Sex, Culture, and Justice: The Limits of Choice by Clare Chambers
Authors: Clare Chambers
Tags: Social Science, Political, Political Science, Philosophy, womens studies, gender studies, Political Ideologies, Anthropology, Cultural, Feminism & Feminist Theory, Conservatism & Liberalism
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Meditations , 170–71.
MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State , 123.
consciously assess, her actions and dispositions. Individuals are thus very significantly influenced by the surroundings and structures in which they live. 29 As individuals tend to remain in social contexts in which they feel comfortable, their habituses are reinforced and tend to remain constant. It follows, moreover, that the social structures that influence an individual’s habitus will be strengthened over time as in- dividuals act in ways that are suggested by, and serve to reinforce, those structures. In other words, in the absence of the kind of dissonance between habitus and field that can lead individuals to become con- scious and questioning of their dispositions, systems of disadvantage are unlikely to be disrupted by those who are disadvantaged.
Gender and Field
It is not entirely clear how gender fits into Bourdieu’s analysis of habi- tus and field. It clearly makes sense to think of a gendered habitus, a set of bodily dispositions ordered along gendered lines. The gendered body is a prime example of one ordered by norms, or discipline: women and men hold and use their bodies differently in ways that cannot be explained by biological difference alone. Bourdieu himself provides many such examples of a gendered habitus, such as the effect of clothing. 30
As a central element of Bourdieu’s work is his argument that habi- tus develops in response to field, it is natural to ask which field is responsible for the development of a gendered habitus. Some feminists have suggested, albeit in other terms, that the family is the field in which the habitus is gendered; or the field to which women are con- fined and in which the female habitus is developed, with the male habitus developing in response to the field of the workplace. 31 Bourdieu explicitly rejects these ideas. The family does operate as a field for Bourdieu, but in the sense that it is the general site of transmission of ‘‘economic, cultural and symbolic privileges,’’ 32 such as those associ- ated with class. The family is not, he argues, the place where masculine
Bourdieu and Wacquant, Invitation to Reflexive Sociology, 136.
Bourdieu’s account of the effects of wearing short skirts and high heels has already been described, but see also Bourdieu, Masculine Domination, 29.
See, for example, Okin, Justice, Gender and the Family, and Betty Friedan, The Feminine Mystique.
Pierre Bourdieu, ‘‘On the Family as a Realized Category,’’ 23; see also Pascalian Medita- tions , 167, and Practical Reason , 19, 64–67.
domination is principally perpetuated. Instead it is ‘‘in agencies such as the school or the state . . . where principles of domination that go on to be exercised within even the most private universe are developed and imposed.’’ 33
We are left, then with a problem: if the habitus is formed in the context of a specific field but there is no specific field in which the habitus becomes gendered, what is the source of gender difference? Terry Lovell argues that, in the context of Bourdieu’s work, gender should be understood in terms of capital. Women should be under- stood simultaneously as ‘‘objects—as repositories of capital for some- one else’’ and as ‘‘capital-accumulating subjects.’’ 34 But while this inter- pretation does shed light on many aspects of gendered experience, it does not explain how the suggestive concept of habitus plays a part: how gender becomes embodied. Perhaps the best way to integrate habi- tus with gender is to conclude that the gendered habitus develops not in response to any one specific field, but rather in response to the gender norms, the symbolic violence, occurring throughout society. Thus, although the family clearly is a site of the perpetuation of gender norms, it is by no means the only such site. We might think of each field as containing (at least) three sets of rules. First, each field
MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State , 123.
consciously assess, her actions and dispositions. Individuals are thus very significantly influenced by the surroundings and structures in which they live. 29 As individuals tend to remain in social contexts in which they feel comfortable, their habituses are reinforced and tend to remain constant. It follows, moreover, that the social structures that influence an individual’s habitus will be strengthened over time as in- dividuals act in ways that are suggested by, and serve to reinforce, those structures. In other words, in the absence of the kind of dissonance between habitus and field that can lead individuals to become con- scious and questioning of their dispositions, systems of disadvantage are unlikely to be disrupted by those who are disadvantaged.
Gender and Field
It is not entirely clear how gender fits into Bourdieu’s analysis of habi- tus and field. It clearly makes sense to think of a gendered habitus, a set of bodily dispositions ordered along gendered lines. The gendered body is a prime example of one ordered by norms, or discipline: women and men hold and use their bodies differently in ways that cannot be explained by biological difference alone. Bourdieu himself provides many such examples of a gendered habitus, such as the effect of clothing. 30
As a central element of Bourdieu’s work is his argument that habi- tus develops in response to field, it is natural to ask which field is responsible for the development of a gendered habitus. Some feminists have suggested, albeit in other terms, that the family is the field in which the habitus is gendered; or the field to which women are con- fined and in which the female habitus is developed, with the male habitus developing in response to the field of the workplace. 31 Bourdieu explicitly rejects these ideas. The family does operate as a field for Bourdieu, but in the sense that it is the general site of transmission of ‘‘economic, cultural and symbolic privileges,’’ 32 such as those associ- ated with class. The family is not, he argues, the place where masculine
Bourdieu and Wacquant, Invitation to Reflexive Sociology, 136.
Bourdieu’s account of the effects of wearing short skirts and high heels has already been described, but see also Bourdieu, Masculine Domination, 29.
See, for example, Okin, Justice, Gender and the Family, and Betty Friedan, The Feminine Mystique.
Pierre Bourdieu, ‘‘On the Family as a Realized Category,’’ 23; see also Pascalian Medita- tions , 167, and Practical Reason , 19, 64–67.
domination is principally perpetuated. Instead it is ‘‘in agencies such as the school or the state . . . where principles of domination that go on to be exercised within even the most private universe are developed and imposed.’’ 33
We are left, then with a problem: if the habitus is formed in the context of a specific field but there is no specific field in which the habitus becomes gendered, what is the source of gender difference? Terry Lovell argues that, in the context of Bourdieu’s work, gender should be understood in terms of capital. Women should be under- stood simultaneously as ‘‘objects—as repositories of capital for some- one else’’ and as ‘‘capital-accumulating subjects.’’ 34 But while this inter- pretation does shed light on many aspects of gendered experience, it does not explain how the suggestive concept of habitus plays a part: how gender becomes embodied. Perhaps the best way to integrate habi- tus with gender is to conclude that the gendered habitus develops not in response to any one specific field, but rather in response to the gender norms, the symbolic violence, occurring throughout society. Thus, although the family clearly is a site of the perpetuation of gender norms, it is by no means the only such site. We might think of each field as containing (at least) three sets of rules. First, each field
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