The President's Call: Executive Leadership From FDR to George Bush by Judith E. Michaels
Authors: Judith E. Michaels
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to happen on their watch." They think politicization is the way to accomplish it.
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Partisans of political leadership (and these almost always include the incumbent set of leaders) are doers, not doubters. They want tools, not obstacles. To the extent that doubts exist about the willingness of career administrators to carry out faithfully the policy directions of the political leadership, career administrators are viewed by political actors as impediments rather than implements. Partisans of politics, consequently, typically look to enhance procedures for control and supervision of the permanent administrative apparatus and, when deemed necessary, to politicize it. (Aberbach and Rockman 1988, 606)
Partisans of political leadership often use the concept and language of mandate, with the logic that presidential election confers automatic rights of sole determination of policy direction. This rationale is favored by theorists such as Nathan, Lowi, Rosen, Lynch, and Moe. Increasingly, those advocating strong presidential control want complete command of civil servants, as well. ''As ex-White House aide (and not just coincidentally also ex-convict) John Ehrlichman so starkly put it . . . : 'When we say jump, the answer should be, how high?"' (Aberbach and Rockman 1988, 607).
Others, however, point to this nation's system of divided authority, checks and balances, in which other entities, such as the Congress and the judiciary, press legitimate claims to authority. They see a similar role for the career bureaucracy.
Partisans of the career or administrative perspective believe that a professional bureaucracy is necessary to achieve its goal of effective government. "Partisans of the career administration, on the other hand, view it as the ballast that maintains the ship of state in unsteady seas. Its resistor-like qualities to the super-charged enthusiasm of new political leaders are seen as a virtue, not a vicea deterrent, in fact, to longer-run damage inflicted by political leaders on themselves as well as on the organizational fabric of government" (ibid., 606). Charges of career sabotage of changes in policy direction are not substantiated when good management practices are followed. In fact,
good management, as reflected in open channels of communication, willingness to listen to advice, clear articulation of goals, and mutual respect . . . may also constitute good politics for department secretaries or their assistant secretaries. No evidence shows that good management is incompatible with effective politics unless the imposition of stringent command procedures is regarded as an integral part of a presidential administration's political style. The anti-bureaucratic styles of recent ad-
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ministrations suggest that this symbolic component has become at least as important as achieving results. (Ibid., 609)
While politicization and centralization strategies have their place in the political landscape, their exact placement is a question of degree. Carried to extremes, they are schemes for sole presidential rule and are ultimately destructive to the effectiveness of the career bureaucracy on which government management turns. "The issue is not whether responsiveness should be promoted, but rather how reflexively and to whom." Attempts at presidential aggrandizement through politicization will only "rob government of its capability for reality testing, and it is without doubt a model for demoralization of the career service" (ibid., 609).
Furthermore, presidents and political administrators need career administrators to apply the brakes on occasion. Said one PAS:
One of the major functions . . . of the permanent apparatus is to serve presidents by helping them avoid stupid mistakes that threaten their political viability. The urge to command and to centralize often fails to recognize that political impulses should be subjected to tests of sobriety. Though there are a good many reasons to argue on behalf of the
Page 54
Partisans of political leadership (and these almost always include the incumbent set of leaders) are doers, not doubters. They want tools, not obstacles. To the extent that doubts exist about the willingness of career administrators to carry out faithfully the policy directions of the political leadership, career administrators are viewed by political actors as impediments rather than implements. Partisans of politics, consequently, typically look to enhance procedures for control and supervision of the permanent administrative apparatus and, when deemed necessary, to politicize it. (Aberbach and Rockman 1988, 606)
Partisans of political leadership often use the concept and language of mandate, with the logic that presidential election confers automatic rights of sole determination of policy direction. This rationale is favored by theorists such as Nathan, Lowi, Rosen, Lynch, and Moe. Increasingly, those advocating strong presidential control want complete command of civil servants, as well. ''As ex-White House aide (and not just coincidentally also ex-convict) John Ehrlichman so starkly put it . . . : 'When we say jump, the answer should be, how high?"' (Aberbach and Rockman 1988, 607).
Others, however, point to this nation's system of divided authority, checks and balances, in which other entities, such as the Congress and the judiciary, press legitimate claims to authority. They see a similar role for the career bureaucracy.
Partisans of the career or administrative perspective believe that a professional bureaucracy is necessary to achieve its goal of effective government. "Partisans of the career administration, on the other hand, view it as the ballast that maintains the ship of state in unsteady seas. Its resistor-like qualities to the super-charged enthusiasm of new political leaders are seen as a virtue, not a vicea deterrent, in fact, to longer-run damage inflicted by political leaders on themselves as well as on the organizational fabric of government" (ibid., 606). Charges of career sabotage of changes in policy direction are not substantiated when good management practices are followed. In fact,
good management, as reflected in open channels of communication, willingness to listen to advice, clear articulation of goals, and mutual respect . . . may also constitute good politics for department secretaries or their assistant secretaries. No evidence shows that good management is incompatible with effective politics unless the imposition of stringent command procedures is regarded as an integral part of a presidential administration's political style. The anti-bureaucratic styles of recent ad-
Page 55
ministrations suggest that this symbolic component has become at least as important as achieving results. (Ibid., 609)
While politicization and centralization strategies have their place in the political landscape, their exact placement is a question of degree. Carried to extremes, they are schemes for sole presidential rule and are ultimately destructive to the effectiveness of the career bureaucracy on which government management turns. "The issue is not whether responsiveness should be promoted, but rather how reflexively and to whom." Attempts at presidential aggrandizement through politicization will only "rob government of its capability for reality testing, and it is without doubt a model for demoralization of the career service" (ibid., 609).
Furthermore, presidents and political administrators need career administrators to apply the brakes on occasion. Said one PAS:
One of the major functions . . . of the permanent apparatus is to serve presidents by helping them avoid stupid mistakes that threaten their political viability. The urge to command and to centralize often fails to recognize that political impulses should be subjected to tests of sobriety. Though there are a good many reasons to argue on behalf of the
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