omitted from the public summary.
At the beginning of March, signalling-company bosses had told MPs that they might –
might
– be able to have moving block working and installed within ten years. In their secret report, the consultants talked, with optimism, of ‘a five-year programme’ for the development and fitting of moving block. Yet this is what Railtrack told the public: ‘The development programme is anticipated to take between three and four years.’
Most surprisingly, Railtrack inserted a line into the public summary that had never appeared in the consultants’ report. ‘Most of the hardware for this train control system already exists,’ it read, ‘the technology required being relatively mature.’
I read that line out to Arthur when I met him. He said: ‘Mm. That’s interesting.’
Did he find it misleading? Arthur paused for a long time. Eventually he said: ‘I don’t think there’s any doubt, sitting here now, that it was not as far developed as we thought it was … I’m surprised by those words, I really am … I am amazed at that statement. Because I don’t know where they had any proof of that.’
Neither Horton nor Edmonds would comment on the discrepancies. I asked another senior industry figure, with close knowledge of the subsequent attempt to make moving block work, what he thought. ‘To say the technology is mature – yes, I think that was a bit adventurous, certainly in 1995.’
What happened? The consultants’ report never mentioned it, but there was one other factor in the back of the minds of Railtrack and the Tories. In 1994 there had been a painful strikeby railway signalling workers. Bringing in the new technology would be another step towards ending the unions’ leverage, by getting rid of thousands of signalling staff.
Some in the rail industry are inclined to give Horton, Edmonds and their colleagues the benefit of the doubt. ‘I think dishonesty does matter, but my suspicion is that it wasn’t a question of dishonesty, it was more a question of misjudgment,’ Michael Beswick, the regulator’s director of rail policy until he retired in 2013, told me. ‘It was assumed that technology would move very quickly, but it doesn’t. That was the problem. That is a bit of an indictment of the calibre of the people running the show at that time in Railtrack.’
Another senior rail industry figure said: ‘John Edmonds was keen to get the company privatised and wanted to say things that would encourage people to believe it was bold and dynamic. It was all about creating confidence, which requires bold statements, sometimes.’
Before I knew I would get to see the consultants’ report, I spoke to a former senior Railtrack executive. He didn’t have a copy of the report, and was trying to remember its conclusions. As I found out later, his memory didn’t quite reflect the report; rather, perhaps, it reflected the real back-room conversations going on in Railtrack at the time. ‘The basic conclusion was that it was impossible to upgrade the west coast at any sensible cost if you went for conventional signalling,’ he said. ‘And the only way forward – whether it was feasible or not – was to bring in twenty-first-century signalling technology.’
Feasible or not
: the decision was made, and Railtrack began unconsciously to weave its downfall.
The consultants weren’t reckless. They never imagined that Railtrack would manage and finance the WCML modernisation itself. In some detail, they outlined a scheme whereby Railtrack would get a big, experienced civil-engineering consortium to raise money for and manage the project, thereby assuming most of the risk. But when Norman Broadhurst, thenRailtrack’s finance director, studied the numbers, he thought the returns looked too juicy to be given away. He thought Railtrack should do it, and talked his colleagues round. One member of the board described how he’d argued against the proposal. ‘I said at the time
At the beginning of March, signalling-company bosses had told MPs that they might –
might
– be able to have moving block working and installed within ten years. In their secret report, the consultants talked, with optimism, of ‘a five-year programme’ for the development and fitting of moving block. Yet this is what Railtrack told the public: ‘The development programme is anticipated to take between three and four years.’
Most surprisingly, Railtrack inserted a line into the public summary that had never appeared in the consultants’ report. ‘Most of the hardware for this train control system already exists,’ it read, ‘the technology required being relatively mature.’
I read that line out to Arthur when I met him. He said: ‘Mm. That’s interesting.’
Did he find it misleading? Arthur paused for a long time. Eventually he said: ‘I don’t think there’s any doubt, sitting here now, that it was not as far developed as we thought it was … I’m surprised by those words, I really am … I am amazed at that statement. Because I don’t know where they had any proof of that.’
Neither Horton nor Edmonds would comment on the discrepancies. I asked another senior industry figure, with close knowledge of the subsequent attempt to make moving block work, what he thought. ‘To say the technology is mature – yes, I think that was a bit adventurous, certainly in 1995.’
What happened? The consultants’ report never mentioned it, but there was one other factor in the back of the minds of Railtrack and the Tories. In 1994 there had been a painful strikeby railway signalling workers. Bringing in the new technology would be another step towards ending the unions’ leverage, by getting rid of thousands of signalling staff.
Some in the rail industry are inclined to give Horton, Edmonds and their colleagues the benefit of the doubt. ‘I think dishonesty does matter, but my suspicion is that it wasn’t a question of dishonesty, it was more a question of misjudgment,’ Michael Beswick, the regulator’s director of rail policy until he retired in 2013, told me. ‘It was assumed that technology would move very quickly, but it doesn’t. That was the problem. That is a bit of an indictment of the calibre of the people running the show at that time in Railtrack.’
Another senior rail industry figure said: ‘John Edmonds was keen to get the company privatised and wanted to say things that would encourage people to believe it was bold and dynamic. It was all about creating confidence, which requires bold statements, sometimes.’
Before I knew I would get to see the consultants’ report, I spoke to a former senior Railtrack executive. He didn’t have a copy of the report, and was trying to remember its conclusions. As I found out later, his memory didn’t quite reflect the report; rather, perhaps, it reflected the real back-room conversations going on in Railtrack at the time. ‘The basic conclusion was that it was impossible to upgrade the west coast at any sensible cost if you went for conventional signalling,’ he said. ‘And the only way forward – whether it was feasible or not – was to bring in twenty-first-century signalling technology.’
Feasible or not
: the decision was made, and Railtrack began unconsciously to weave its downfall.
The consultants weren’t reckless. They never imagined that Railtrack would manage and finance the WCML modernisation itself. In some detail, they outlined a scheme whereby Railtrack would get a big, experienced civil-engineering consortium to raise money for and manage the project, thereby assuming most of the risk. But when Norman Broadhurst, thenRailtrack’s finance director, studied the numbers, he thought the returns looked too juicy to be given away. He thought Railtrack should do it, and talked his colleagues round. One member of the board described how he’d argued against the proposal. ‘I said at the time
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