Battat was the former director of a CIA field office in New York City. Battat had recently returned to Manhattan after helping OpCenter stop a terrorist from sabotaging oil supplies in Azerbaijan. Thirty-four-year old Aideen Marley was still in Washington. The former foreign service officer had worked with Maria Corneja, averting a Spanish civil war two years before. Now she was working as a political consultant for both OpCenter and the State Department. The other operatives were living in different parts of the world. Twenty-eight-year old Falah Shibli was still working as a police officer in Kiryat Shmona in northern Israel. A veteran of seven years in the Sayeret Ha’Druzim-Israel’s elite Druze Reconnaissance unit-the Lebanon-born Israeli had assisted OpCenter in their Bekaa Valley operation. Forty-nine-year old Harold Moore divided his time between London and Tokyo. Moore was a former G-man who had been recruited by McCaskey to help OpCenter with its first crisis, finding and defusing a terrorist bomb on board the space shuttle Atlantis. Feeling underappreciated, Moore had elected to take early retirement. He was now working as a consultant to both Scotland Yard’s Specialist Operations Antiterrorist Branch and the Intelligence and Analysis Bureau of Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Twenty-nine-year old Zack Bemler was based in New York. Bemler was a magna cum laude Ph.D. graduate in international security from Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. The young man had been courted by the CIA and the FBI but ended up working for World Financial Consultants, an international investment group. After rogue generals were prevented from overthrowing the legitimate government in Russia, then-political liaison Martha McCall contacted Bemler. Bemler had dated Martha’s kid sister Christine at Princeton. Together, Martha and Bemler worked to clean out the generals’ bank accounts in Switzerland and the Cayman Islands. The twenty-five million dollars was used to fund joint intelligence ventures between Paul Hood and Sergei Orlov’s Russian OpCenter. Rodgers knew how to contact the personnel he wanted. He had the money to hire them. But numerous questions remained. Should he mix veterans with new personnel, combine new ideas with the old? Would these people consider working for OpCenter full-time, if at all? If so, where would they be based? Would it be practical to run an entirely freelance operation? Then there were logistic issues. They could not travel as a unit in a military transport, since those aircraft were routinely watched by satellite and on the ground. Upon arriving at an air base, they might be spotted and followed. But it was also unwise to put them on a single commercial flight. If one were identified, they might all be exposed. Rodgers also had to figure out how to run the unit. Covert operatives were more like artists than soldiers. They were creative individuals. They did not enjoy working in groups or doing things by the book. The general wanted input from Herbert. He also wanted to talk to the spy chief about the way the team had come about. After the meeting with Hood, Mike Rodgers could think of nothing but the new team. It did not occur to him until hours later that it probably upset Herbert to be excluded from this process. As a former spy himself, Herbert had a great poker face. He might not have let his displeasure show to Rodgers. Herbert was also a team player. He would not want to dull Rodgers’s enthusiasm. Unfortunately, Herbert had been busy for most of the day. Rodgers busied himself with the personnel files and other OpCenter business. That included daily military reports from around the world. Rodgers liked to keep track of former allies as well as potential enemies. A crisis management officer never knew when he would have to call on one group for assistance or fight the other. The night team came on at six P.M. That left Rodgers