Milosevic by Adam LeBor

responsibility for their disbursement encouraged local financial kingpins to build their own mini-economic empires. The policy of economic decentralisation encouraged the growth of patronage and nepotism. Party bosses would sanction the building of a factory for political reasons, to bring jobs and boost a local economy, even if it might be totally unviable economically. The system soon became mired in endemic corruption, and the situation was not helped by Yugoslavia’s six republic governments each arguing for a larger slice of the federal economic cake. The capitalist reality was much clearer: western loans and financial aid kept Yugoslavs in fridges.
    Milosevic was known as a loyal official of the Communist system that had created this economic mess. Unlike Crnobrnja, who had worked with Milosevic at Tehnogas, Vucic and other managers at Beogradska Banka were initially frightened of Milosevic. They believed he would immediately sack them, according to William Montgomery, a US ambassador to Belgrade who was the American embassy’s banking specialist in the late 1970s. He knew both Borka Vucic and Milosevic well. ‘Borka Vucic was our primary contact. I liked her, she and the rest of the bank’s management were trying to make the bank more modern. We had good relations with her.’ 7
    The fears of Vucic and her colleagues were groundless. Not only Yugoslav bankers such as Aca Singer, but also westerners observed how deftly Milosevic played the system to boost both Beogradska Banka and his own standing. Bolstered by his support in the Communist Party, he boldly dragged Beobank into the harsh world of genuine capitalist economic competition. The old comrades muttered, but with Ivan Stambolic behind him, Milosevic seemed impregnable. ‘He tooka very active interest. He established relations that enabled Beogradska Banka to make great progress in terms of being a more western bank, and to compete with other banks. His position in the Communist Party gave him freedom of movement to allow Beobank to be more western orientated than other banks,’ said Montgomery.
    Borka Vucic and Milosevic soon became close. Vucic’s son had died at the age of twenty-six, and she poured her maternal instincts into looking after Milosevic. ‘There was a strong emotional bond. Milosevic became her substitute son, and he accepted her, although the tie was more on her side than his. He loved her dearly, although not as a mother, though by age she could easily have been his mother,’ said Crnobrnja. Milosevic preferred strong-minded women, although Mira would never have countenanced too strong an emotional attachment with another woman. Milosevic, like many Balkan men, knew when it was easiest to submit to female authority.
    Together with Mihailo Crnobrnja and Borka Vucic, Milosevic travelled in 1981 to Washington, D.C. for an IMF meeting. The two men were chatting in Milosevic’s room when Borka Vucic walked in and noticed that Milosevic’s trousers were crumpled. Vucic immediately offered to press them. ‘Don’t be silly, there is room service here, call them up and they will iron them,’ he replied. ‘No, no, they don’t know how to iron trousers,’ she proclaimed. Crnobrnja, who watched the exchange with amusement, recalled: ‘She practically forced him to say, OK, OK. With this mother-hen behaviour she wanted to take care of him, from ironing his trousers to who knows what else.’
    Still, for many it all looked too good to be true. Was Milosevic really a Balkan version of Armand Hammer, the American millionaire financier who had helped bail out his friend Lenin when the Soviet economy appeared about to crash? What was he really up to? From the outside it was hard to disentangle the conflicting strands. Serbia’s political heritage of Balkan double-dealing crossed with Communist half-truths makes its politics even more opaque than they seem. ‘Milosevic always had