Private Island: Why Britian Now Belongs to Someone Else by James Meek Page B
Authors: James Meek
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insistence, Railtrack appointed a champion of moving-block technology to be its engineering director. Brian Mellitt was a clever, experienced specialist who’d already supervised the early stage of introducing moving block on London Underground’s Jubilee line extension, then under construction.
But in 1997, just when his expertise was most needed, Mellitt’s pet project was suffering a horrible public failure. Quite simply, moving block on the Jubilee line didn’t work. Computers that were supposed to talk to each other couldn’t. Costs soared. Desperately trying to complete the project in time for the opening of the Millennium Dome, engineers had to come up with a crash programme for an old-style conventional signalling system. The number of trains an hour was slashed in half. Westinghouse, the key signalling company responsible, took much of the blame. John Mills, who in 1995 had told parliament that moving block on the west coast main line might be possible in ten years, was removed as chief executive.
Throughout 1998, as news of the problems on the Jubilee line began to emerge, the newly arrived Gerald Corbett – who took over from Edmonds in late 1997 – became increasingly uneasy about the moving-block plan he’d inherited for the west coast. He didn’t get on with Mellitt. Corbett was, if anything, even more hostile towards the engineering profession than his predecessor. Railtrack didn’t sign a contract to develop the system with the British-French company GEC-Alsthom (later Alstom) until July 1998, more than a year behind schedule. But even this wasn’t a proper contract to deliver something; it was a nine-month contract to define the thing that should be delivered.
And the signalling was only part of the WCML modernisation. Much more needed to be done. Tracks needed to be relaid, tunnels modified, bridges altered. This work, too, was behind schedule and over budget. Plans changed constantly. At one point, Railtrack paid £10 million to a contractor to develop a new kind of transformer, only to abandon it later and go backto the original type. With every passing day, contractors were finding out how much more seriously the line had deteriorated than Railtrack and the consultants had understood.
At the same time, because Railtrack had shed so much of its engineering and railway operations expertise, it had little ability to judge whether the prices its myriad contractors were charging were fair. ‘It is easy to understand why certain elements within the industry took advantage of that situation,’ said one rail industry figure. ‘It would have been a great temptation.’
In one iteration of a recurring pattern, Railtrack turned to a US company for project management expertise, but managed to botch that, too. Railtrack hired Brown & Root, a subsidiary of the US engineering group Halliburton, then run by Dick Cheney. Whether Brown & Root, which had grown fat on Pentagon contracts from the Vietnam war and beyond, could have managed the job is unknown, but Railtrack never allowed it to try.
‘Railtrack was half in bed with them and half not,’ said an executive who saw the process from the inside. ‘Brown & Root had a lot of experience in oil and gas contracts. Railtrack said, “Fine, show us how,” but they got cold feet and never signed up.’
Meanwhile, Corbett and his team were becoming horribly aware of the other set of baroque errors that had been made by their predecessors: the Virgin contract, presented to the new Railtrack boss on his accession as a fait accompli.
Despite Virgin Trains’ initial reputation for lateness, there was a general fondness for the Railtrack-Virgin plan, not just in Railtrack, but among politicians, the media and the public. Tilting trains going at 140 mph; London to Glasgow in time for lunch; it sounded good. It sounded like progress. But there was a severe problem.
Again, the lay observer would think it was obvious: other trains needed to use the same line.
But in 1997, just when his expertise was most needed, Mellitt’s pet project was suffering a horrible public failure. Quite simply, moving block on the Jubilee line didn’t work. Computers that were supposed to talk to each other couldn’t. Costs soared. Desperately trying to complete the project in time for the opening of the Millennium Dome, engineers had to come up with a crash programme for an old-style conventional signalling system. The number of trains an hour was slashed in half. Westinghouse, the key signalling company responsible, took much of the blame. John Mills, who in 1995 had told parliament that moving block on the west coast main line might be possible in ten years, was removed as chief executive.
Throughout 1998, as news of the problems on the Jubilee line began to emerge, the newly arrived Gerald Corbett – who took over from Edmonds in late 1997 – became increasingly uneasy about the moving-block plan he’d inherited for the west coast. He didn’t get on with Mellitt. Corbett was, if anything, even more hostile towards the engineering profession than his predecessor. Railtrack didn’t sign a contract to develop the system with the British-French company GEC-Alsthom (later Alstom) until July 1998, more than a year behind schedule. But even this wasn’t a proper contract to deliver something; it was a nine-month contract to define the thing that should be delivered.
And the signalling was only part of the WCML modernisation. Much more needed to be done. Tracks needed to be relaid, tunnels modified, bridges altered. This work, too, was behind schedule and over budget. Plans changed constantly. At one point, Railtrack paid £10 million to a contractor to develop a new kind of transformer, only to abandon it later and go backto the original type. With every passing day, contractors were finding out how much more seriously the line had deteriorated than Railtrack and the consultants had understood.
At the same time, because Railtrack had shed so much of its engineering and railway operations expertise, it had little ability to judge whether the prices its myriad contractors were charging were fair. ‘It is easy to understand why certain elements within the industry took advantage of that situation,’ said one rail industry figure. ‘It would have been a great temptation.’
In one iteration of a recurring pattern, Railtrack turned to a US company for project management expertise, but managed to botch that, too. Railtrack hired Brown & Root, a subsidiary of the US engineering group Halliburton, then run by Dick Cheney. Whether Brown & Root, which had grown fat on Pentagon contracts from the Vietnam war and beyond, could have managed the job is unknown, but Railtrack never allowed it to try.
‘Railtrack was half in bed with them and half not,’ said an executive who saw the process from the inside. ‘Brown & Root had a lot of experience in oil and gas contracts. Railtrack said, “Fine, show us how,” but they got cold feet and never signed up.’
Meanwhile, Corbett and his team were becoming horribly aware of the other set of baroque errors that had been made by their predecessors: the Virgin contract, presented to the new Railtrack boss on his accession as a fait accompli.
Despite Virgin Trains’ initial reputation for lateness, there was a general fondness for the Railtrack-Virgin plan, not just in Railtrack, but among politicians, the media and the public. Tilting trains going at 140 mph; London to Glasgow in time for lunch; it sounded good. It sounded like progress. But there was a severe problem.
Again, the lay observer would think it was obvious: other trains needed to use the same line.
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