priority, and finally the green (which needed careful choice about the moment to present them), covering promotions and appointments.
On the fronts, Stalin had two sets of representatives, those from the Stavka and his civilian supervisors who joined military soviets as the political member (in addition to the commander and the chief of staff). For critically important operations, the top officers were on hand as Stavka representatives, either to supervise preparation or ‘co-ordinate’ execution (or both). Marshal Zhukov had supervised the preparations for the Voronezh Front attack on the middle Don, after which he moved to the north-west even though Marshal Voroshilov had been sent to the Leningrad area by Stalin as Stavka representative. Marshal Timoshenko had also taken over the North-Western Front but this did not preclude the ‘co-ordination’ of Marshals Zhukov and Voronov. Vasilevskii, joined by Antonov, remained with the Voronezh and Bryansk Fronts as the focus of attention shifted from the south itself into the northern Ukraine. From the
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