The President's Call: Executive Leadership From FDR to George Bush by Judith E. Michaels Page A
Authors: Judith E. Michaels
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basic idea of "neutral competence" and against the politicization of all executive organizations, the most fundamental one that a president ought to consider is the avoidance of error and illegality that have wracked recent presidencies. (Ibid., 610)
Or, as he succinctly put it, "We do some stupid things. Trust the judgment of careerists in substantive issues . . . their program identification is very high but not partisan."
While some would argue that politicization of the federal bureaucracy is in the president's interest or in the public interest, neither rationale is likely to be true and, in fact, attempts at politicization invite retaliation by the Congress.
Nixon's fall from power was paved by the Watergate break-in, but it had as much to do with abuses of the executive as anything else. Even had Watergate not occurred, but with Congress remaining in the hands of the Democratic opposition, it is hard to imagine that the congressional hand would have been stayed for long. The revelations of 1986-87 involving the White House-NSC operation of arms shipments to Iran and laundered funds to the Nicaraguan contras also threatens to erode fatally the polit-
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ical standing and the policy credibility of the Reagan presidency. Operating through the back door and around the institutionalized apparatus of government can lead to decisions and illegalities that are truly presidency-threatening. It is hard to imagine that this is in a president's interests. (Ibid., 610)
The presidentialist literature, as represented by Nathan and Moe, urges reform of the political system to make it more amenable to presidential control through politicization of the bureaucracy and centralization of command in the executive. However, when presidents with shortterm vision or goals make maximum use of these administrative tools, they are likely to provoke congressional retaliation and judicial stop signs in the long term.
If swift and sure congressional retaliation were a given in the game, presidents would learn to replace their competitive behavior with norms of cooperative behavior. However, there is scant hope for this eventuality because presidents have incentives to operate with a short time frame, rather than with a longer one, and Congress does not hold them accountable for the latter.
If presidents follow their short-term interests, they are likely to stimulate more and more restrictive congressional bonds on their behavior, thereby giving presidents incentives to engage in the types of behavior exemplified by the Iran-Contra Affair. Yet each individual president is likely to put his short-term interests above the institution's interests. As in many other aspects of American politics, Congress is key here. It will ultimately determine the kind of presidency we get. It must act expeditiously when presidents arrogate for their exclusive use constitutionally shared authority. Otherwise, presidents will take as theirs what Congress by its inaction bestows. (Ibid., 611)
Depoliticization and Debureaucratization: Push and Pull on Appointees
As Mosher observes, the claim that "the government of the United States is run not by career ministers but by amateurs" is something of an exaggeration.
A substantial part of the government is in fact run by career officials and under laws that permit little discretion; and a good many noncareer officials are in fact professionals, not amateurs. Yet the central fact remains:
Page 57
a relatively small number of political appointees, whose tenure is typically temporary, are presumed to govern the activities of [the 4.25 million, excluding the 600,000 employees of the U.S. Postal system] mostly permanent federal employees in the civil service, the military services, and other career systems. The politically appointed and presumably responsive executives amount to less than one-tenth of one percent of total direct federal employment. (Mosher 1985, 405)
The institution of the federal bureaucracy exists
Or, as he succinctly put it, "We do some stupid things. Trust the judgment of careerists in substantive issues . . . their program identification is very high but not partisan."
While some would argue that politicization of the federal bureaucracy is in the president's interest or in the public interest, neither rationale is likely to be true and, in fact, attempts at politicization invite retaliation by the Congress.
Nixon's fall from power was paved by the Watergate break-in, but it had as much to do with abuses of the executive as anything else. Even had Watergate not occurred, but with Congress remaining in the hands of the Democratic opposition, it is hard to imagine that the congressional hand would have been stayed for long. The revelations of 1986-87 involving the White House-NSC operation of arms shipments to Iran and laundered funds to the Nicaraguan contras also threatens to erode fatally the polit-
Page 56
ical standing and the policy credibility of the Reagan presidency. Operating through the back door and around the institutionalized apparatus of government can lead to decisions and illegalities that are truly presidency-threatening. It is hard to imagine that this is in a president's interests. (Ibid., 610)
The presidentialist literature, as represented by Nathan and Moe, urges reform of the political system to make it more amenable to presidential control through politicization of the bureaucracy and centralization of command in the executive. However, when presidents with shortterm vision or goals make maximum use of these administrative tools, they are likely to provoke congressional retaliation and judicial stop signs in the long term.
If swift and sure congressional retaliation were a given in the game, presidents would learn to replace their competitive behavior with norms of cooperative behavior. However, there is scant hope for this eventuality because presidents have incentives to operate with a short time frame, rather than with a longer one, and Congress does not hold them accountable for the latter.
If presidents follow their short-term interests, they are likely to stimulate more and more restrictive congressional bonds on their behavior, thereby giving presidents incentives to engage in the types of behavior exemplified by the Iran-Contra Affair. Yet each individual president is likely to put his short-term interests above the institution's interests. As in many other aspects of American politics, Congress is key here. It will ultimately determine the kind of presidency we get. It must act expeditiously when presidents arrogate for their exclusive use constitutionally shared authority. Otherwise, presidents will take as theirs what Congress by its inaction bestows. (Ibid., 611)
Depoliticization and Debureaucratization: Push and Pull on Appointees
As Mosher observes, the claim that "the government of the United States is run not by career ministers but by amateurs" is something of an exaggeration.
A substantial part of the government is in fact run by career officials and under laws that permit little discretion; and a good many noncareer officials are in fact professionals, not amateurs. Yet the central fact remains:
Page 57
a relatively small number of political appointees, whose tenure is typically temporary, are presumed to govern the activities of [the 4.25 million, excluding the 600,000 employees of the U.S. Postal system] mostly permanent federal employees in the civil service, the military services, and other career systems. The politically appointed and presumably responsive executives amount to less than one-tenth of one percent of total direct federal employment. (Mosher 1985, 405)
The institution of the federal bureaucracy exists
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