partly in echelon to the right to prevent the enemy from turning the Allied flank by maneuvering along the road between Nivelles and Mont-Saint-Jean, were Mitchell's English brigade, Clinton's Anglo-Hanoverian division, and the Brunswick contingent. Posted far behind the front line, near the village of Braine l'Alleud on the Allies' extreme western flank, were the Dutch-Belgians of Chasse's Third Netherlands Division. All told, these units positioned in the rear formed a powerful reserve of some 20,000 bayonets, of which nearly 15,000 were regular army troops. The Anglo-Hanoverian cavalry brigades of Dornberg, Grant, and Arentschildt, together with the Brunswicker cavalry, added 3,700 sabers to a sector that, with its 74 guns, was much denser and far better protected than the left wing.
In short, Wellington's deployment was distinctly unbalanced, with a mighty, deeply echeloned right wing, a strong center, and a decidedly weaker left wing. Judging from these dispositions, the duke intended to hold at all costs the two outposts protecting his line, the farm of La Haye Sainte and the chateau of Hougoumont; he moreover expected—and feared—an attack on his right, and perhaps he also anticipated the necessity of opposing a movement to envelop his right flank and cut his lines of communication with the ports on the English Channel. By contrast, Wellington was much less concerned about his left flank, where he placed the troops that had been most severely bloodied at Quatre Bras, as if giving them a chance to catch their breath, and where he expected at any moment to see the vanguard of the Prussian columns appear.
All in all, the defensive position that Wellington assumed has always been deemed an excellent one. The two walled enclosures of Hougoumont and La Haye Sainte were veritable fortresses that he could hope to defend all day long from any frontal assault, and the ridge of Mont-Saint-Jean hid the majority of his troops from the enemy's view and gave them at least partial protection from artillery fire, even though an intense bombardment, with the enemy guns firing blindly over the ridge, was still capable of causing some casualties. At the time, though, some disagreed. Sir Thomas Picton, having ridden all along the Allied line, felt the necessity of remarking to Sir John Colborne, the colonel of the Fifty-second Light Infantry, "I never saw a worse position taken up by any army." But Sir Thomas was renowned for his ill humor; furthermore, at Quatre Bras a cannonball had cracked two or three of his ribs, and to avoid being sent back to Brussels, the general had mentioned his wound to no one except his servant. Under the circumstances, it's understandable that Sir Thomas may have been more irritable than usual.
SIXTEEN
NAPOLEON'S DEPLOYMENT
W hat would Napoleon do? Would he be able to take advantage of the weakness in his enemy's line and strike his vulnerable left wing, or would he try to maneuver around Wellington's right flank, as the duke feared? In truth, at ten in the morning Napoleon still had not decided what course of action he would take, for the good reason that he was totally ignorant of Wellington's deployment on the reverse slope of the Mont-Saint-Jean ridge. All the emperor knew was what a reconnaissance officer sent out shortly after dawn had reported, namely that the position was "defended by an army of guns, and by mountains of infantry" Therefore, the emperor deployed his troops as symmetrically as he could, not wishing to compromise any future developments, and retaining until the last moment the possibility of committing the bulk of his forces to the right, left, or center. Besides, this was Napoleon's normal way of opening a battle: He would evaluate all alternative possibilities, holding his decision in abeyance until he had gathered sufficient clues. The most significant feature of a Napoleonic plan was its resolute flexibility; thereafter, as the emperor liked to repeat, "execution is
In short, Wellington's deployment was distinctly unbalanced, with a mighty, deeply echeloned right wing, a strong center, and a decidedly weaker left wing. Judging from these dispositions, the duke intended to hold at all costs the two outposts protecting his line, the farm of La Haye Sainte and the chateau of Hougoumont; he moreover expected—and feared—an attack on his right, and perhaps he also anticipated the necessity of opposing a movement to envelop his right flank and cut his lines of communication with the ports on the English Channel. By contrast, Wellington was much less concerned about his left flank, where he placed the troops that had been most severely bloodied at Quatre Bras, as if giving them a chance to catch their breath, and where he expected at any moment to see the vanguard of the Prussian columns appear.
All in all, the defensive position that Wellington assumed has always been deemed an excellent one. The two walled enclosures of Hougoumont and La Haye Sainte were veritable fortresses that he could hope to defend all day long from any frontal assault, and the ridge of Mont-Saint-Jean hid the majority of his troops from the enemy's view and gave them at least partial protection from artillery fire, even though an intense bombardment, with the enemy guns firing blindly over the ridge, was still capable of causing some casualties. At the time, though, some disagreed. Sir Thomas Picton, having ridden all along the Allied line, felt the necessity of remarking to Sir John Colborne, the colonel of the Fifty-second Light Infantry, "I never saw a worse position taken up by any army." But Sir Thomas was renowned for his ill humor; furthermore, at Quatre Bras a cannonball had cracked two or three of his ribs, and to avoid being sent back to Brussels, the general had mentioned his wound to no one except his servant. Under the circumstances, it's understandable that Sir Thomas may have been more irritable than usual.
SIXTEEN
NAPOLEON'S DEPLOYMENT
W hat would Napoleon do? Would he be able to take advantage of the weakness in his enemy's line and strike his vulnerable left wing, or would he try to maneuver around Wellington's right flank, as the duke feared? In truth, at ten in the morning Napoleon still had not decided what course of action he would take, for the good reason that he was totally ignorant of Wellington's deployment on the reverse slope of the Mont-Saint-Jean ridge. All the emperor knew was what a reconnaissance officer sent out shortly after dawn had reported, namely that the position was "defended by an army of guns, and by mountains of infantry" Therefore, the emperor deployed his troops as symmetrically as he could, not wishing to compromise any future developments, and retaining until the last moment the possibility of committing the bulk of his forces to the right, left, or center. Besides, this was Napoleon's normal way of opening a battle: He would evaluate all alternative possibilities, holding his decision in abeyance until he had gathered sufficient clues. The most significant feature of a Napoleonic plan was its resolute flexibility; thereafter, as the emperor liked to repeat, "execution is
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