Supreme Commander by Jr. Seymour Morris

president as document SWNCC150/4/A. To be expected of a document emanating from many fathers, it was bureaucratese to the core, so vague and poorly organized as to be virtually useless to the man entrusted with implementing it, Douglas MacArthur. To summarize the document, the objectives of the occupation were to ensure that Japan did not become a menace to the world, and to impose a democratic self-government consistent with the freely imposed will of the people. The occupation would accomplish this by disarming and demilitarizing the country, promoting democratic and representative organizations, and strengthening the economy. Should there be differences among the Allied Powers, “the policies of the United States will govern.” The supreme commander (appointed by the United States) would exercise sole executive power, and would work with the existing Japanese government to whatever extent he deemed feasible in reforming its “feudal and authoritarian tendencies.” Militarists would be removed from office and war criminals put on trial. War production factories would be dismantled and large economic monopolies broken up. Democratic parties and groups would be encouraged, and citizens’ individual rights would be protected.
    Thus ended what was essentially a wish list. How it was to be achieved was up to MacArthur. It was his job to clarify the policy, develop the strategy, set priorities and deadlines, and manage the operation. The most important line in the document was the one that defined his role: “The authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government will be subject to the Supreme Commander, who will possess all powers necessary to effectuate the surrender terms and to carry out the policies established for the conduct of the occupation and the control of Japan.”
    â€œAll powers necessary. . . . ” The next sentence is interesting: It talks about “the desire of the United States to attain its objectives with a minimum commitment of its forces and resources.” That is exactly what MacArthur was doing when he talked about how he hoped to reduce American troops from 500,000 to 200,000: He was exercising his powers in trying to fulfill a major “desire of the United States”—demobilization. President Truman may not have been happy about MacArthur stating U.S. policy so forcefully and revealing specific dates and troop numbers, but it was a lot better than if MacArthur had said he needed a million men.
    To use examples from the Civil War, generals can be divided into those like the infamous George McClellan, who need twice as many men as the enemy before they dare attack, and others like Grant, who don’t complain and make do with whatever they’ve got. MacArthur was the latter. At a time when Americans were weary of war, and mothers, wives, and girlfriends wanted their boys back home, the size of forces available for MacArthur would have to be lean. One month later, in October, the issue of how many troops MacArthur needed came up again. He received a wire from the army chief of staff, General Marshall, saying Truman wanted to know whether MacArthur could reduce the minimum of 200,000 which he had contemplated. MacArthur chuckled over that one. In a conversation with General Eichelberger he said: “It seems funny that they should now be asking me to reduce below 200,000 when you think of all the fuss they made when I advanced the idea that 200,000 would be enough.”
    But MacArthur still wasn’t out of the doghouse with the president. He had been invited by Truman to make a trip back to the United States for a meeting and “to receive the plaudits of a grateful nation.” To Truman’s surprise, MacArthur passed, claiming it would be “unwise” to leave Japan because of “the delicate and difficult situation which prevails here.” In October, Truman issued a second invitation for MacArthur “to make a trip