The Great War of Our Time: The CIA's Fight Against Terrorism--From Al Qa'ida to ISIS by Michael Morell Page B

sitting around a campfire under the stars, drinking tea and discussing the history of the Afghan people, Afghan politics, and the future of a country that had been at war for decades. This is how deep and enduring relationships are built in the intelligence business—relationships that made our rapid response to 9/11 and our success possible.
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    In the months that followed the attacks of 9/11, despite the weight of the enormous tragedy that had befallen our nation, those of us at the Agency received a tremendous boost from the unity of purpose and determination of the American people. And it was not just Americans. CIA benefited from goodwill and good wishes from not only our traditional foreign intelligence partners but also even longtime foes like the Russians.
    It didn’t take long for the national sense of unity to evaporate, however. Sadly, the “we are in this together” attitude eroded in favor of “let’s find someone to blame” for allowing the attacks to happen. Senator Carl Levin of Michigan said publicly, “Prior to September 11, US intelligence officials had terrorist information that if properly handled could have disrupted or possibly prevented the terrorist attacks.… This is not a matter of scapegoating. This is a matter of accountability.” Senator Richard Shelby of Alabama asked, “Hasanyone in CIA been held accountable for the failures of September 11 or the events leading up to it?” The officers of the Counterterrorism Center, who had been among the few in the country who recognized the threat and tried to something about it, now felt very much alone.
    A couple of years after I left the briefing job, the finger-pointing even came in my direction. I was on vacation with my family in Normandy when I returned to our hotel to find a note instructing me to call a phone number that I recognized immediately as being at CIA headquarters. I reached Jami Miscik, the deputy director of intelligence and a longtime friend. “Michael, are you sitting down?” she asked. “I am now, what’s up?” I responded. “It seems Steve Biegun [the NSC staffer who had been with me in Crawford on August 6, 2001] is telling people that you told the president there was no need to worry about an al Qa‘ida attack on the homeland when you briefed the August 6 PDB. They want to share this with the 9/11 Commission.” “What!” I said. “That’s absurd. It is wrong. The August 6 PDB made clear that there was plenty to worry about—it just didn’t have the time, place, and means of attack.” It became clear to me that as the political sharks circled the White House, some thought was being given to tossing me—and therefore CIA—over the side. Fortunately, with Miscik’s intercession—along with that of Tenet’s chief of staff, John Moseman—the idea of pinning responsibility on CIA and me did not gain traction at the more senior levels of the White House.
    In fact, senior Bush administration officials later told me that they had not been aware of the idea of throwing me overboard and would have opposed it had it ever reached them. They also told me that President Bush would never have let it happen.
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    9/11 changed CIA more than any other single event during my time at the Agency, and probably more than any other single event inthe history of the organization. Never before had CIA refocused so abruptly and dramatically as we did after 9/11. The number of officers working on terrorism—including contractors—more than tripled, and the dollars flowing to the terrorism problem jumped even more. Terrorism became the focus of nearly every overseas station and operational division in the Agency. As a result, intelligence collection on terrorism improved significantly. Terrorism analysis got better as well. For the first time, terrorism analysts became the fighter pilots of the analytic ranks. Prior to 9/11, terrorism analysts had been seen as second-class citizens by their counterparts who were working