by the American entry into the war. Within hours of the American declaration of war on Germany the British Prime Minister was inviting himself to Washington.
Roosevelt did not wish to see him immediately, but was too tactful in saying so. Churchill ignored the hint; he was afraid that the American service chiefs might reach some conclusions of their own if his visit was delayed. On the night of 11 December he made the long journey north through blacked-out Britain to the Clyde, and there boarded the new battleship Duke of York for the cross-Atlantic voyage. This time he did not read Hornblower en route; he and the Chiefs of Staff were too busy drawing up plans for the continued prosecution of the war.
The strategy outlined during the voyage comprised five basic elements. They were:
1. The need to translate the enormous industrial potential of the anti-Axis alliance into military strength.
2. The need to maintain communications, first and foremost those between the three Great Powers engaged in the struggle, and secondly those connecting these powers with their armies and raw material sources overseas.
3. The continuance of the war against Germany by those means presently available: strategic bombing, encouragement of subversion in the occupied territories, propaganda, and blockade.
4. The retention of vital positions in the Far East, notably Singapore.
5. The tightening of the military ring around Axis- occupied Europe, by increasing aid to the Soviet Union, and by conquering North Africa and opening up the Mediterranean.
Point 1, the realisation of military potential, was no problem for the United States. Two weeks after Churchill’s arrival Roosevelt announced the grandly-titled ‘Victory Programme’. In 1942 the US would produce 45,000 tanks, 45,000 aircraft, 20,000 anti-aircraft guns, 15,000 anti-tank guns and half a million machine-guns. And these figures would be doubled in 1943.
Point 2 was rather more problematic. The enemy, though doubtless impressed by all this prospective production, could find consolation in the difficulties likely to be encountered in its transportation. For by the end of 1941 Allied communication lines were looking distinctly tenuous.
Allied naval commitments seemed to be ever-expanding. They now included protecting the major convoy routes to Britain, Russia and the Middle East, holding off the rampant Japanese in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and keeping a watchful eye on the remnants of the French fleet in Dakar and Casablanca. And while the commitments expanded the fleets shrunk. The back of the US Pacific Fleet had been broken at Pearl Harbor, and Churchill’s wish to reinforce the survivors with the Prince of Wales and Repulse had been rudely dashed by the sinking of the two ships on 10 December. From the east coast of Africa to the west coast of America the Allies had lost any semblance of naval superiority.
Nor was this the worst of it. The British Mediterranean Fleet had suddenly become disaster-prone. First Ark Royal had been sunk, then Force K sailed into a minefield and lost three cruisers, and finally two battleships in Alexandria Harbour - Queen Elizabeth and Valiant - were disabled by Italian frogmen. The only capital ship still afloat in the Mediterranean was the battleship Barham , and this was badly needed in the Indian Ocean.
Only in the Atlantic were the Allies holding their own, but here too the situation was soon to take another plunge for the worse. Balked by improved British radar in the latter half of 1941, Admiral Doenitz, the German U-boat Chief, was now busy organising ‘Operation Drumbeat’, a calculated carnage of those American merchant ships still sailing, alone and unescorted, the East Coast and Caribbean sea-routes.
The imminent success of this enterprise would place an additional strain on the already serious Allied shipping situation. By January 1942 the British had lost both the option of sending ships through the Mediterranean and
Roosevelt did not wish to see him immediately, but was too tactful in saying so. Churchill ignored the hint; he was afraid that the American service chiefs might reach some conclusions of their own if his visit was delayed. On the night of 11 December he made the long journey north through blacked-out Britain to the Clyde, and there boarded the new battleship Duke of York for the cross-Atlantic voyage. This time he did not read Hornblower en route; he and the Chiefs of Staff were too busy drawing up plans for the continued prosecution of the war.
The strategy outlined during the voyage comprised five basic elements. They were:
1. The need to translate the enormous industrial potential of the anti-Axis alliance into military strength.
2. The need to maintain communications, first and foremost those between the three Great Powers engaged in the struggle, and secondly those connecting these powers with their armies and raw material sources overseas.
3. The continuance of the war against Germany by those means presently available: strategic bombing, encouragement of subversion in the occupied territories, propaganda, and blockade.
4. The retention of vital positions in the Far East, notably Singapore.
5. The tightening of the military ring around Axis- occupied Europe, by increasing aid to the Soviet Union, and by conquering North Africa and opening up the Mediterranean.
Point 1, the realisation of military potential, was no problem for the United States. Two weeks after Churchill’s arrival Roosevelt announced the grandly-titled ‘Victory Programme’. In 1942 the US would produce 45,000 tanks, 45,000 aircraft, 20,000 anti-aircraft guns, 15,000 anti-tank guns and half a million machine-guns. And these figures would be doubled in 1943.
Point 2 was rather more problematic. The enemy, though doubtless impressed by all this prospective production, could find consolation in the difficulties likely to be encountered in its transportation. For by the end of 1941 Allied communication lines were looking distinctly tenuous.
Allied naval commitments seemed to be ever-expanding. They now included protecting the major convoy routes to Britain, Russia and the Middle East, holding off the rampant Japanese in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and keeping a watchful eye on the remnants of the French fleet in Dakar and Casablanca. And while the commitments expanded the fleets shrunk. The back of the US Pacific Fleet had been broken at Pearl Harbor, and Churchill’s wish to reinforce the survivors with the Prince of Wales and Repulse had been rudely dashed by the sinking of the two ships on 10 December. From the east coast of Africa to the west coast of America the Allies had lost any semblance of naval superiority.
Nor was this the worst of it. The British Mediterranean Fleet had suddenly become disaster-prone. First Ark Royal had been sunk, then Force K sailed into a minefield and lost three cruisers, and finally two battleships in Alexandria Harbour - Queen Elizabeth and Valiant - were disabled by Italian frogmen. The only capital ship still afloat in the Mediterranean was the battleship Barham , and this was badly needed in the Indian Ocean.
Only in the Atlantic were the Allies holding their own, but here too the situation was soon to take another plunge for the worse. Balked by improved British radar in the latter half of 1941, Admiral Doenitz, the German U-boat Chief, was now busy organising ‘Operation Drumbeat’, a calculated carnage of those American merchant ships still sailing, alone and unescorted, the East Coast and Caribbean sea-routes.
The imminent success of this enterprise would place an additional strain on the already serious Allied shipping situation. By January 1942 the British had lost both the option of sending ships through the Mediterranean and
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