Supreme Commander by Jr. Seymour Morris Page B

its purpose was to give those countries that had suffered from Japan’s aggression a chance to influence the rehabilitation of their former enemy. In late November 1945 MacArthur invited the commission to visit Japan to see actual conditions firsthand and to provide him the “greatest possible aid.” The delegates arrived the day after Christmas and got treated to a tour of eight Japanese cities in addition to extensive briefings by SCAP officials, plus extensive time with the supreme commander himself. His charm could be overwhelming. Back in Washington, the commission chairman wrote a letter to Secretary of State James Byrnes that sounded as if it could have been written by MacArthur himself:
    The most satisfactory result of the Commission’s visit, from the point of view of the United States, was the feeling of confidence in the Supreme Commander engendered in the minds of the foreign representatives. Regardless of their views concerning the policies established by the United States for the control of Japan, all delegates are convinced that these policies are being carried out effectively and with the utmost wisdom by the Supreme Commander and his staff. They were all impressed by General MacArthur’s grasp of the problems which face him and by the statesmanship he has shown in performing his difficult task.
    Because it was based in Washington the commission could really do nothing but send memos, which more often than not were read quickly and promptly filed away in some basement storage room. When significant issues came up MacArthur could be fearless in using his power. He got into a major row with Australia and China when he allowed Japan to conduct deep-sea whaling off the coasts of China and the Philippines; even the British got aroused when he permitted Japanese whalers to go as far south as the Antarctic. The protesting nations lodged formal complaints with the State Department, only to be told nothing could be done to counteract whatever MacArthur decreed, his authority being inherent in his position as supreme commander.
    The other advisory organization was the Allied Council for Japan (ACJ), based in Tokyo and consisting of the United States, the USSR, China, and the United Kingdom (representing itself, Australia, New Zealand, and India). Whereas the FEC was to set the general policy of the occupation, the ACJ was to advise on its execution. The council would meet once a week to “consult and advise” MacArthur. The idea was that if any members had disagreements of a fundamental nature with the supreme commander, he would seek their agreement before issuing his orders. Here MacArthur proved himself to be a master of the hidden dagger. In his April 5, 1946, address to the ACJ, he put the members—especially the Soviets—in their place:
    I welcome you with utmost cordiality in the earnest anticipation that . . . your deliberations throughout shall be governed by goodwill, mutual understanding and broad tolerance. As the functions of the Council will be advisory and consultative, it will not divide the heavy administrative responsibility of the Supreme Commander as the sole executive authority for the Allied Powers in Japan, but it will make available to him the several viewpoints of its members on questions of policy and action. I hope it will prove to be a valuable factor in the future solution of many problems.
    In other words, take it or leave it. The delegates nodded in agreement that their views would be consulted, but the Russians knew toughness when they saw it. Their response was one of grudging admiration: “Now there’s a man!” The council met for more than 160 sessions; MacArthur never attended any of them, leaving the United States to be represented by one of his officials. With the State Department he was more blunt: He told the department he would do things his way, otherwise he might as well “quit and go home.”
    Even Japan felt the ax