dominated the homicide landscape. The Crips far outnumbered the Bloods, but for a reason no one could ever adequately explain, the Crips often fought among themselves, even killing each other; the Bloods usually managed to maintain a united front.
In the 1980s, with the rising popularity of crack, or rock cocaine, a simpler alternative to freebasing, the gangs moved into drug trafficking, marketing the cheap high in the lower-income neighborhoods. Rocks could go for as little as two or three dollars and the gangs profited from their semisophisticated distribution networks.
Compared to La Cosa Nostra, the street gangs of South Central had a somewhat looser organizational structure. No single person ran a set. There was no formal hierarchy within each gang, nor was there any sort of interset commission of representatives from the various sets. The leaders in each set were known as “shot callers.” More often than not, the shot callers were those with the money, the drugs, and the women. The ranking was fluid: today’s “pu-butt,” or novice member, might be tomorrow’s shot caller, if he developed a lucrative source for cocaine or performed a necessary criminal deed that advanced the gang’s stature.
When Congress became convinced of the highly addictive nature of rock cocaine, they responded with what many defense counsels believed to be draconian criminal provisions. Distribution of five grams of rock was equal in punishment to the sale of five hundred grams of powder cocaine: a minimum mandatory five years in prison. Fifty grams of rock, an amount which could easily fit in the palm of your hand, was equivalent to five kilograms of powder, roughly the size of five large Tom Clancy hardback novels. Conviction carried a minimum mandatory ten-year sentence. If the distributor had a previous felony drug conviction, it was a “double-up,” the punishment was doubled. Although I have heard sociologists attribute declining crime rates to such liberalized practices as legalized abortion, I am more inclined to believe that the federal sentencing statutes played a major role. The thirty-three gang members I eventually convicted under federal drug statutes, most of whom were responsible for at least a felony a day, were unable to commit their criminal deeds on the street while tucked away in federal prison for many, many years. And I was just one agent. Multiply my successes by the many other federal agents working gangs and you begin to understand the basis for my belief.
Tom and I began working closely with two of the best detectives I ever met—Rick and Mike. Rick was a stocky, street-smart white cop and Mike was a rail-thin African American with the fortitude of a Samurai warrior. On many a slow night, Tom, Rick, and I would station ourselves at the far end of a gang-infested housing complex. Mike would begin running through the complex, scattering drug-dealing gang members, who often ran into our waiting arms at the opposite end of the complex.
Rather than take a shotgun approach to the South Central Los Angeles gang problem, we initially narrowed our investigation to two Crip sets, the Seven-Four Hoovers and the Backstreet. We began to develop as much intelligence as possible on the most notorious members of these two gangs and identified the shot callers within each set. We also discovered who had prior felony drug convictions and who was currently believed to be distributing.
Concentrating on the drug distribution made sense. The sentencing statutes proved a tremendous incentive for cooperation with anyone we caught dealing. A strong network of informants working off beefs from a federal drug arrest would allow us to solve many crimes and possibly gain freedom for a neighborhood presently in the stranglehold of street gangs.
We created our target list and sought funds from the FBI to make a series of drug buys. Once we had our money in place, we were ready to begin. Our only problem was finding an entry into the
In the 1980s, with the rising popularity of crack, or rock cocaine, a simpler alternative to freebasing, the gangs moved into drug trafficking, marketing the cheap high in the lower-income neighborhoods. Rocks could go for as little as two or three dollars and the gangs profited from their semisophisticated distribution networks.
Compared to La Cosa Nostra, the street gangs of South Central had a somewhat looser organizational structure. No single person ran a set. There was no formal hierarchy within each gang, nor was there any sort of interset commission of representatives from the various sets. The leaders in each set were known as “shot callers.” More often than not, the shot callers were those with the money, the drugs, and the women. The ranking was fluid: today’s “pu-butt,” or novice member, might be tomorrow’s shot caller, if he developed a lucrative source for cocaine or performed a necessary criminal deed that advanced the gang’s stature.
When Congress became convinced of the highly addictive nature of rock cocaine, they responded with what many defense counsels believed to be draconian criminal provisions. Distribution of five grams of rock was equal in punishment to the sale of five hundred grams of powder cocaine: a minimum mandatory five years in prison. Fifty grams of rock, an amount which could easily fit in the palm of your hand, was equivalent to five kilograms of powder, roughly the size of five large Tom Clancy hardback novels. Conviction carried a minimum mandatory ten-year sentence. If the distributor had a previous felony drug conviction, it was a “double-up,” the punishment was doubled. Although I have heard sociologists attribute declining crime rates to such liberalized practices as legalized abortion, I am more inclined to believe that the federal sentencing statutes played a major role. The thirty-three gang members I eventually convicted under federal drug statutes, most of whom were responsible for at least a felony a day, were unable to commit their criminal deeds on the street while tucked away in federal prison for many, many years. And I was just one agent. Multiply my successes by the many other federal agents working gangs and you begin to understand the basis for my belief.
Tom and I began working closely with two of the best detectives I ever met—Rick and Mike. Rick was a stocky, street-smart white cop and Mike was a rail-thin African American with the fortitude of a Samurai warrior. On many a slow night, Tom, Rick, and I would station ourselves at the far end of a gang-infested housing complex. Mike would begin running through the complex, scattering drug-dealing gang members, who often ran into our waiting arms at the opposite end of the complex.
Rather than take a shotgun approach to the South Central Los Angeles gang problem, we initially narrowed our investigation to two Crip sets, the Seven-Four Hoovers and the Backstreet. We began to develop as much intelligence as possible on the most notorious members of these two gangs and identified the shot callers within each set. We also discovered who had prior felony drug convictions and who was currently believed to be distributing.
Concentrating on the drug distribution made sense. The sentencing statutes proved a tremendous incentive for cooperation with anyone we caught dealing. A strong network of informants working off beefs from a federal drug arrest would allow us to solve many crimes and possibly gain freedom for a neighborhood presently in the stranglehold of street gangs.
We created our target list and sought funds from the FBI to make a series of drug buys. Once we had our money in place, we were ready to begin. Our only problem was finding an entry into the
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