thirty-five per cent of their pre-war merchant tonnage. Thus there were more miles to cover and less ships to cover them. As a result only forty to fifty thousand troops could be dispatched overseas each month, a figure that barely covered the natural wastage through injury and illness. Even this level of transportation had only been sustained by the borrowing of American ships, a practice which would now have to cease. For the Americans, though naturally in a better situation than the British, had barely enough ships to meet their own needs, and this number was to be further depleted by ‘Drumbeat’s’ ominous roll. To sum up this picture of Allied marine gloom, by February 1942 there was barely sufficient shipping to form the necessary convoys and barely sufficient naval forces to protect them. Further setbacks would be calamitous.
The hopes expressed in Point 2 could be generously described as optimistic; those expressed in Points 4 and 5 were merely naive. The chances of stemming the Japanese onslaught in South-east Asia were slim indeed; already their forces were racing down the Malay peninsula towards Singapore and island-hopping their way towards the East Indian oil-wells. Perhaps Burma could still be held, but little else.
Churchill, however, had as much misplaced faith in the garrison of Singapore as he had previously had in the ill- fated Prince of Wales and Repulse . He brushed aside suggestions that reinforcements bound for the island should be redirected to Burma. As a consequence both would fall to the enemy.
This sad process was still unfolding; the situation in North Africa could better be described as unravelling. The failure of ‘Crusader’ and the need to send troops to the Far East had set in motion that course of events most feared in London. Malta was now in direst peril. Should it fall Egypt would surely follow. And the threat from the Caucasus was likely to loom larger with the coming spring. It was now not so much a question of tightening the ring around Axis Europe as of holding it desperately shut. Any hopes of a joint Anglo-American landing in Northwest Africa would have to be placed in cold storage for the indefinite future.
So where should those forces that were available be committed? To the British it was obvious - in the Middle East and the Indian Ocean. These were the areas of potential crisis; these were the areas that had to be held. The enemy still held the initiative; in Russia, the Middle East, the Far East. His armies were still moving forward, and they had to be stopped. Until such time as they were, all else was clearly secondary.
Unfortunately the Americans, as Churchill and his party discovered on reaching Washington, were unaware of the escalating peril. Their service chiefs, who considered the military initiative a god-given right, were understandably loth to admit that it rested with the enemy. Consequently they had devised plans for utilising an initiative they did not possess. The East Indies would be held, North-west Africa invaded. As soon as possible.
Churchill, with rare tact, explained that the failure of ‘Crusader’ had rendered a North-west Africa operation inadvisable. There was not enough shipping, he explained, to countenance this operation, the supply of the Middle East and the retention of footholds in the Far East.
The Americans were not convinced that the general situation was as lamentable as the British said it was. But, amidst the prevailing honeymoon spirit, they agreed to put their disagreements aside for the time being. Churchill was reasonably satisfied. He was confident that time and a few more unexpected jolts would produce a more realistic approach. And the British representatives on the new Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee would naturally be on hand to hasten their new ally down the road to wisdom.
Kuybyshev
Better to turn back than to lose your way.
Russian proverb
One crucial decision was taken by the British and
The hopes expressed in Point 2 could be generously described as optimistic; those expressed in Points 4 and 5 were merely naive. The chances of stemming the Japanese onslaught in South-east Asia were slim indeed; already their forces were racing down the Malay peninsula towards Singapore and island-hopping their way towards the East Indian oil-wells. Perhaps Burma could still be held, but little else.
Churchill, however, had as much misplaced faith in the garrison of Singapore as he had previously had in the ill- fated Prince of Wales and Repulse . He brushed aside suggestions that reinforcements bound for the island should be redirected to Burma. As a consequence both would fall to the enemy.
This sad process was still unfolding; the situation in North Africa could better be described as unravelling. The failure of ‘Crusader’ and the need to send troops to the Far East had set in motion that course of events most feared in London. Malta was now in direst peril. Should it fall Egypt would surely follow. And the threat from the Caucasus was likely to loom larger with the coming spring. It was now not so much a question of tightening the ring around Axis Europe as of holding it desperately shut. Any hopes of a joint Anglo-American landing in Northwest Africa would have to be placed in cold storage for the indefinite future.
So where should those forces that were available be committed? To the British it was obvious - in the Middle East and the Indian Ocean. These were the areas of potential crisis; these were the areas that had to be held. The enemy still held the initiative; in Russia, the Middle East, the Far East. His armies were still moving forward, and they had to be stopped. Until such time as they were, all else was clearly secondary.
Unfortunately the Americans, as Churchill and his party discovered on reaching Washington, were unaware of the escalating peril. Their service chiefs, who considered the military initiative a god-given right, were understandably loth to admit that it rested with the enemy. Consequently they had devised plans for utilising an initiative they did not possess. The East Indies would be held, North-west Africa invaded. As soon as possible.
Churchill, with rare tact, explained that the failure of ‘Crusader’ had rendered a North-west Africa operation inadvisable. There was not enough shipping, he explained, to countenance this operation, the supply of the Middle East and the retention of footholds in the Far East.
The Americans were not convinced that the general situation was as lamentable as the British said it was. But, amidst the prevailing honeymoon spirit, they agreed to put their disagreements aside for the time being. Churchill was reasonably satisfied. He was confident that time and a few more unexpected jolts would produce a more realistic approach. And the British representatives on the new Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee would naturally be on hand to hasten their new ally down the road to wisdom.
Kuybyshev
Better to turn back than to lose your way.
Russian proverb
One crucial decision was taken by the British and
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