Scapegoat: The Death of Prince of Wales and Repulse by Dr Martin Stephen Page A

assessment of Japanese capabilities round its carrier-based biplane, the ‘Stringbag’ or Fairey Swordfish, and the land-based Beaufort. Both had significantly shorter range than their Japanese counterparts. British experience pointed to 200 miles as the standard reach of torpedo bombers, and that the risk from them at 400 miles or over was negligible. The British had no idea that Japanese aircraft were capable of at least twice that range, and could launch torpedoes at twice the height and twice the speed of their Fleet Air Arm equivalents. It is interesting that this failure to recognize the strength of Japanese materiel did not extend to Japanese submarines, which were regarded as a potent and effective threat. As for surface ships, the last ship built for Japan in Britain was the battle-cruiser Kongo in 1910. Ironically, it was this vessel the crews of Force Z were told they were most likely to face if they met any Japanese surface forces, and the men were understandably optimistic about the outcome of a duel between Britain’s most modern battleship and a battle-cruiser, albeit modernized, that predated the First World War.
    Thus though dismissal of Japanese materiel was not universal and across the board, what does seem to have infected service culture, and spread to the ranks, was an arrogant, colonial, racist and above all plain wrong judgment on the fighting prowess of the Japanese:
    ‘In lectures troops were told that the Japanese were small, myopic and technically backward … The British military attaché at the Tokyo embassy complained after a visit to Malaya: ‘our chaps place the Japs somewhere between the Italians and the Afghans’ … Japan’s failure to defeat China had not impressed European soldiers.’ 3
    The publicity given to the arrival of Prince of Wales in Singapore and other vessels (a failure to name that rankled with survivors of Repulse until their dying day) was also quite a gross intelligence failure. Intended to inflate Force Z as a deterrent, it arguably failed entirely in that aim and gave the Japanese significant operational intelligence. It also created a level of public expectation that in effect made it impossible for the two ships to sneak out and hide in the islands or retreat. As the Admiralty sowed, so Force Z reaped.
    One question that remains unanswered despite the vast amount of print expended on the story of Force Z is whether or not the Admiralty actually knew that the Japanese had long-range torpedo bombers within range of the British force. One reason for thinking they did is the unsubstantiated report credited to a now-dead survivor of Prince of Wales : ‘After I got back to Singapore, Tom’s Staff Officer (Intelligence), who also survived the sinking, told me that he had discovered since his return that intelligence about these torpedo bombers had been available in Singapore.’ 4
    A further piece of evidence is the otherwise inexplicable signal timed at 2210 on 9 December, when Force Z was en route to Kuantan, from the Admiralty, warning Phillips about the danger of a Taranto-style attack on Singapore. Such a signal only makes sense if the Admiralty had been told the Japanese had torpedo-bombers capable of reaching Singapore:
    ‘Tom asked if I knew what the First Sea Lord was getting at. I said I knew what he was referring to but that I couldn’t see any relevance since there was, so far as I knew, no possibility of torpedo attack in the Johor Strait until either the Japanese had carriers in the area or had established shore-based aircraft in Malaya. He said that was what he felt too.’ 5
    If it was indeed known by the Admiralty or even at Singapore, it is clear that it was not known to Phillips, or to any of his staff.
    The sinking of the two ships was unusual in that more people survived than were killed. We have testimony from a wide range of people, including senior people who were with Phillips until the last minute. This was not like the sinking of the