Quentin Tarantino and Philosophy by Richard Greene, K. Silem Mohammad

in the classical philosophers, a commonly accepted knock-down argument against the moral permissibility of revenge. This, however, is not the case. Many classic philosophers consider whether “retribution” or “rehabilitation” should be the goal of government punishment, but most of them say nothing about the moral permissibility of personal revenge. They do agree that a government allowing citizens to seek personal revenge is ill-advised because it would lead to social unrest (perhaps even chaos), but this doesn’t tell us about revenge’s morality; the fact that something should be illegal doesn’t entail that it is immoral. A few have said a little about the moral permissibility of personal revenge—and at first glance it seems that they oppose it—but when one takes a closer look, it becomes clear that they actually leave the question of revenge’s moral justification open.
    Hobbes (1588-1679), for instance, says that the natural law frowns upon vengeance.
    The fifth precept of the Law of nature is: That we must forgive him who repents, and asketh pardon for what is past. . . . The sixth precept of the naturall Law is, that in revenge . . . and punishments we must have our eye not at the evill past, but the future good. That is: It is not lawfull to inflict punishment for any other end, but
that the offender may be corrected, or that others warned by his punishment may become better. 38
    Thus one is tempted to conclude that Hobbes doesn’t think vengeance is morally justified. But such a conclusion would be hasty. Later Hobbes admits that if someone doesn’t repent for his wrongs, nature doesn’t demand forgiving mercy.
    But Peace granted to him that repents not, that is, to him that retains an hostile mind . . . that . . . seeks not Peace, but opportunity, is not properly Peace but feare, and therefore is not commanded by nature. 39
    And presumably, like Jules, he wouldn’t let admitting wrongdoing qualify as repentance. And more importantly, since Hobbes didn’t view the natural law as morally binding (it only describes what is prudent for one to do) whether or not vengeance is in accordance with the natural law is irrelevant to vengeance’s morality. 40 Thus it seems that Hobbes leaves the question open.
    John Locke (1632-1704) suggests that one should not seek vengeance on an abusive tyrant.
    Must the people then always lay themselves open to the cruelty and rage of tyranny? Must they see their cities pillaged . . . their wives and children exposed to the tyrant’s lust and fury . . . and all the miseries of want and oppression, and yet sit still? . . . I answer: Self-defence is a part of the law of nature; nor can it be denied the
community, even against the king himself: but to revenge themselves upon him, must by no means be allowed them; it being not agreeable to that law. 41
    So at first glance it seems that Locke would suggest that revenge is never justified; if it is not justified when a tyrant is subjecting you to “all the miseries of want and oppression,” then it would seem never to be. But once we read further, we realize that such actions are not off limits because they are acts of revenge, but because they inappropriately cross social barriers. Such actions
    exceed the bounds of due reverence and respect. [Those wronged] may repulse the present attempt, but must not revenge past violences: for it is natural for us to defend life and limb, but that an inferior should punish a superior, is against nature. 42
    Locke is not condemning revenge but the punishment of superiors. (Like Bushido, Locke would condemn the Bride’s revenge on Bill.) But he leaves open the question of punishing—taking revenge upon—your equals.
    Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) argued that resentment (clearly an emotion that fuels revenge) tends to poison one from within. Thus one might think that Nietzsche would argue that revenge is never morally justified. However, such a conclusion is hasty. As Murphy points