everything."
The deployment adopted by Napoleon was an expression of his insistence on remaining flexible. His right wing, whose assigned positions were in the fields beyond La Belle Alliance, to the east of the main road that divided the battlefield in two, was formed by d'Erlon's I Corps. Since this corps had taken no part in the bloody battles of Ligny and Quatre Bras, it was the strongest in the entire army: Its four divisions numbered around 16,000 muskets and 46 cannon, along with 1,500 cavalry. These latter troops were stationed on the extreme right, not far from Papelotte, keeping an eye on the enemy's outposts. On the left wing, west of the main road, Reille's II Corps took up its positions. Originally even stronger than I Corps, the II Corps was much reduced: Three of its four divisions had been damaged at Quatre Bras, and the fourth so thoroughly mauled at Ligny that it had been left there to get reorganized. 10 Nevertheless, Reille still had 13,000 bayonets, 1,300 cavalry, and 36 guns; by midmorning, his infantry, which had bivouacked at Genappe, was still taking up positions in front of Hougoumont, while the cavalry had already pushed farther on, in the direction of Braine l'Alleud.
In the center, along the road between Le Caillou and La Belle Alliance, the emperor massed his reserves. Had one or the other of his two wings proven unable to overcome on its own the Allied forces in its front, Napoleon intended to send in his reserves, counting on the impact of their attack to deliver the decisive blow These troops included the VI Corps, commanded by Georges Mouton, Count Lobau, and the infantry of Drouot's Imperial Guard. From the beginning, Mouton's corps had been the weakest in the army, and then one of its three divisions had been detached to pursue the Prussians, so now it numbered only 6,000 muskets and 30 cannon, but these were fresh troops who had not yet been in combat. As for the infantry of the Guard, its three divisions had contributed to the victory at Ligny, but they had by no means fought themselves out, and with their 13,000 muskets—all select troops—and their 72 guns, they were capable of attacking with great force and delivering immense firepower.
The emperor deployed his numerous reserve cavalry according to the same principle of symmetry, which guaranteed him maximum flexibility and the possibility of intervening anywhere on the field. On the right, behind d'Erlon's infantry, he placed Milhaud's IV Corps, with its 2,700 cuirassiers, and the light cavalry of the Imperial Guard, under the command of Lefebvre-Desnouettes, with 2,000 lancers and chasseurs. On the left, supporting Reille's infantry, was Kellermann's III Corps, with nearly 3,000 cuirassiers, carabineers, and dragoons, and the Imperial Guard's heavy cavalry, commanded by Guyot, with horse grenadiers and dragoons numbering 1,600 sabers. Finally, there was one last reserve force in the center, behind La Belle Alliance, consisting of the two light cavalry divisions of Domon and Subervie, with a total of 2,000 lancers and chasseurs. In all, ten horse artillery batteries—a total of 60 guns—were attached to these various units.
SEVENTEEN
"VIVE L'EMPEREUR"
W hile the troops were still marching into position, Napoleon mounted his horse to inspect the outposts one more time. The artillery officers had reported that the ground was drying out and that soon it would be possible to maneuver their heavy weapons. The valet Marchand stayed behind at Le Caillou, together with the coaches carrying the emperor's baggage and his cooks, who had received orders to have dinner ("a well-cooked shoulder of mutton") ready at six o'clock in the evening. Riding with the emperor and his adjutants was a local resident, a peasant named De Coster who owned a tavern on the road not far from Le Caillou. At five in the morning, the French had hauled him out of his bed and forced him to go with them; the emperor needed a guide. To keep De Coster from
The deployment adopted by Napoleon was an expression of his insistence on remaining flexible. His right wing, whose assigned positions were in the fields beyond La Belle Alliance, to the east of the main road that divided the battlefield in two, was formed by d'Erlon's I Corps. Since this corps had taken no part in the bloody battles of Ligny and Quatre Bras, it was the strongest in the entire army: Its four divisions numbered around 16,000 muskets and 46 cannon, along with 1,500 cavalry. These latter troops were stationed on the extreme right, not far from Papelotte, keeping an eye on the enemy's outposts. On the left wing, west of the main road, Reille's II Corps took up its positions. Originally even stronger than I Corps, the II Corps was much reduced: Three of its four divisions had been damaged at Quatre Bras, and the fourth so thoroughly mauled at Ligny that it had been left there to get reorganized. 10 Nevertheless, Reille still had 13,000 bayonets, 1,300 cavalry, and 36 guns; by midmorning, his infantry, which had bivouacked at Genappe, was still taking up positions in front of Hougoumont, while the cavalry had already pushed farther on, in the direction of Braine l'Alleud.
In the center, along the road between Le Caillou and La Belle Alliance, the emperor massed his reserves. Had one or the other of his two wings proven unable to overcome on its own the Allied forces in its front, Napoleon intended to send in his reserves, counting on the impact of their attack to deliver the decisive blow These troops included the VI Corps, commanded by Georges Mouton, Count Lobau, and the infantry of Drouot's Imperial Guard. From the beginning, Mouton's corps had been the weakest in the army, and then one of its three divisions had been detached to pursue the Prussians, so now it numbered only 6,000 muskets and 30 cannon, but these were fresh troops who had not yet been in combat. As for the infantry of the Guard, its three divisions had contributed to the victory at Ligny, but they had by no means fought themselves out, and with their 13,000 muskets—all select troops—and their 72 guns, they were capable of attacking with great force and delivering immense firepower.
The emperor deployed his numerous reserve cavalry according to the same principle of symmetry, which guaranteed him maximum flexibility and the possibility of intervening anywhere on the field. On the right, behind d'Erlon's infantry, he placed Milhaud's IV Corps, with its 2,700 cuirassiers, and the light cavalry of the Imperial Guard, under the command of Lefebvre-Desnouettes, with 2,000 lancers and chasseurs. On the left, supporting Reille's infantry, was Kellermann's III Corps, with nearly 3,000 cuirassiers, carabineers, and dragoons, and the Imperial Guard's heavy cavalry, commanded by Guyot, with horse grenadiers and dragoons numbering 1,600 sabers. Finally, there was one last reserve force in the center, behind La Belle Alliance, consisting of the two light cavalry divisions of Domon and Subervie, with a total of 2,000 lancers and chasseurs. In all, ten horse artillery batteries—a total of 60 guns—were attached to these various units.
SEVENTEEN
"VIVE L'EMPEREUR"
W hile the troops were still marching into position, Napoleon mounted his horse to inspect the outposts one more time. The artillery officers had reported that the ground was drying out and that soon it would be possible to maneuver their heavy weapons. The valet Marchand stayed behind at Le Caillou, together with the coaches carrying the emperor's baggage and his cooks, who had received orders to have dinner ("a well-cooked shoulder of mutton") ready at six o'clock in the evening. Riding with the emperor and his adjutants was a local resident, a peasant named De Coster who owned a tavern on the road not far from Le Caillou. At five in the morning, the French had hauled him out of his bed and forced him to go with them; the emperor needed a guide. To keep De Coster from
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