Quentin Tarantino and Philosophy by Richard Greene, K. Silem Mohammad Page A
Authors: Richard Greene, K. Silem Mohammad
Tags: Non-Fiction, Philosophy
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out, 43 Nietzsche is suggesting that resentment is not in your self-interest because, given the laws of society, it is usually repressed and thus acts as a poison. Given that fact, it seems unjustified to conclude that Nietzsche condemned expressed resentment in the form of revenge; if you can get away with it—like O-Ren and Beatrix—expressed resentment will not poison. So, it seems, Nietzsche too leaves open the question of revenge’s moral justification.
The only classical philosopher I know of who explicitly speaks against revenge is Socrates (469-399 B.C.E.), who suggests
that desires for vengeance and harming one’s enemies are immoral. But he never actually presents a satisfactory argument to this effect; he merely relies on his “intuition” that “true moral goodness is incapable of doing intentional injury to others.” 44 So it seems, if we are to show that revenge is not morally justified, we need to go beyond the classical philosophers and seek out contemporary arguments.
Some might argue against the moral justification of revenge by pointing out that “two wrongs don’t make a right.” Those who offer up this “saying” as an argument against the moral justification of revenge, however, would be begging the question: that is, they would simply be assuming the truth of what they are trying to prove. To assume that vengeance is “answering wrong with wrong” is to assume, without argument, that vengeance is wrong. If vengeance is morally permissible, then a wrong followed by vengeance is not a case of “two wrongs” but a case of “a wrong and a right.” Thus, a separate argument against revenge needs to be put forth.
To do so, some might argue that we are not morally qualified to enact revenge; only God knows the intent of the wrongdoer and only he is without sin and thus morally worthy of “casting the first stone.” 45 But that perfect knowledge and moral character is required to qualify one to enact revenge is, at the least, unclear. 46 It seems that we can be “sure enough” about an offender’s intentions and as long as we haven’t done something just as bad as the offender, we are not being hypocritical by punishing them. (Even though O-Ren is not completely without sin, the fact that she has never killed anyone’s parents in cold blood entails that she is not a hypocrite for punishing Boss Matsumoto.) So this argument seems wanting.
Some argue against revenge by suggesting that it does no good . After all, even though O-Ren isn’t a hypocrite, killing Boss Matsumoto doesn’t bring her parents back. But, although it is true that seeking revenge doesn’t “undo” the offense, it is far from clear that revenge accomplishes “no good” at all. The offender does get what she or he is due (thus justice is accomplished)
and the victim gets satisfaction and perhaps even peace of mind. If a desire for revenge possesses a person it might harm more than it benefits—and if that is the case, revenge is unadvisable—but it’s hardly obvious that revenge does no good at all.
If universal pacifism—the position that all actions of violence are wrong—is true, then clearly vengeance would be morally unjustified. But many don’t find universal pacifism plausible. It entails that even actions of self-defense, both personal and social, are morally unjustified; and this means that Alabama in True Romance should not have defended herself against the hit man Virgil, and that we should not have opposed Hitler with force. Most find this implausible and in the same way that we can offer of up an argument for self-defense, it seems that we can offer up an argument for revenge: It seems perfectly clear that we have a moral obligation not to harm people who have not wronged us . However, what could this possibly mean but that, when one does wrong us, the obligation not to harm them has been lifted? Why even bother to point out that we have an obligation not to harm others who don’t wrong
The only classical philosopher I know of who explicitly speaks against revenge is Socrates (469-399 B.C.E.), who suggests
that desires for vengeance and harming one’s enemies are immoral. But he never actually presents a satisfactory argument to this effect; he merely relies on his “intuition” that “true moral goodness is incapable of doing intentional injury to others.” 44 So it seems, if we are to show that revenge is not morally justified, we need to go beyond the classical philosophers and seek out contemporary arguments.
Some might argue against the moral justification of revenge by pointing out that “two wrongs don’t make a right.” Those who offer up this “saying” as an argument against the moral justification of revenge, however, would be begging the question: that is, they would simply be assuming the truth of what they are trying to prove. To assume that vengeance is “answering wrong with wrong” is to assume, without argument, that vengeance is wrong. If vengeance is morally permissible, then a wrong followed by vengeance is not a case of “two wrongs” but a case of “a wrong and a right.” Thus, a separate argument against revenge needs to be put forth.
To do so, some might argue that we are not morally qualified to enact revenge; only God knows the intent of the wrongdoer and only he is without sin and thus morally worthy of “casting the first stone.” 45 But that perfect knowledge and moral character is required to qualify one to enact revenge is, at the least, unclear. 46 It seems that we can be “sure enough” about an offender’s intentions and as long as we haven’t done something just as bad as the offender, we are not being hypocritical by punishing them. (Even though O-Ren is not completely without sin, the fact that she has never killed anyone’s parents in cold blood entails that she is not a hypocrite for punishing Boss Matsumoto.) So this argument seems wanting.
Some argue against revenge by suggesting that it does no good . After all, even though O-Ren isn’t a hypocrite, killing Boss Matsumoto doesn’t bring her parents back. But, although it is true that seeking revenge doesn’t “undo” the offense, it is far from clear that revenge accomplishes “no good” at all. The offender does get what she or he is due (thus justice is accomplished)
and the victim gets satisfaction and perhaps even peace of mind. If a desire for revenge possesses a person it might harm more than it benefits—and if that is the case, revenge is unadvisable—but it’s hardly obvious that revenge does no good at all.
If universal pacifism—the position that all actions of violence are wrong—is true, then clearly vengeance would be morally unjustified. But many don’t find universal pacifism plausible. It entails that even actions of self-defense, both personal and social, are morally unjustified; and this means that Alabama in True Romance should not have defended herself against the hit man Virgil, and that we should not have opposed Hitler with force. Most find this implausible and in the same way that we can offer of up an argument for self-defense, it seems that we can offer up an argument for revenge: It seems perfectly clear that we have a moral obligation not to harm people who have not wronged us . However, what could this possibly mean but that, when one does wrong us, the obligation not to harm them has been lifted? Why even bother to point out that we have an obligation not to harm others who don’t wrong
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