lengthen credit and, eventually, the United States to lend its support. During the 1980s Iran was regarded by the United States as the most dangerous of its Third World enemies, because of the violent anti-Americanism of the ayatollah régime and for its seizure of the staff of the American embassy in Tehran, in gross violation of international law. The extension of support to anti-Iranian Gulf States was a natural consequence; it eventually included the reflagging of Kuwaiti tankers as American ships, hastened after Iran began air attacks on tankers in 1984, and the strengthening of the American naval presence in the Gulf to protect them.
Yet despite foreign assistance, the war began to go badly against Iraq after 1982 and the turn of events was not to be disguised.Internally the cost, running at a billion US dollars a month, began to reduce funds available for imports; after an initial boom, deliberately sustained by Saddam to buoy civilian support for the war, the economy began to show signs of recession. Between 1980 and 1983 Iraq’s foreign currency reserves fell from $35 billion to $3 billion, with a consequent drop in imports; the reserves were farther adversely affected by Syria’s action in closing the pipeline to the Mediterranean, in retaliation for Saddam’s rupture of relations with the Syrian Ba’athist party. The human as well as financial costs were high, with casualties running at 1,200 a month, a figure that rose sharply during offensives. Militarily, from 1982 onwards, Iran was able to mount offensives with increasing frequency. During the summer of 1982 Iran embarked on a major offensive designed to cross the Tigris and reach Basra, Iraq’s second city and capital of the Shi’a south. The methods were as before: mass attacks by waves of untrained, under-age volunteers. After the initial shock, however, the Iraqis proved equal to the strain. Their engineers constructed extensive and deep lines of fortifications, in places creating artificial lakes which funnelled the direction of the Iranian thrusts. Behind strong defences the Iraqis fought well, inflicting heavy losses on the attackers; if ground was lost, it was recaptured by ground–air counter-attacks. The Iranian air force had difficulty in operating, because of American refusal to supply spare parts for its aircraft, while the Iraqi air force, flying French and Russian aircraft, was not so penalized; it was also equipped with large numbers of helicopters which Iran lacked. Moreover the Iraqi ground forces, encouraged by their defensive successes, displayed markedly improved morale; even the Shi’a conscripts, deterred at the thought of the ayatollahs exporting their joyless regime in the wake of victory, found a sense of patriotism and battled with a will.
Between 1982 and 1984 the struggle degenerated into a war of attrition, with the Iranians maintaining the offensive but Iraq inflicting the heavier casualties. Although by 1984 the total of Iraqi war dead had reached 65,000, with up to 60,000 taken prisoner, the equivalent Iranian figure was 180,000 dead and half amillion wounded. Moreover, the Iranians were not gaining ground. The exception to their consistent failure to do so came in early 1984 when, by a cunningly organized night attack, Iranian amphibious forces succeeded in surprising the garrison of the Majnun Islands, near Basra. Despite repeated attempts to recapture the islands, the Iraqis failed. Saddam therefore decided to resort to unconventional methods. He was already manufacturing chemical weapons at two plants, at Salman Pak and Samarra, and now used two products, mustard gas and Tabun, in helicopter attacks on the Iranian positions. Mustard gas is a blistering agent, developed and widely used during the First World War, Tabun a nerve agent developed by the Nazis for use in extermination camps.
Chemical agents are notoriously unsatisfactory as weapons of war. They are difficult to deliver with precision and, once launched,
Yet despite foreign assistance, the war began to go badly against Iraq after 1982 and the turn of events was not to be disguised.Internally the cost, running at a billion US dollars a month, began to reduce funds available for imports; after an initial boom, deliberately sustained by Saddam to buoy civilian support for the war, the economy began to show signs of recession. Between 1980 and 1983 Iraq’s foreign currency reserves fell from $35 billion to $3 billion, with a consequent drop in imports; the reserves were farther adversely affected by Syria’s action in closing the pipeline to the Mediterranean, in retaliation for Saddam’s rupture of relations with the Syrian Ba’athist party. The human as well as financial costs were high, with casualties running at 1,200 a month, a figure that rose sharply during offensives. Militarily, from 1982 onwards, Iran was able to mount offensives with increasing frequency. During the summer of 1982 Iran embarked on a major offensive designed to cross the Tigris and reach Basra, Iraq’s second city and capital of the Shi’a south. The methods were as before: mass attacks by waves of untrained, under-age volunteers. After the initial shock, however, the Iraqis proved equal to the strain. Their engineers constructed extensive and deep lines of fortifications, in places creating artificial lakes which funnelled the direction of the Iranian thrusts. Behind strong defences the Iraqis fought well, inflicting heavy losses on the attackers; if ground was lost, it was recaptured by ground–air counter-attacks. The Iranian air force had difficulty in operating, because of American refusal to supply spare parts for its aircraft, while the Iraqi air force, flying French and Russian aircraft, was not so penalized; it was also equipped with large numbers of helicopters which Iran lacked. Moreover the Iraqi ground forces, encouraged by their defensive successes, displayed markedly improved morale; even the Shi’a conscripts, deterred at the thought of the ayatollahs exporting their joyless regime in the wake of victory, found a sense of patriotism and battled with a will.
Between 1982 and 1984 the struggle degenerated into a war of attrition, with the Iranians maintaining the offensive but Iraq inflicting the heavier casualties. Although by 1984 the total of Iraqi war dead had reached 65,000, with up to 60,000 taken prisoner, the equivalent Iranian figure was 180,000 dead and half amillion wounded. Moreover, the Iranians were not gaining ground. The exception to their consistent failure to do so came in early 1984 when, by a cunningly organized night attack, Iranian amphibious forces succeeded in surprising the garrison of the Majnun Islands, near Basra. Despite repeated attempts to recapture the islands, the Iraqis failed. Saddam therefore decided to resort to unconventional methods. He was already manufacturing chemical weapons at two plants, at Salman Pak and Samarra, and now used two products, mustard gas and Tabun, in helicopter attacks on the Iranian positions. Mustard gas is a blistering agent, developed and widely used during the First World War, Tabun a nerve agent developed by the Nazis for use in extermination camps.
Chemical agents are notoriously unsatisfactory as weapons of war. They are difficult to deliver with precision and, once launched,
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