The Great War of Our Time: The CIA's Fight Against Terrorism--From Al Qa'ida to ISIS by Michael Morell Page A
Authors: Michael Morell
Tags: Political Science / Intelligence & Espionage, True Crime / Espionage, Biography & Autobiography / Political
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Afghanistan, and Tenet would update the president on the latest operational developments.
Tenet was out for a few days on an overseas trip, and while he was gone, I started using a detailed table-size military map of Afghanistan to update the president. The map showed the disposition of the Northern Alliance and Pashtun forces fighting on behalf of the United States, as well as the Taliban and al Qa‘ida forces defending their territory. I knew the president liked the map. When Tenet returned, he saw, during our prep session, that I was planning to use it, and he made it very clear that he did not want me to do so, arguing it was too detailed for the president.
“I’m using it,” I said. “Oh, no you’re not,” my boss responded. “Oh, yes I am,” I said. We were like a bickering married couple. I won the day, and when the president walked into the Situation Room and saw the map spread on the table, he said, “Ah, my map. I love that map!” I just looked at Tenet and smiled.
After the one-time experiment with taking Black to a briefing, Tenet started bringing one of Black’s deputies, Hank Crumpton. Crumpton was the senior CIA officer with the daily job of running our war effort in Afghanistan. Crumpton, a smart, savvy, and likable officer, had been called back from a plum overseas assignment to lead the war against al Qa‘ida. Crumpton’s personality could not be more different from Black’s. Crumpton would sit close to thepresident and, in a near whisper, methodically walk through the latest information. For his part, I think Black was happy to have Crumpton brief the president. Black believed that his rightful place was with his officers working the problem directly.
* * *
While all the pieces for taking on the Taliban and al Qa‘ida were in place in only a few weeks, it took a while for the Northern Alliance to get going—much to the dismay of the president. For days our Afghan allies did not start the push south. They were tentative, concerned about what they would face in battle. And every day the president expressed his frustration to Tenet. “When are they going to get moving?” and “What is taking them so long?” were frequent refrains from the commander in chief. But Tenet got the message and pushed hard for action when he returned to Langley, and, in a short time, the Northern Alliance began to move. Once that happened, the collapse of the Taliban unfolded quickly. They were no match for the well-trained Northern Alliance backed by US air strikes.
Our Afghan allies took Kabul in mid-November 2001, and by the end of the year had forced the Taliban from power and significantly disrupted al Qa‘ida. Looking back, it is hard to believe that in our military involvement in Afghanistan—which, at this writing, has been going on for over thirteen years—so much was achieved in the first several weeks.
This was CIA’s finest hour. The paramilitary operation that Crumpton and his officers carried out, led passionately by Cofer Black, was historic. A handful of CIA officers working closely with a small number of military Special Forces operators moved mountains. At one moment they were calling in deadly accurate air strikes and guiding sophisticated bombs precisely to their targets, and the next they were calling in airdrops to receive saddles they needed to accompany their Northern Alliance counterparts in cavalry missions.Twenty-first-century military tactics merged flawlessly with methods from the seventeenth century.
CIA’s post-9/11 achievement was the result of our planning and our great flexibility as an organization, but it was also the result of our knowing the turf so well. In the two years before 9/11, CIA officers had traveled multiple times to northern Afghanistan to meet with a group of tribal warlords there. One of my friends once delivered a briefcase holding a million dollars to one of the key Northern Alliance leaders (“It was heavy,” he said). There were long nights of
Tenet was out for a few days on an overseas trip, and while he was gone, I started using a detailed table-size military map of Afghanistan to update the president. The map showed the disposition of the Northern Alliance and Pashtun forces fighting on behalf of the United States, as well as the Taliban and al Qa‘ida forces defending their territory. I knew the president liked the map. When Tenet returned, he saw, during our prep session, that I was planning to use it, and he made it very clear that he did not want me to do so, arguing it was too detailed for the president.
“I’m using it,” I said. “Oh, no you’re not,” my boss responded. “Oh, yes I am,” I said. We were like a bickering married couple. I won the day, and when the president walked into the Situation Room and saw the map spread on the table, he said, “Ah, my map. I love that map!” I just looked at Tenet and smiled.
After the one-time experiment with taking Black to a briefing, Tenet started bringing one of Black’s deputies, Hank Crumpton. Crumpton was the senior CIA officer with the daily job of running our war effort in Afghanistan. Crumpton, a smart, savvy, and likable officer, had been called back from a plum overseas assignment to lead the war against al Qa‘ida. Crumpton’s personality could not be more different from Black’s. Crumpton would sit close to thepresident and, in a near whisper, methodically walk through the latest information. For his part, I think Black was happy to have Crumpton brief the president. Black believed that his rightful place was with his officers working the problem directly.
* * *
While all the pieces for taking on the Taliban and al Qa‘ida were in place in only a few weeks, it took a while for the Northern Alliance to get going—much to the dismay of the president. For days our Afghan allies did not start the push south. They were tentative, concerned about what they would face in battle. And every day the president expressed his frustration to Tenet. “When are they going to get moving?” and “What is taking them so long?” were frequent refrains from the commander in chief. But Tenet got the message and pushed hard for action when he returned to Langley, and, in a short time, the Northern Alliance began to move. Once that happened, the collapse of the Taliban unfolded quickly. They were no match for the well-trained Northern Alliance backed by US air strikes.
Our Afghan allies took Kabul in mid-November 2001, and by the end of the year had forced the Taliban from power and significantly disrupted al Qa‘ida. Looking back, it is hard to believe that in our military involvement in Afghanistan—which, at this writing, has been going on for over thirteen years—so much was achieved in the first several weeks.
This was CIA’s finest hour. The paramilitary operation that Crumpton and his officers carried out, led passionately by Cofer Black, was historic. A handful of CIA officers working closely with a small number of military Special Forces operators moved mountains. At one moment they were calling in deadly accurate air strikes and guiding sophisticated bombs precisely to their targets, and the next they were calling in airdrops to receive saddles they needed to accompany their Northern Alliance counterparts in cavalry missions.Twenty-first-century military tactics merged flawlessly with methods from the seventeenth century.
CIA’s post-9/11 achievement was the result of our planning and our great flexibility as an organization, but it was also the result of our knowing the turf so well. In the two years before 9/11, CIA officers had traveled multiple times to northern Afghanistan to meet with a group of tribal warlords there. One of my friends once delivered a briefcase holding a million dollars to one of the key Northern Alliance leaders (“It was heavy,” he said). There were long nights of
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