it was found that seniority levels of the bureaucrats chosen for the post determined the authority they wielded and the influence they had on policy decisions that affected the airline.
While most bureaucrats who have occupied the chair have been joint secretaries, in the case of Mr Thulasidas, the eligibility criterion for the position was changed to that of additional secretary. It was a one-off instance because since then, joint secretaries have been routinely appointed to the position. A similar flip-flop on eligibility criteria was visible with respect to the Air India board. The government was, in its initial years, represented by the Secretary in the Ministry of Civil Aviation, who was expected to have a wider understanding of the aviation sector, but in the later years, the representatives have been from various levels within the bureaucracy, with not everyone being familiar with the business or with Air India.
It is important to understand that the government had the right to appoint a bureaucrat to the position and that the problem was not that a bureaucrat was being chosen for the task at hand. In fact, the airline has had some of the best bureaucrats working on its behalf in the early years. Air India had an ICS officer, B. R. Patel, as its chief executive from September 1955 to November 1966. He not only provided stability to the airline but also gave his deputies great latitude, and under his leadership, both S. K. Kooka, commercial director, and A. F. Dubash, planning director, built two great teams that helped them to guide the airline in its most formative years. It was an era in which the bureaucrats deputed to Air India displayed total commitment to the airline and could make an impact because they were a class apart and were not moved around at short notice as they were in the later years.
It is also difficult to comprehend, however, why the government, despite the disastrous turn of events at Air India has not exercised greater caution in the selection of the incumbent. The airline business was changing. Policies were being amended to create a more competitive environment and it should have been obvious to the owners of Air India that the set of core competences needed to lead the organisation was different from that required earlier. Additionally, within the bureaucracy, the government continued to repose its faith on officers whose exposure to the airline industry and to Air India was minimal but who were known to be loyal to the establishment. Thus, even if a few bureaucrats who were made managing directors did try and make a difference, they were prematurely transferred.
The severity of the situation is all the more glaring if one looks at the way the last five chairmen and managing directors were appointed. It shows how the process was subverted to bring in people at the whims of the political establishment.
Rajiv Pratap Rudy, the minister for civil aviation in 2003, appointed V. Thulasidas, who was then Chief Secretary, Tripura, as the chairman in December 2003. Mr Thulasidas’s candidature was said to have been recommended by R. K. Singh, then a director in the Ministry of Civil Aviation and allegedly a friend of the minister and a cadre-mate of Mr Thulasidas.
Likewise, in May 2009 Praful Patel appointed Arvind Jadhav, an IAS officer from the Karnataka cadre, as the chairman of Air India. Mr Jadhav had applied in 2008, but his candidature had been rejected by the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet on the grounds that he lacked domain knowledge since he had never worked in the Ministry of Civil Aviation. Mr Patel, however, paid no heed to the observations of the Appointments Committee and brought in Mr Jadhav to replace Raghu Menon. Speaking to the media after Mr Menon was moved, Mr Patel said that action was necessitated because of non-performance. The real story was that Mr Menon, despite toeing the ministry’s line on several controversial decisions such as aircraft acquisition, had
While most bureaucrats who have occupied the chair have been joint secretaries, in the case of Mr Thulasidas, the eligibility criterion for the position was changed to that of additional secretary. It was a one-off instance because since then, joint secretaries have been routinely appointed to the position. A similar flip-flop on eligibility criteria was visible with respect to the Air India board. The government was, in its initial years, represented by the Secretary in the Ministry of Civil Aviation, who was expected to have a wider understanding of the aviation sector, but in the later years, the representatives have been from various levels within the bureaucracy, with not everyone being familiar with the business or with Air India.
It is important to understand that the government had the right to appoint a bureaucrat to the position and that the problem was not that a bureaucrat was being chosen for the task at hand. In fact, the airline has had some of the best bureaucrats working on its behalf in the early years. Air India had an ICS officer, B. R. Patel, as its chief executive from September 1955 to November 1966. He not only provided stability to the airline but also gave his deputies great latitude, and under his leadership, both S. K. Kooka, commercial director, and A. F. Dubash, planning director, built two great teams that helped them to guide the airline in its most formative years. It was an era in which the bureaucrats deputed to Air India displayed total commitment to the airline and could make an impact because they were a class apart and were not moved around at short notice as they were in the later years.
It is also difficult to comprehend, however, why the government, despite the disastrous turn of events at Air India has not exercised greater caution in the selection of the incumbent. The airline business was changing. Policies were being amended to create a more competitive environment and it should have been obvious to the owners of Air India that the set of core competences needed to lead the organisation was different from that required earlier. Additionally, within the bureaucracy, the government continued to repose its faith on officers whose exposure to the airline industry and to Air India was minimal but who were known to be loyal to the establishment. Thus, even if a few bureaucrats who were made managing directors did try and make a difference, they were prematurely transferred.
The severity of the situation is all the more glaring if one looks at the way the last five chairmen and managing directors were appointed. It shows how the process was subverted to bring in people at the whims of the political establishment.
Rajiv Pratap Rudy, the minister for civil aviation in 2003, appointed V. Thulasidas, who was then Chief Secretary, Tripura, as the chairman in December 2003. Mr Thulasidas’s candidature was said to have been recommended by R. K. Singh, then a director in the Ministry of Civil Aviation and allegedly a friend of the minister and a cadre-mate of Mr Thulasidas.
Likewise, in May 2009 Praful Patel appointed Arvind Jadhav, an IAS officer from the Karnataka cadre, as the chairman of Air India. Mr Jadhav had applied in 2008, but his candidature had been rejected by the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet on the grounds that he lacked domain knowledge since he had never worked in the Ministry of Civil Aviation. Mr Patel, however, paid no heed to the observations of the Appointments Committee and brought in Mr Jadhav to replace Raghu Menon. Speaking to the media after Mr Menon was moved, Mr Patel said that action was necessitated because of non-performance. The real story was that Mr Menon, despite toeing the ministry’s line on several controversial decisions such as aircraft acquisition, had
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