support the Republic. But since the popular vote of the Socialists also never amounted to much more than 20 percent — scarcely more than the Left republicans — it was not clear how a socialist regime could be established by democratic republican politics alone.
Did Azaña's concept of an exclusively leftist, radically reformist republic therefore make any sense if it was not going to lead to a socialist regime? Azaña seems initially to have believed that full Socialist support would be needed for no more than a few years, after which a united coalition of middle-class republican parties in a radically reformed Spain might have the strength to govern. The other main republican force, the parties of the moderate liberal democratic center, soon refused to maintain the alliance with the Socialists — who did not accept the democratic regime as an ultimate goal — nor did they agree with the extent or radicalism of the reforms imposed by a government led by Left republicans and Socialists. To maintain the strictly leftist option, the Left republicans were thus dependent on the Socialists, who nonetheless refused simply to settle for the Left republican program. Though for the moment disunited, Left republicans and Socialists rejected the results of the second republican elections of 1933, which returned a majority for the moderate republicans and the Catholic Right. Left Republicans and Socialists immediately launched a series of attempts to cancel the results of the most honest and democratic elections in Spanish history. Much more than the contest of 1931, the elections of 1933 reflected the competition of a fully mobilized electorate, and would constitute the freest and fairest contest known to Spain until 1977. 2 If even the Left republicans would not accept the results of democratic elections, the question of the future of a democratic republic lay in grave doubt.
The only large party to support a democratic republic tout court were the Radicals, whose share of the vote was, mutatis mutandis, no greater than that of the Left republicans. At one point the Radicals had sought to form an all-republican government (that is, a coalition of all the republican parties), but the virtual disappearance of the Left republicans in the new elections made that impossible. The Radicals were therefore willing to work with the moderate Right, in this case the new Catholic party, the CEDA (Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas — Spanish Confederation of Autonomous Rightist Groups), which had suddenly emerged as the largest party in Spain; with only about 30 percent of the vote, however, it was far from having a majority.
From June 1933 the key figure in Spanish politics was not any of the major party leaders but the president of the Republic, Niceto Alcalá-Zamora, who, because of the extreme political fragmentation, assumed a dominant role. The Republican constitution required that each parliamentary government face a "double responsibility" — responsible not merely to a majority of the Cortes but also to the approval of the president of the Republic, who had the power to force the resignation of any cabinet of ministers. Alcalá-Zamora used this prerogative with a vengeance, further destabilizing Republican politics.
He was a veteran of the Old Regime, a former leader of one of the more progressive wings of the old monarchist Liberal Party. A practicing Catholic, scrupulously honest in his personal affairs, Alcalá-Zamora in theory supported the Republic as a liberal democratic system. He opposed both radical anti-Catholic reformism and any form of rightist authoritarianism, believing that he had a special responsibility to "center the Republic," as he put it. To that end he constantly interfered in parliamentary affairs, making and unmaking governments according to his own will, to the extent that he himself became one of the Republic's chief political problems.
As Alcalá-Zamora saw it, the main problem facing the
Did Azaña's concept of an exclusively leftist, radically reformist republic therefore make any sense if it was not going to lead to a socialist regime? Azaña seems initially to have believed that full Socialist support would be needed for no more than a few years, after which a united coalition of middle-class republican parties in a radically reformed Spain might have the strength to govern. The other main republican force, the parties of the moderate liberal democratic center, soon refused to maintain the alliance with the Socialists — who did not accept the democratic regime as an ultimate goal — nor did they agree with the extent or radicalism of the reforms imposed by a government led by Left republicans and Socialists. To maintain the strictly leftist option, the Left republicans were thus dependent on the Socialists, who nonetheless refused simply to settle for the Left republican program. Though for the moment disunited, Left republicans and Socialists rejected the results of the second republican elections of 1933, which returned a majority for the moderate republicans and the Catholic Right. Left Republicans and Socialists immediately launched a series of attempts to cancel the results of the most honest and democratic elections in Spanish history. Much more than the contest of 1931, the elections of 1933 reflected the competition of a fully mobilized electorate, and would constitute the freest and fairest contest known to Spain until 1977. 2 If even the Left republicans would not accept the results of democratic elections, the question of the future of a democratic republic lay in grave doubt.
The only large party to support a democratic republic tout court were the Radicals, whose share of the vote was, mutatis mutandis, no greater than that of the Left republicans. At one point the Radicals had sought to form an all-republican government (that is, a coalition of all the republican parties), but the virtual disappearance of the Left republicans in the new elections made that impossible. The Radicals were therefore willing to work with the moderate Right, in this case the new Catholic party, the CEDA (Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas — Spanish Confederation of Autonomous Rightist Groups), which had suddenly emerged as the largest party in Spain; with only about 30 percent of the vote, however, it was far from having a majority.
From June 1933 the key figure in Spanish politics was not any of the major party leaders but the president of the Republic, Niceto Alcalá-Zamora, who, because of the extreme political fragmentation, assumed a dominant role. The Republican constitution required that each parliamentary government face a "double responsibility" — responsible not merely to a majority of the Cortes but also to the approval of the president of the Republic, who had the power to force the resignation of any cabinet of ministers. Alcalá-Zamora used this prerogative with a vengeance, further destabilizing Republican politics.
He was a veteran of the Old Regime, a former leader of one of the more progressive wings of the old monarchist Liberal Party. A practicing Catholic, scrupulously honest in his personal affairs, Alcalá-Zamora in theory supported the Republic as a liberal democratic system. He opposed both radical anti-Catholic reformism and any form of rightist authoritarianism, believing that he had a special responsibility to "center the Republic," as he put it. To that end he constantly interfered in parliamentary affairs, making and unmaking governments according to his own will, to the extent that he himself became one of the Republic's chief political problems.
As Alcalá-Zamora saw it, the main problem facing the
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