Scapegoat: The Death of Prince of Wales and Repulse by Dr Martin Stephen

the media had claimed, but all too sinkable, with systemic weaknesses that made it unacceptably vulnerable to precisely the type of attack to which it was subjected. It was not only the physical weakness of his flagship that made Force Z such a hollow threat. It was human weakness as well, and Tom Phillips was responsible for neither the physical nor the human deficiencies in his force. He was not only let down by the Admiralty. He was let down by his flagship, and by the honesty of Great Britain in adhering to treaty limitations in the 1920s and 1930s.

Newly Qualified Tom Phillips.

Admiral Sir Tom Phillips.

Admiral Phillips and Churchill.

Captain Leach.

Tom Phillips Tour of Command, probably HMS Aurora .

Captain Tennant after the sinking.

Tennant as Vice-Admiral.

Churchill negotiating with Blanche, Prince of Wales ’s ship’s cat, with US destroyer alongside.

Admiral Stark, Admiral Pound and Admiral King.

Admiral Palliser and Admiral Phillips at Singapore.

Admiral Palliser and Admiral Phillips at Singapore in more relaxed mode.

Admiral Phillips and Admiral Palliser on the quayside as Prince of Wales docks in Singapore.

HMS Prince of Wales in dazzle paint.

Prince of Wales ’s Walrus aircraft.

5.25” guns, the main anti-aircraft defence of Prince of Wales .

The secondary anti-aircraft defence of Prince of Wales , her ‘pom-poms’.

5.25” guns firing on Prince of Wales .

Prince of Wales ’s solitary, stern-mounted Bofors gun.

Chief Engineer’s Control Room, Prince of Wales .

Engine Room, Prince of Wales .

Damage to Prince of Wales after the Bismarck action.

Boiler Room, Prince of Wales .

HMS Repulse .

Repulse in dry dock, showing her rudder and propellors.

HMS Electra .

HMS Tenedos .

HMS Express .

The Japanese cruiser Chokai.

Prince of Wales docking at Singapore.



The final photographs of both vessels, leaving Singapore for the last time.

Prince of Wales and Repulse : Japanese photograph of the action.

Japanese photographs of the attack.

Electra alongside Prince of Wales .

Captured Japanese ‘Betty’ aircraft in RAF livery.

Chapter 8
    Intelligence, SS Automedon and ‘Matador’
    T here has long been a theory that the British knew more about Japanese intentions in the Malayan Peninsula in 1941 than was admitted at the time. There is the story, reported above, that Singapore intercepted Japanese sighting reports of Force Z. There is also a story which cannot now be verified because the source of it, an officer who survived the sinking of Prince of Wales , died before his account could be checked:
    ‘There is also hearsay evidence that the Intelligence on Admiral Phillips’s staff found, on his return to Singapore after the sinkings, that the naval staff ashore had known of the presence of Japanese torpedo-bombers in Indo-China while Force Z had been at sea but had not thought it necessary to send a warning signal.’ 1
    Another historian claims that the British had a limited ability to read Japanese naval signals, and that the British knew four hours in advance an attack would be launched against Force Z. Unfortunately, the source for this allegation is not made clear. 2
    As we have seen, there was confusion in many levels of communication, including between the signals Intelligence division and the army and RAF. It is at least possible that vital intelligence was not passed on to both commanders in Singapore and to Force Z. This matters because had Phillips been more clearly informed he would have been extremely unlikely to stay around Kuantan as he did, but chosen instead to make maximum speed back to Singapore. It also needs to be remembered that the delay off Kuantan was at the behest of Captain Tennant of Repulse , and did not originate with Phillips.
    What is clear beyond reasonable doubt is that Phillips was woefully ill-informed about the range and power of Japanese aircraft. This is dealt with more fully in a chapter below, but in essence the Royal Navy based its