Nor did the airline go for an alternative recruitment process. It could have, for instance, entrusted the task to a selection committee of professionals, but that never quite happened. As a result, a pall of uncertainty was cast over the post of chairman in Air India as few wanted to take on the responsibility. This has led to a situation where there are no takers for what once used to be a coveted management position. Who would want to join an airline that could deflagrate any day? It is alleged by those in the airline that even the current incumbent, Rohit Nandan, was reluctant to take on the assignment.
This insecurity of tenure has also led to indecisive and weak chairmen. People feared retribution and most chairmen, even if they had the requisite competence, preferred to be subservient to the government’s demands. None was willing to stand up to the politicians and bureaucrats. Thus, Air India’s interests were, more often than not, ignored and individual priorities took precedence over the organisation’s requirements.
The game of musical chairs that the government has played with the chairman’s post has had another fallout. The balance of power in Air India has shifted away from Mumbai, where it was once headquartered, to New Delhi. This has been more than a geographical shift—the airline’s operation centre is Mumbai and yet, its chairmen began spending more and more time in the capital city, away from the organisation but close to the political power centres. This, in turn, slowed down the airline, impacted efficiency and allowed the ministry to wield a greater and more direct control over the airline.
In the beginning, the chairmen were based in Mumbai and would travel to the capital for occasional meetings. Gradually, the trend changed, and the first to make the shift was V. Thulasidas. Other chairmen followed suit, and finally, in February 2013 it seemed that the airline gave up the charade of maintaining Mumbai as its headquarters and announced a formal shift to New Delhi. How this will impact the airline will be clear to us in the years to come.
The government could also never make up its mind on whether the posts of chairman and managing director should be rolled into one or should be assigned to two separate individuals. As a result, in addition to the those named earlier, Air India also had corporate stalwarts, such as Ratan Tata and Russi Modi, and senior bureaucrats like K. Padmanabiah, P. C. Sen, P. V. Jayakrishnan, Ravindra Gupta, A. H. Jung and K. Roy Paul functioning as chairmen. Barring P. C. Sen, who held the position of chairman because he was the chairman and managing director of Indian Airlines, the other bureaucrats assigned to the position were secretaries in the Ministry of Civil Aviation and held concurrent charge of the airline. In fact, the appointment of A. H. Jung as Secretary of the Ministry of Civil Aviation and his consequent appointment as the chairman of Air India were unusual because he did not belong to the IAS cadre but was an officer in the Indian Accounts and Audit Service. One could ignore these anomalies in the appointment process if the ministry had extended a rationale for its behaviour, but there was none forthcoming. Also, while some chairmen worked well with their managing directors, others were in perpetual conflict, adding another layer to the beleaguered airline’s troubled leadership history.
FLAWED CHOICES
The government was also inconsistent in the way it appointed its bureaucrats to the position of chairman. The position of chairman of Air India was on par with that of an additional secretary in the Ministry of Civil Aviation. But this was only on paper. The selectors made no distinction between an additional secretary and a joint secretary as part of the candidate’s eligibility criteria. The choice depended more on who the minister was comfortable with or wanted to keep away. This impacted the relationship that the airline had with its owner because
This insecurity of tenure has also led to indecisive and weak chairmen. People feared retribution and most chairmen, even if they had the requisite competence, preferred to be subservient to the government’s demands. None was willing to stand up to the politicians and bureaucrats. Thus, Air India’s interests were, more often than not, ignored and individual priorities took precedence over the organisation’s requirements.
The game of musical chairs that the government has played with the chairman’s post has had another fallout. The balance of power in Air India has shifted away from Mumbai, where it was once headquartered, to New Delhi. This has been more than a geographical shift—the airline’s operation centre is Mumbai and yet, its chairmen began spending more and more time in the capital city, away from the organisation but close to the political power centres. This, in turn, slowed down the airline, impacted efficiency and allowed the ministry to wield a greater and more direct control over the airline.
In the beginning, the chairmen were based in Mumbai and would travel to the capital for occasional meetings. Gradually, the trend changed, and the first to make the shift was V. Thulasidas. Other chairmen followed suit, and finally, in February 2013 it seemed that the airline gave up the charade of maintaining Mumbai as its headquarters and announced a formal shift to New Delhi. How this will impact the airline will be clear to us in the years to come.
The government could also never make up its mind on whether the posts of chairman and managing director should be rolled into one or should be assigned to two separate individuals. As a result, in addition to the those named earlier, Air India also had corporate stalwarts, such as Ratan Tata and Russi Modi, and senior bureaucrats like K. Padmanabiah, P. C. Sen, P. V. Jayakrishnan, Ravindra Gupta, A. H. Jung and K. Roy Paul functioning as chairmen. Barring P. C. Sen, who held the position of chairman because he was the chairman and managing director of Indian Airlines, the other bureaucrats assigned to the position were secretaries in the Ministry of Civil Aviation and held concurrent charge of the airline. In fact, the appointment of A. H. Jung as Secretary of the Ministry of Civil Aviation and his consequent appointment as the chairman of Air India were unusual because he did not belong to the IAS cadre but was an officer in the Indian Accounts and Audit Service. One could ignore these anomalies in the appointment process if the ministry had extended a rationale for its behaviour, but there was none forthcoming. Also, while some chairmen worked well with their managing directors, others were in perpetual conflict, adding another layer to the beleaguered airline’s troubled leadership history.
FLAWED CHOICES
The government was also inconsistent in the way it appointed its bureaucrats to the position of chairman. The position of chairman of Air India was on par with that of an additional secretary in the Ministry of Civil Aviation. But this was only on paper. The selectors made no distinction between an additional secretary and a joint secretary as part of the candidate’s eligibility criteria. The choice depended more on who the minister was comfortable with or wanted to keep away. This impacted the relationship that the airline had with its owner because
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